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Abstract
The purpose of this grounded theory study was to develop an understanding of what board
members experience during a time of organizational crisis. Major corporate and nonprofit
failures of previously successful organizations in recent years have raised questions and led to
speculation about the role of boards of directors through the crises. In this study twenty board
members of nonprofit organizations who had experienced an organizational crisis during their
board service were interviewed. Participants were asked to share their perceptions and explore
how they identified and made meaning of the events and board processes that went on as the
crisis became apparent and progressed. The overall research design was grounded theory guided
by Schatzman’s and Charmaz’ methodological contributions. A dimensional analysis was
employed to create explanatory matrices that focused on theory development. From dimensional
analysis the core dimension, the Tangled Web, and primary dimensions Recognizing,
Responding, and Stepping Up emerged. The model of a Tangled Web depicts the processes that
obstruct a board’s ability to recognize and respond to signs of crisis. Complexity theory,
governance, crisis and turnaround, and group process all contribute to the understanding of the
research question. The electronic version of this dissertation is available through the OhioLink
ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd
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Chapter I: Introduction
The numerous failures of businesses and nonprofit organizations in recent years piqued
my curiosity about the role of the board of directors during periods of organizational distress. My
interest in studying the role of boards of directors facing challenges emerged as I watched the
Enron case unfold. As an accountant and professor teaching Intermediate Accounting—the
course sequence that deals with accounting theory and financial reporting—I was amazed at how
quickly the financial condition of this major corporation descended into bankruptcy. There were
supposed to be rules in place that made it impossible for a huge successful company to collapse
in a matter of months. As a public accountant I was appalled at Arthur Andersen’s complicity in
the matter and the demise of that entire professional services firm, one always considered above
reproach, because of the ethical lapses of a small group of accountants in the Houston office. My
mind kept coming back to the question of where was the board. If individuals were appointed to
boards because of their expertise and leadership talents as I always assumed, why had they not
recognized that there was a problem before the company was on the brink of collapse.
In the years since Enron there have been numerous failures of large corporations despite
U.S. government intervention with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The goal of that legislation
was to prevent a recurrence, yet huge collapses in the banking and financial services sectors
followed a few years later. The problem has not been limited to the U.S. nor has it been limited
to the for-profit world. Nonprofit organizations have also been scrutinized for indications of
misuse of governmental funds and private donations. Recent issues at Pennsylvania State
University and the Susan B. Komen Foundation again brought the boards of those organizations
into the limelight. To those outside it appeared that the boards stood by and watched. It has
been difficult to uncover the debates, the concerns, and the decisions at the board level because

2

as a matter of practice, boards operate behind closed doors. As a result, much of the available
research on board governance has been based on data gathered from outside the organization.
The role of governance and of boards of directors in organizational crisis and failure has been
poorly understood and limited at best. From a distance it sometimes appears that boards make
decisions that are less than rational given the available data, decisions that ultimately harm the
organization the board is charged with protecting.
The goal of this research was to develop some understanding of what members of boards
of directors, generally accomplished, intelligent individuals, experience during times of
organizational crisis. Looking through the eyes of board members who had faced an
organizational crisis has contributed to the development of a theory that provides some
explanation of how a group of individuals chosen for their knowledge and skills missed the
signals of an impending problem. This study asks the question how nonprofit board members
experience an organizational crisis. It fills a gap in the literature by seeking board member
perspectives of what went on in the boardroom prior to and during an organizational crisis. The
insight gained has relevance for those who serve as nonprofit board members and for those who
train or facilitate board activities. Due to limited access to corporate board members a decision
was made to focus the study on the boards of large nonprofit organizations with the assumption
that members would be fairly sophisticated about business practices as well as the needs of the
organization.
Position of the Researcher
The apparent sudden failure of organizations that have a history of success fascinates me.
Having served as a chief financial officer at a small college I am acutely aware of the financial
nature of impending crisis. I began the design of this study trying to determine the financial
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indicators that would suggest crisis, but reflecting on my own board experience I also knew that
“people” rather than financial issues could have a critical impact on an organization. I recalled
voicing a concern to the board chair in a specific situation and then backing down when I was
assured that the problem was manageable. Later when those issues of concern escalated and the
organization faced a full-blown crisis I was bothered by my own willingness to accept the board
chair’s dismissal and wondered why I had not been more insistent that the board address the
questions. Thus I must confess that I have played a role in dysfunctional board behaviors.
While there was some financial impact, it was minimal compared to the threat to the integrity of
the organization. I knew that it was critical to look beyond financial measures to define a crisis.
I have been involved in strategic planning efforts over a significant part of my career. I
coordinated major planning processes for the college where I work and have facilitated strategic
planning processes with a number of nonprofit and small corporate boards as a consultant. As a
member of the executive staff of the college I attended all full board meetings and a majority of
committee meetings for a number of years. I have observed boards make inconsistent decisions,
and sometimes those decisions appeared less than rational to me. I have been taken aback by the
response of some board members when anyone questioned assumptions. In every case, the
individual members of these boards have been competent people who cared, often passionately,
about the organization, yet the board still took actions that were harmful.
Because of the nature of my role as an outsider/nonmember I never had the opportunity
to ask why. I did engage in informal conversations with some of my board colleagues after the
crisis in our organization, but it was not until I conducted practice interviews as a preliminary
test of this study that I had the chance to actually question board members who faced a crisis
about what they experienced during that period. I was shocked when in all three cases, involving
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different kinds of nonprofit organizations from very different regions and communities, the
interviewees used the exact same phrase, “I knew better,” that I sensed that in board
deliberations more was going on than meets the eye.
To situate the study I begin with discussion of the legal and theoretical bases for
governance for an understanding of board roles in crisis situations.
Legal Basis of Governance
Although few practices are more ancient than communities delegating authority to small
groups of elders, deacons, proprietors, selectmen, counselors, directors, or trustees, the
formal responsibilities and informal expectations defining who they are, what they do,
and how they do it have varied from time to time and from place to place. (Hall, 2003,
p. 3)
Trustee-like relationships were defined in Roman law and passed down to the U.S. and
other common law countries through British custom and practice (D. H. Smith, 1995). Colonial
organizations like the Massachusetts Bay Company and Harvard, as well as churches and
religious congregations established boards to oversee the organizations and ensure they met the
specific purpose for which they were established (Hall, 2003; D. H. Smith, 1995). Even in
colonial times, however, controversy over governing boards and legal control of organizations
was not uncommon (Hall, 2003).
Legally whether dealing in the profit or nonprofit world, the board of directors or trustees
is responsible for everything related to the organization and how it operates. In the corporate
for-profit environment, directors represent the interests of shareholders. In nonprofit
organizations directors or trustees represent the interests of community, stakeholders, donors,
and society. In both cases the board has the ultimate authority in all that pertains to the
organization. Boards hire and delegate responsibility for running the organization to an
executive. Boards authorize policy; select, determine compensation, and remove the executive;
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and make major financial decisions (R. L. Miller & Jentz, 2011). Board members serve as
fiduciaries, and as such are bound by the legal duties of loyalty, care, and obedience.
The duty of loyalty obligates board members to act in the best interest of the organization
(Seay, 2004). The duty of care requires due diligence of the board when acting on behalf of the
organization (Hopkins, 2009; R. L. Miller & Jentz, 2011). If the duties of loyalty and care are
met, the business judgment rule protects directors/trustees and officers from liability for
decisions made in good faith (Jennings, 2004; R. L. Miller & Jentz, 2011). As long as directors
take the care necessary to become adequately informed about the subject matter and have a
rational basis for the decision at the time it is made, without the benefit of hindsight, the courts
will not hold them responsible for honest mistakes or bad decisions (Cheeseman, 2001; R. L.
Miller & Jentz, 2011). Given the failures of recent years and the lack of sanctions or
consequences for directors and officers, the business judgment rule seems to provide significant
shelter for board members. It does, however, raise questions about whether board members have
access to adequate and accurate information.
The third legal duty, the duty of obedience, has traditionally been viewed as only
applicable to nonprofit organizations, but there is also support for its relevance to all as the
foundation on which the duties of loyalty and care rest (Atkinson, 2008). The duty of obedience
requires the board ensure that the organization complies with all relevant regulations and laws.
In nonprofit institutions the duty of obedience requires faithfulness to mission as a means of
insuring the public that donated resources are used appropriately (Hopkins, 2009). While the
terminology and language of these legal duties is specific to the U.S. and other common law
countries, comparable requirements serve as a legal basis for governance throughout the world.
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Governance Theory and the Role of the Board
In the traditional view of organizational governance a board of directors/trustees oversees
the management to ensure that the managers are operating in the best interest of the owners or
community. This arrangement is based on agency theory, the most commonly cited theoretical
basis for governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; R. L. Miller & Jentz,
2011; Nordberg, 2008). The theory charges the board with hiring a chief executive, delegating
the responsibility for running the organization to that individual, holding him/her accountable for
the performance of the organization, and if necessary, firing the chief executive when
expectations are not met. In contrast to agency theory, which assumes agents will act in their
own self-interest, stewardship theory is based on executive as steward of the organization (Davis,
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Nordberg, 2008). This theory
suggests that the executive is a steward who is motivated to maximize organizational
performance thereby making his/her goals the same as those of the principals.
Other often cited theoretical bases for governance particularly in nonprofit organizations
include resource dependency and institutional theories. Resource dependency suggests that
individuals are appointed to boards because they can offer access to some resource the
organization requires—boundary spanning activities—but might not otherwise be able to secure
(W. A. Brown & Guo, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; J. L. Miller, 2003; Nordberg, 2008; Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). Institutional theory addresses the political and ceremonial aspects that define
and influence organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Guo, 2007) and suggests that
organizations attempt to incorporate the same procedures and policies as other respected
organizations (Fama & Jensen, 1983; J. L. Miller, 2003). The focus on best practices driving the
policies and procedures under which boards operate derives from this theoretical perspective.
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There are other proposed theoretical bases for institutional governance addressed in the review of
the literature, but none adequately define all board roles or aspects of governance. Given the
dominance of agency theory in governance research and its emphasis on the monitoring activities
of a board, the string of failures over the last decade raises serious questions about the impact of
research results on practice. Calls for accountability are numerous, but there seems to be
something inherent in the system that makes monitoring difficult or impossible.
Governance in Troubled Organizations
Corporate governance research leans heavily on quantitative, positivist approaches and
tends to focus on the usual suspects of board independence and chief executive duality when
looking at the role of governance in organizational failure. There are studies that attempt to link
those factors to profitability and other financial measures of organizational effectiveness, but
they lack consistency, demonstrating conflicting or contradictory results (Daily, Dalton, &
Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). These results may be a
complication of the need to rely on publically accessible information because boards of directors
tend to operate behind closed doors. Nonprofit governance becomes even more challenging
absent the profit motive as a measure of effectiveness. Financial measures are less certain in
nonprofits because of the nature of funding streams, and merely having resources adequate to
exist is often the only measurement of organizational effectiveness available.
There are, however, informative case studies of the failure process in particular
organizations or small groups of organizations. These provide some insight as to what was going
on in the external environment and within the organization through a process of decline. While
failure/crisis has traditionally been viewed as the result of either external or internal factors, the
available cases indicate that a complex combination of factors over a substantial period of time is
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at work. Most of the cases focus on management through the failure process (Burns,
Cacciamani, Clement, & Aquino, 2000; Kam, 2005; Mellahi, Jackson, & Sparks, 2002; Sheppard
& Chowdhury, 2005), but two cases focus on the role of the board (Mellahi, 2005; Mordaunt &
Cornforth, 2004). While these case studies provide considerable depth and analysis of specific
situations, the findings are not necessarily transferable to other organizations and situations
(Stake, 1995).
Another challenge associated with this type of governance inquiry was the lack of
consistent terminology. The terms “decline,” “crisis,” and “failure” are used almost
interchangeably in management research (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Mellahi, 2005; Mordaunt
& Cornforth, 2004; Walshe, Harvey, Hyde, & Pandit, 2004). There is some overlap in the
processes proposed in these models based on specific cases, but they are named differently and
that lack of clarity complicates attempts to apply existing theory to an array of specific situations.
There have been a few investigations that included observation of board members in the normal
course of their interactions (Huse & Zattoni, 2008; Leblanc, 2003; Pick, 2007). This paucity of
information on board operations is largely a result of limited access to board proceedings. Board
activities, for strategic reasons are not designed to be transparent. The few studies that exist do,
however, provide interesting perspectives of board behavior from both directors and observers.
This suggested that there could be merit in an inquiry that approaches board activities during a
period of organizational crisis from the perspective of directors/trustees who were serving on the
boards.
One of the salient findings in the case studies was that there had been signals of decline
in the organization prior to and often for an extended period of time, but either no one was
paying attention or the signals were weak and not taken seriously (Gandossy & Sonnenfeld,
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2005; Lorange & Nelson, 1987). What the board knew and when they knew it may have been
debatable, but at some point there was agreement that a crisis existed.
Crises can arise in multiple ways. A crisis can be the result of a single or complex series
of issues. There can be a specific critical event—Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) use the term
nadir, Walshe et al. (2004) label them triggers—that cannot be ignored. Or the crisis can be
socially constructed when key stakeholders decide there is a crisis that threatens the existence or
legitimacy of the organization (Bovens, Hart, Dekker, & Verheuvel, 1999). Specifics may or
may not be definite but at some point in time there is recognition in the boardroom that some
kind of intervention and/or correction is necessary.
Purpose of Proposed Study
The purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of what board members
experience during a time of organizational crisis. The study explored how board members
identified and made meaning of difficult situations or events and how they determine the
response or actions that best serve the organization. In interviews participants were able to
discuss their perceptions of the board processes that went on as the crisis became apparent and
progressed.
For the purpose of this study, a crisis was defined as a major incident or series of
incidents that has the potential to harm the well-being of organizational stakeholders and
threatens the legitimacy of the institution (adapted from Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). It is
“characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that
decisions must be made swiftly” (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 60). This definition allowed for a
social construct of crisis along with the more traditional view of crisis as a singular event
external or internal to the organization.
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Many organizations experience crises that are not necessarily of a catastrophic level.
With the definition adopted a crisis could be a series of minor incidents and issues that had the
potential to compromise an organization in some way but not necessarily lead to its permanent
demise. A crisis, however, can lead to disillusionment and shatter assumptions and values,
leaving a permanent impact on individuals and on the organization (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009).
How the board and management respond does have a significant impact on the ability of the
organization to survive.
Research Question
How do board members experience an organizational crisis? From a distance it sometimes
appears that boards make decisions that are less than rational given the available data, decisions
that ultimately harm the organization the board is charged with protecting. In this study, board
members, who have faced an organizational crisis, were asked to share their experiences. Their
perceptions contributed to the development of an explanatory model that provides some
explanation for how a group of individuals chosen for their knowledge and skills miss the signals
of an impending problem.
Methodology for the Proposed Study
There is no existing governance theory that can provide an adequate explanation for
board roles and activities particularly in a time of organizational crisis. I approached this study
believing that there were aspects and social processes involved that were not fully understood.
From the perspective of participants, at times interactions in the boardroom influenced board
actions in ways that did not appear anywhere in the formal bylaws and rules. Even when results
seem predictable to those observing from outside, participants in the process often claim to have
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been shocked or caught off guard. Uncovering the unspoken and invisible things that impact
board proceedings provided a way to explore the underlying processes.
The methodological approach of grounded theory provided a research tool to help
uncover board members’ perspectives of the social processes that unfold in the boardroom
(Blumer, 1969; Charmaz, 2006; Star, 2007). “A finished grounded theory explains the studied
process in new theoretical terms, explicates the properties of the theoretical categories, and often
demonstrates the causes and conditions under which the process emerges and varies and
delineates its consequences” (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 7-8). Gathering and analyzing multiple
perspectives from individuals serving on boards of different types of nonprofit organizations
provided additional insights and explanations regarding the role of boards of directors in
organizational governance not yet fully addressed in existing governance theory.
In this study, I have chosen to focus on nonprofit boards. Theoretically the role of the
board of directors/trustees in the governance of an organization is the same for both profit
making and nonprofit organizations, but there are some notable differences. Board members in
publically traded corporations are likely to be compensated while nonprofit board members are
typically volunteers. These volunteers often have some special commitment to the organization
and view sharing their expertise through board service as a way to give back. There can be
considerable prestige to serving large organizations like hospitals, health systems, colleges,
universities and large charitable organizations where board activities and decisions are much the
same as typical for a comparably sized profit-making corporation. This is not necessarily the
case for smaller local agency boards where stakeholder groups are often represented. Because of
the lack of access to corporate board members, this study will focus on the large nonprofit
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organizations where directors/trustees bring the same kind of experience and skill levels more
typical of a for-profit corporation.
Overview of the Dissertation
This introduction provides an overview of the dissertation as the first of five chapters.
Chapter II is framed by the sensitizing concepts brought to the study and begins with a
review of current governance models and best practices in nonprofit organizations. The
somewhat limited collection of studies that address the role of boards of directors/trustees in
organizational crisis and failure are explored in some detail. While opinions as to what goes
wrong in the boardroom during an organizational crisis abound, several general process models
that address organizational failure and organizational crisis but not the role of governance in the
process are defined and discussed. The chapter concludes by establishing the relevance of the
proposed study in relation to existing theoretical models that are currently used to explain board
actions.
Chapter III discusses issues of methodological fit for this inquiry. The method of the
proposed study, methodological fit between the subject of inquiry and the chosen method, and
ethical considerations are addressed.
Chapter VI reports the results of the dimensional analysis, detailing the core and primary
dimension details.
Chapter V discusses the theoretical model and offers conclusions for the question of how
board members experience organizational crisis. Limitations of the study, implications for
leadership and practice and suggested topics for additional research are detailed.
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Chapter II: Review of the Literature
“In many organizations, the board is viewed in a way similar to an appendix, a part of the
body without apparent purpose but capable of serious inconvenience” (Robinson, 2001, p. 12).
Institutional governance and boards of directors have come under considerable scrutiny
in recent years with failures that were hard to imagine. For example, major organizations like
Enron and WorldCom collapsed in what appeared to be short periods of time. In the postmortem
analysis carried out in the popular press as well as around the water cooler the question that
always surfaces is where was the board. From outside it looks like the organizations were to the
point of meltdown before the board, if at all, intervened. Assuming that directors/trustees are
appointed or elected to boards because of their leadership abilities, how do these groups of
knowledgeable and talented individuals, not see the possibility of ultimate failure coming?
In this chapter I begin my examination of organizational governance and boards of
directors by reviewing the extant literature in four somewhat distinct yet slightly overlapping
areas. First I review the legal, theoretical and ethical bases of governance for guidance on the
appropriate role of boards of directors/trustees in the governance of organizations. Next I focus
on nonprofit governance models. I then consider the literature available on the boards of
organizations that experienced crisis. In the fourth and final topic area I focus on failure and
turnaround in organizations.
Legal, Theoretical, and Ethical Bases of Governance
A review of the legal, theoretical, and ethical bases for organizational governance is a
logical place to begin. The legal duties and ethical responsibilities of governing boards to the
organizations they serve are first discussed. A number of governance theories will also be
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presented, all with some merit but none that alone adequately address the role of governing
boards in organizational crisis. Finally an ethical basis for governance is considered.
Legal duties. Nonprofit boards have three fundamental legal duties, two of which are
shared with for-profit or corporate boards. The first of these duties is the duty of care. A
director or trustee must use the care and due diligence of an ordinarily prudent person when
acting on behalf of the organization (Hopkins, 2009; R. L. Miller & Jentz, 2011). The care
expected of a prudent board member includes preparing for and attending meetings, exercising
informed and independent judgment, requesting additional information when necessary for the
decision under discussion, and making the same rational decision a prudent person would make
given the same circumstances (Jennings, 2004; Robinson, 2001; Seay, 2004).
The duty of loyalty applies to both for-profit and not-for-profit boards as well. A board
member has an obligation to always act in the best interest of the organization, not for him or
herself, when making decisions (Seay, 2004). The duty of loyalty is the basis for the conflict of
interest policies most board have that specify a board member not participate in decisions where
there is a potential for personal gain for the member, his/her family, friends, or business
associates, or use knowledge gained through board service for personal gain (Robinson, 2001).
Even when there has been no board decision, using confidential information gained by serving as
a trustee for personal opportunity or gain will also violate the duty of loyalty (Seay, 2004). A
trustee must subordinate his/her personal interest to that of the organization when serving on a
board.
The third legal duty, obedience, is generally viewed as only applicable in nonprofits
though there is reason to include as appropriate in profit making organizations as a foundational
element of fiduciary duty (Atkinson, 2008). A nonprofit organization is granted tax exempt
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status because its mission and purpose are charitable and beneficial to the community. The
board then has a duty to ensure that the organization obeys or is faithful to that mission and
complies with the laws and regulations necessary for maintenance of tax exempt status
(Robinson, 2001). The board maintains the trustworthiness of the organization through the duty
of obedience. The board provides assurance to benefactors that donated resources will be used
for the stated purpose and serves as the conscience of the organization (Seay, 2004).
Theoretical basis of governance. The most commonly cited theoretical basis for
governance is agency theory (W. A. Brown & Guo, 2010; Du Bois et al., 2009; Fama & Jensen,
1983; J. L. Miller, 2003; Olsen, 2000). Agency theory is based on the principal–agent
relationship, and in terms of governance is concerned with issues arising from the difference in
goals and attitudes toward risk between the board as principal and the executive/management as
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is the basis for board monitoring activities designed to ensure that
management decisions are in the best interest of shareholders in the corporate world, and
community, donors, and other stakeholder groups in nonprofit organizations (J. L. Miller, 2002).
It is the board who hires, holds accountable, and if necessary, fires the chief executive.
Agency theory has been criticized for having too narrow a focus. Assuming that the sole
function of the board is to ensure that the chief executive and management do not sacrifice the
best interest of shareholders or community for personal gain does not allow for other traditional
board roles like setting the direction and strategy for the organization, insuring sustainability, and
in the case of many nonprofits a significant responsibility for organizational fund raising
activities. Many believe that it is possible for executives to put the best interest of the
organization ahead of their own as suggested by alternative theories.
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Resource dependency theory is also an often cited basis for governance (W. A. Brown &
Guo, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; J. L. Miller, 2003; Nordberg, 2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
Individuals who can offer access to some resource the organization requires but might not
otherwise be able to secure make desirable board members. The theory highlights the boundary
spanning activities of the board and the board’s role in uniting the organization and environment
(J. L. Miller, 2003). It is particularly relevant in nonprofit organizations. Fund raising, contacts
and introductions to power sources in government and industry, and even just lending a
prominent name are expectations that most organizations have for those appointed to the board.
A third theory, institutional, is based on the politics and ceremony that define and
influence organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Guo, 2007) and pressure them to follow the
norms of the sector (Fama & Jensen, 1983; J. L. Miller, 2003). The current focus on best
practices driving the policies and procedures under which boards operate is accepted as the rule
even though empirical evidence to validate that these practices increase effectiveness is often
lacking. In a nonprofit organization granted favorable tax status, however, there are sanctions
for failing to adhere to best practices that could result in loss of status so organizations have little
choice but to mimic other successful institutions (J. L. Miller, 2003).
A democratic view of governance provides another theoretical perspective suggesting
that board members are representatives of the interests of specific stakeholder groups that they
have been chosen or elected to represent (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). In a nonprofit
organization that provides charitable services, at least in western society, the assumption of a
moral obligation to provide services that meet community needs is fundamental to the
organization’s success (Guo, 2007). Unlike corporate boards in the for-profit sector where
members are virtually all professionals who bring specific business or legal expertise, nonprofit
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boards are likely to include representatives from community and other stakeholder groups in
addition to those with business backgrounds.
In contrast to agency theory that assumes agents will act in their own self interest,
stewardship theory views the executive as a steward of the organization (Davis et al., 1997; Muth
& Donaldson, 1998; Nordberg, 2008). A psychological perspective that recognizes the role of
self-esteem and fulfillment, stewardship theory suggests that a steward is motivated to maximize
organizational performance thereby making the executive’s goals the same as those of the
principal. The theory has been used as a basis for a governance structure that gives the CEO
maximum authority as chair of the board of directors (Davis et al., 1997), but has been criticized
as making it easier for that individual to subordinate the organization for personal gain.
Ethical principles of governance. In the for-profit environment, the organizational
purpose is clear—generating income for shareholders. There is some ethical pressure for boards
to encourage good corporate citizenship but profitability at all cost seemed to be the driving
force in the wave of corporate failures in recent years. Governments have attempted to force
business to comply with more rigorous governance and reporting practices legislation like
Sarbanes-Oxley in the US, but the failures continued. As a result directors are feeling the public
pressure for more ethical business models and social responsibility (Nordberg, 2008). The legal
duties of loyalty, care, and obedience may no longer be enough.
Nonprofit organizations are not immune from scandal. In nonprofit organizations,
trustees are faced with the balance between mission and financial constraints. While there is no
profit motive, ignoring the bottom line can compromise the sustainability of an organization.
Financing growth often requires a board of directors to compromise immediate needs in order to
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prepare for the future making financial decisions into moral decisions as well (May, 2004).
Boards of directors or trustees in nonprofit organizations also feel this pressure.
D. H. Smith (1995) defines the moral core of trusteeship in nonprofit organizations by
suggesting three principles to guide that work: “the fiduciary principle, the common good
principle, and the obligation to act as a community of interpretation” (p. 5). The fiduciary
principle covers the traditional legal duties of a board with the recognition of duty to three
parties. There is an entrustor who creates the entity for a specific purpose, transfers
responsibility to a trustee to act as an agent of the entrustor for the purpose of providing some
benefit for a third party beneficiary (D. H. Smith, 1995). In governance, then, the trustee must
be loyal to the purpose for which the organization exists, similar to the legal duty of obedience.
The common good principle suggests that “trustee action is rightly constrained by general
social morality” (D. H. Smith, 1995). Nonprofit organizations often have multiple and
sometimes conflicting purposes and trustees must ensure resolution is fair, honest and open to
public review (D. H. Smith, 1995). They must govern in a manner that maintains a morally
worthy organization acting in a morally worthy manner to achieve its moral purpose always for
the common good (D. H. Smith, 1995). Trustees also serve as a community of interpretation,
interpreting the organization’s history and planning its future in a way that contributes to the
overall good of society (D. H. Smith, 1995). Pressure for a more ethics-based approach to
governance is likely to continue.
None of the governance theories or ethical principles alone provide an adequate
explanation of the current conditions and consequences of organizational governance. Nor do
they address all the roles of a board of directors. When combined these theories of governance
and ethical principles can be pieced together to offer explanations but not in any exact or
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structured way. In the world of nonprofits where board members are volunteers with varying
levels of commitment, the work is at best part-time and occasional (Pointer & Orlikoff, 2002)
and the commitment of board members may not be strong (Ostrower & Stone, 2006). The
literature includes prescriptive advice about what boards should and should not do, but there is
no single best theory that defines all of a board’s responsibilities (Inglis & Alexander, 1999; J. L.
Miller, 2003; Nordberg, 2008; Ostrower & Stone, 2006; Speckbacher, 2008).
Nonprofit Governance
In the corporate environment the measurement of success for shareholders is relatively
straightforward with earnings easily determined and evaluated. The market determines the
success of the organization. Measuring success in the nonprofit world, however, is not so
obvious since the objective financial measure of profitability does not apply. As long as a
nonprofit organization has adequate resources to continue to exist, it will. There is no clear way
to measure whether the resources are used as effectively as possible. This could be a valid
explanation for one of the criticisms in the nonprofit governance literature: it is replete with
prescriptive advice, detailing practices and procedures that define good governance but does not
address effectiveness or define success (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999; Inglis & Alexander, 1999;
J. L. Miller, 2003).
Servant leadership. Greenleaf (1977) proposes a very different and interesting
perspective of governance based on servant leadership. He suggests that in most organizations
the board exists to meet a legal requirement and to give the organization legitimacy and this
nominal trustee with limited obligation idea is “a respectable, comfortable, time-honored
arrangement. Please do not rock the boat” (Greenleaf, 1977). Boards may become more
involved in a crisis, but for the most part trustees or board members, particularly in nonprofit
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organizations, seem to serve in an honorary role. From Greenleaf’s perspective, that creates a
problem because legally the board has responsibility for everything that pertains to the
organization. The board can delegate responsibilities with the corresponding power necessary to
operate the organization to the chief executive but cannot give it away entirely and irretrievably
and still fulfill the role of trusteeship (Greenleaf, 1977).
Building trust is the cornerstone of trustee as servant, and that requires boards to actually
set the organization’s goals rather than approve those that management proposes, and then
objectively review performance using data provided by sources independent of management
(Greenleaf, 1977). If the board is going to determine the goals, servant leadership requires a
board to learn what owners/community actually want. That means directors or trustees must
know more about the subject matter than the community (Carver, 2002), something that
Greenleaf referred to as trustee judgment (Greenleaf, 1977). When trustees are viewed as
servants, trust should build and organizations should become more effective at meeting the needs
of the communities they serve.
Policy governance®. John Carver’s Policy Governance® model is one of the more
widely accepted formats for how boards should govern. Based on the concepts of servant
leadership, Carver’s premise is that the board speaks for the ownership as a group. Individual
board members have no authority, and the board only has authority when it speaks as one. The
board has responsibility for everything in the organization but delegates most of it to the CEO.
In turn the board holds the CEO responsible for operating the organization so that board efforts
are spent on governing (Carver, 1997). In order to focus on governing rather than following the
lead and agenda of staff, the board assumes the central role of policymaking, using policy to
define the position of the board on intentions and activities of the organization. Policies need to
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address: “(1) ends to be achieved, (2) means to those ends, (3) the board-staff relationship, and
(4) the process of governance itself” (Carver, 1997). Carver (1997) goes on to detail Policy
Governance® specifics.
Policy governance differentiates ends policies from means policies. Ends policies start
with a view from outside the organization and specify results and outcomes rather than the
traditional terminology of goals and strategies. Because goals and strategies have both ends and
means components, the board focus is on defining the ends as expected results and outcomes.
The board delegates determination of the means to accomplish the specified results to the
executive. Brief, results-focused mission statements characterize Policy Governance®, and it is
up to the board to determine the specific constraints limiting how the mission should be
accomplished through policy. Policies for means, for board-staff relationships, and for the
governance process are the tools that allow a board to balance tendencies toward intrusion and
“rubber-stamping” by determining the level where a majority of the board is comfortable with
allowing the CEO to make the rest of the decisions. An executive evaluation system based on
achieving the specified ends within the parameters of policy provides the mechanism for CEO
accountability in Policy Governance® (Carver, 1997).
Governance as leadership. Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005) define three modes of
governance that boards address if governance is leadership. Type I, the fiduciary mode
encompasses the traditional board activities necessary to meet the legal duties of loyalty, care
and obedience. Type II, the strategic mode addresses strategy, another traditional board activity.
In the strategic mode, the board along with management addresses priorities, strategies, and the
allocation of resources necessary for support. Type III, the generative mode has not traditionally
been part of board governance activities. Effective leadership involves determining to what an
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organization should pay attention. If a board wishes to lead it cannot leave the decisions about
how problems are defined strictly to management. A board in the generative mode participates
with executives in framing or making sense of ambiguous situations (Chait et al., 2005).
Governance as leadership is collaborative and allows executives to use trustees as
sounding boards resulting in an agenda that consists of more ambiguity than reports and motions.
“Instead of winning the board’s confidence by masking all ambiguities, an executive can earn
trust by exposing the ambiguities and then grappling together to make sense of the situation”
(Chait et al., 2005, p. 97). Since trustees are somewhat removed from the operations of the
organization yet still understand its culture and goals, they provide a different perspective and
can help to bring the big picture into focus. It adds debate to the mix, something that boards
preferring congeniality and “dysfunctional politeness” (Chait et al., 2005) might find
uncomfortable at first. Most of all generative mode governance leads to a more efficient
exchange of knowledge, more meaningful work for board and executive, and contributes to
organizational effectiveness (Chait et al., 2005).
Boards of Directors/Trustees in Organizations in Crisis
Because of the subject matter and the notorious lack of transparency in governing boards,
it was not a total surprise that when researching governance in troubled situations, the selected
studies relied heavily on archival data. The sources of archived information included financial
statements, annual reports, press and other published information, subscription databases, and
governmental reports and databases.
“The field of corporate governance is at a crossroads. Our knowledge of what we know
about the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms is rivaled by what we do not know”
(Daily et al., 2003, p. 371). The question of governance in an organization in crisis has received
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a lot of attention in the popular press, but the availability of empirical research in the field is
limited and tends to focus on agency theory and the potential conflict of interest between
management and shareholders in stable or growing firms. Much of governance reform, in the
US specifically Sarbanes-Oxley, has been based on the assumption that independent boards that
separate the CEO and board chair roles are more effective and yield better financial results. The
research, however, is inconsistent and does not always support that assumption (Dailey et al.,
2003). Sarbanes-Oxley requirements are increasingly being incorporated into nonprofit
governance policies.
There has been considerable interest and much written about governance in recent years
because of the number of significant corporate failures. In the world of nonprofits where board
members may not have the same kind of business experience as corporate board members,
individuals who agree to serve generally do so because of a strong commitment to the mission
and the organization. These are hardly individuals who would want to see anything interfere
with the organization’s success; yet board members in a number of recent cases did just that.
Agency theory and information asymmetry research suggest why this sometimes happens.
Agency theory focused research. The majority of studies that looked at boards of
organizations that fail or experience major crises support agency theory and its view that the role
of the board is to protect shareholders and/or stakeholders by keeping management in check. In
for-profit organizations agency theory suggests that is best accomplished with an independent
board and a structure that separates the role of CEO and chairman. Nonprofit organizations
typically do not combine the roles of CEO and chairman but in many nonprofit organizations the
CEO directs the chairman. A CEO who is responsible for the overall strategic management of a
firm as board chair is also in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of that strategy, an apparent
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conflict of interest (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). Board composition and structure contribute to
negative financial results (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Elloumi & Gueyié, 2001). These studies used
pairs of firms, one with financial troubles and a similar firm in a sound financial position, and
compared their governance characteristics. While neither concluded that independence and
structure led to financial success both found that inappropriate board composition and structure
was more likely in distressed firms than in comparable firms that were not (Daily & Dalton,
1994; Elloumi & Gueyié, 2001). In another study based on negative financial consequences of
governance, Kosnik (1987) compared a group of companies that paid greenmail, a strategy
where a firm pays an inflated price for its own stock in order to stop raiders known to unseat
management from acquiring controlling interest, with a comparable group of firms that did not.
This study found that independent boards and boards with a high percentage of directors with
executive experience or with contractual interests tied in with the firm resisted the practice
(Kosnik, 1987).
While there is strong support for the value of board independence and structure for
successful governance, there are also studies that do not support that conclusion. Westphal
(1998) suggested that changes in board structure that increase board independence from
management are associated with higher levels of CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior
toward board members. This kind of behavior can offset the effect of independence on strategy
and CEO compensation policy. Westphal (1998) concluded that independent boards rather than
having a positive effect on shareholder wealth may actually have the reverse impact when CEOs
use interpersonal influence to get board approval.
Boards with higher percentages of independent directors and that separate the CEO and
board chair positions were no more likely to reveal negative information to shareholders and
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analysts (Abrahamson & Park, 1994). They committed no fewer illegal acts (Kesner, Victor, &
Lamont, 1986) than companies with more inside directors and a single CEO/chair. These studies
raise questions about the merit of board structure and composition reforms in terms of preventing
negative consequences. Petra (2006) applied Sarbanes-Oxley reforms to Enron, WorldCom, and
Global Crossings at the time of their crises and found that the companies actually met many of
the reform standards. He concluded that reform based on the usual suspects of board
independence and structure will not necessarily prevent future scandals, and suggests a need to
rethink corporate governance from its most basic assumptions.
Information asymmetry. A recurring issue in governance research is that of information
asymmetry, a term indicating that executives and board members do not have access to the same
information. The board of directors should be aware of the external environment but generally
depends on the executive and management team to provide relevant data and report on internal
institutional issues and progress. While health care and education organizations traditionally
include internal board members, external board members predominate on other nonprofit boards.
That increases the chances that directors may not have all the information necessary for an
informed decision.
Failure to report relevant information to the board, leaving board members unaware that a
problem exists has been identified as a potential problem (Burns et al., 2000; Cannon &
Edmondson, 2005; Fullan, 2006; Gandossy & Sonnenfeld, 2005; Kam, 2005; Mordaunt &
Cornforth, 2004). Negative results may be “sugar-coated” in reporting fostering an aura that all
is well when it is not (Kam, 2005) or dismissed as irrelevant due to executive arrogance
(Maccoby, 2000; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). A questioner may be marginalized for asking
(Gandossy & Sonnenfeld, 2005; Leslie & Fretwell, 1996; L. S. Lewis, 2000; Mellahi, 2005).

26

Despite all of the issues, a board may still have faith in the executive and management and
continue to rely on them to know what is best (Gandossy & Sonnenfeld, 2005; Janis, 1982; L. S.
Lewis, 2000).
Even when provided with accurate but troublesome information, a board may still ignore,
deny, or actually fail to understand the significance (Lorsch, 2009; Mordaunt & Cornforth,
2004). Board members who do not understand the information or its relevance can be
embarrassed to ask. There may be fear that if the question is raised the board will have to deal
with the issue, or directors may stay silent to be polite or to avoid conflict (Cannon &
Edmondson, 2005; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). Groupthink has also been identified as a
potential issue in two case studies (Hensley & Griffin, 1986; Rabinowitz, 1986), and while the
concept is plausible and intuitively attractive, the lack of access to board deliberation makes that
classification speculative. All of these situations can lead to disastrous consequences if the
organization remains committed to an inappropriate course of action, enhancing the rate of
decline (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004) and leading to the ultimate failure of the organization.
Board role in organizational crisis. It is reasonable to argue that during failure boards
of directors ought to be more vigilant and increase their contribution to the management of the
firm (Mellahi, 2005). Directors may actually play their most significant role during a crisis
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), increasing monitoring and control activities (Huse & Zattoni, 2008).
Board response can be an important factor in whether the organization is able to recover (Harker
& Sharma, 2000; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mellahi, 2005;Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Mordaunt
& Cornforth, 2004). Directors or trustees are the stewards and have legal responsibility for the
health of the organization (Carver, 1997; Chait et al., 2005; Greenleaf, 1977; Lorsch, 2009).
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Their responsibility cannot be minimized when an organization finds itself in trouble. The last
decade of business failures suggest that board vigilance is critical.
In looking at the role of the board in the failure and turnaround of organizations, Lorsch
and MacIver (1989) suggests that a board’s ability to handle a crisis depends not only on whether
it is internal or external in nature but also whether it evolved over a period of time or happens
suddenly. A quickly developing crisis, like a major lawsuit that threatens the organization’s
existence (external) or the death or illness of the CEO (internal) without an adequate succession
plan, is easily identified and a board is likely to be quick to act. Conversely, slow declines
within or outside the organization are often only clear in hindsight and the need for action is
debatable (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).
Boards cannot shy away from their power to govern but that can be challenging for part
time outsiders. In times of crisis, members of successful boards find their time commitment
increased dramatically (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004) and some board
members are less willing to invest time and effort providing advice when the crisis is severe
(Minichilli & Hansen, 2007). They need to know not only what questions to ask but how to
assess the answers provided by management (Lorsch, 2009). They need to be prepared to deal
with conflict, something that makes many directors uncomfortable, and have the emotional
resilience to remain involved in difficult deliberations (Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004).
Successful boards have identified the need for leadership. Someone or some group needs
to sort out what has happened and mobilize support for change (Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004).
If the management is implicated, directors may have to take a “hands-on” approach and
temporarily get involved in the management of the organization (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989;
Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004) . There may be a need for a “safe place” for board members to
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discuss the crisis, either in an executive session for independent directors only (Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989) or away from board meetings and the executive and staff of the organization
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). Challenges can be overwhelming, and
dealing with crisis situations can take a toll on board members. Turnover following a crisis, even
one that results in a successful turnaround is not uncommon particularly with volunteer boards in
nonprofit organizations (Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004).
Crisis and Turnaround in Organizations
There are challenges in approaching the broad concepts of organizational crisis. It seems
that the terms “decline”, “crisis”, and “failure” are used almost interchangeably in management
research ( Mellahi, 2005; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Walshe et
al., 2004). There are differences when approaching the topic from a nonprofit versus a for-profit
organization. The absence of consistent measurable determinations of success like profit and
return on investment (ROI) make the determination of failure much less clear in the nonprofit
world where just having enough to stay in existence is sufficient (Walshe et al., 2004). The lack
of market discipline allows nonprofits more discretion and removes some of the competitive
pressures associated with trying to satisfy customers and shareholders. Institutional mission is
deemed satisfied solely by the pursuit of sound financial objectives so despite the best of
intentions, mission is often reduced to survival at all costs (Sasso, 2003). As a result identifying
crisis or failure can actually be quite political as the current discussions of failing schools.
Crisis models. It is rare that a single event causes the failure of an organization. It is far
more likely that a history of small failures where outcomes did not meet expectations and the
results were ignored or explained away preceded the decline (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005).
Decline sets in but no one within the organization seems to notice what objective outsiders might
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find obvious. “Long periods of continued success foster structural and strategic inertia, extreme
process orientations, inattention and insularity” (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Leaders deceive
themselves into believing that staying the course will ensure continued success. A rigid
organizational culture that demands conformity, limits independent voices, and leads to too much
consensus can accelerate decline. As a result, a once successful organization is suddenly in
crisis, and no one can understand how it happened (Lorange & Nelson, 1987).
There has been considerable debate over the years as to whether the antecedents to failure
are external (environmental) to or within (behavioral) the organization. The external view
attributes failure to market and economic conditions while an internal view focuses on
managerial errors as responsible for failure (Kam, 2005). Most of the time both internal and
external factors are involved (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Sheppard & Chowdhury, 2005;
Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Failure is often located at that juncture between internal and external
forces. The failure of the organization to deal with environmental realities creates the problem
(Sheppard & Chowdhury, 2005).
Specific cases of failure in both corporate and nonprofit organizations have provided
interesting insights and offer some understanding of the processes that contributed to the
unfortunate situations (Burns et al., 2000; Hensley & Griffin, 1986; Huse & Zattoni, 2008; Kam,
2005; L. S. Lewis, 2000; Mellahi, 2005; Mellahi et al., 2002; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004;
Rabinowitz, 1986; Sheppard & Chowdhury, 2005). These cases are compelling and have value
in that they provide some insight into specific situations but are also limited in terms of
generalizing the findings to other organizations (Yin, 2004). There are, however, numerous
common threads in the cases and all offer the value in the opportunity to learn from the mistakes
of others.
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A number of models for crisis, failure, and turnaround have been proposed. The first, a
conceptual framework model, was proposed by Weitzel & Jonsson (1989). This model refines
definitions and perspectives and identifies five stages: blinded, inaction, faulty action, crisis, and
dissolution. It also suggests that the crisis stage is the last chance for an organization to reverse
its fortunes. Other models define stages based on specific case studies using somewhat different
terminology, and while the stages differ, there are still a number of similarities in the models.
Mellahi (2005) detailed stages of organizational failure as conception, warning signals, rebellion,
and collapse to describe what happened at HIH, and identified the management actions and
board reactions in each of those stages. Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) include four phases in
the way that they observed nonprofit boards deal with organizational crisis: recognition and
denial, mobilization, action, and transition. Using the failure of Canadian retailer Eaton,
Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) identify decline, response initiation, transition and outcome to
define the failure/turnaround process. While all address the management actions during the early
stages, Mellahi (2005) and Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) also attempt to account for why and
when the governing board of the organization starts paying attention.
All of the models begin with a period of mistakes or missed signals that go largely
unnoticed. All describe a tendency for the actors to deny the problem and do nothing until
something or someone forces recognition of a problem. The critical moment for successful
turnaround is when the potential for disaster is recognized and the management and board
respond effectively.
Crisis. Given the complexity and size of failures in recent years it would seem that a
single event was not the cause. The four models discussed earlier as well as significant
anecdotal evidence indicate that there is a process of decline. Weak signals are easy to miss and

31

even when noted, tend to not be taken seriously (Lorange & Nelson, 1987). Recognizing that
something has become a crisis happens in a variety of ways. There can be a specific critical
event—Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) use the term nadir, Walshe et al. (2004) talk about
triggers—that cannot be ignored. The crisis can also be socially constructed as when key
stakeholders decide there is a crisis that threatens the existence or legitimacy of the organization
(Bovens et al., 1999). Specifics may or may not be definite but at some point in time there is
recognition that some kind of intervention and/or correction is necessary.
Crises, from an organizational perspective, can be defined as “disruptive situations
characterized by urgency of decision, large impacts, and system restructuring” (Shrivastava,
1993). The literature on organizational crises sheds some light on what can happen when some
event creates a situation that cannot be ignored. Adequate understanding requires a
multidisciplinary approach with research contributions from the perspectives of psychological,
social-political, and technological-structural factors (Pearson & Clair, 1998). The psychological
approach focuses on the roles individuals play in crisis; the social political on shared meaning
and socially constructed relationships; and the technological–structural on management and
structure of the organization and environment (Pearson & Clair, 1998).
Roux-Dufort (2009) provides a processual model for how crises build in organizations.
Like the other models, he suggests that most crises are “the result of a long period of incubation
that bluntly occurs through the influence of a precipitating event” (p. 5) but goes on to describe
why the organization does not seem to notice. Similar to other models the stages in the crisis
development process are identified as anomalies and inattention, vulnerabilities and attribution,
disruptions and denial of reality, and crisis and escalation (Roux-Dufort, 2009). “Effective crisis
management involves improvising and interacting by key stakeholders so that individual and
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collective sense making, shared meaning, and roles are reconstructed” (Pearson & Clair, 1998).
Organizational survival often requires that basic assumptions be challenged and subject to
revision in order to move forward (Pearson & Clair, 1998). While seemingly simple, this can be
an incredibly difficult endeavor.
Turnaround. Recognizing a crisis is critical. Recognizing it before it becomes a full
crisis is more crucial. The ability to learn from failures, particularly the small ones, should be
easy but there many factors prevent that from happening. “Pervasive social barriers,
psychological and organizational, discourage reporting failure, just as technical barriers such as
system complexity and causal ambiguity inhibit recognizing failure” (Cannon & Edmondson,
2005, p. 306). It is possible to turn a failing organization around once the real issues are
identified (Harker & Sharma, 2000; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Sheppard & Chowdhury,
2005) but the challenges to doing so are many.
Three major turnaround strategies--retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization—
have been the subject of research, and all three have had some measure of success in at least
some cases (Boyne, 2006; Boyne & Meier, 2009). Retrenchment involves reducing the size and
or scope of an organization and is often the first action taken particularly when the crisis is
financial. Making cuts in less profitable areas of a business can be an effective strategy and
increase efficiency in the corporate world but may not be an option in nonprofit organizations
that are obligated to provide certain services (Boyne, 2006). Repositioning with new mission,
new markets, new products and reorganizing the structure and management responsibilities are
also common first steps when trying to turnaround a failing organization (Boyne, 2006). None
of these strategies are guaranteed and results may actually produce results that are the opposite of
what was intended (Boyne & Meier, 2009).
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“Turnarounds often proceed unevenly, in fits and starts, and are fraught with the danger
of false recoveries that cannot be sustained because fundamentals have not been fixed” (Kanter,
2004, p. 173). Organizations are complex systems and a single intervention can lead to
instability and more rapid disruptive changes that create anxiety and trigger systems breakdown
(Farazmand, 2003). In a crisis that demands immediate action, traditional strategies of retrench,
reposition, and reorganize will have a short-term positive impact that allows the organization to
continue operations. All too often results are temporary and superficial, the organization is back
to business as usual, change agents move on before changes are fully implemented, and despite
the best of intentions the organization continues on a path of just getting by until the next crisis
surfaces (Fullan, 2006).
There is no quick fix or one right way to turn a failing organization around. Effective
turnaround requires accepting “that hard decisions must be made and that the institution will
change in sometimes painful ways” (Leslie & Fretwell, 1996, p. 216). It requires strong
leadership (Harker & Sharma, 2000; Kanter, 2003) and that can mean replacing the chief
executive (Boyne & Meier, 2009; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004) and/or
board chair and board members (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). It
requires organizational learning (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Cannon & Edmondson, 2005) and
the restoration of trust in the organization (W. A. Brown & Pritchard, 2006; Gillespie & Dietz,
2009; Leslie & Fretwell, 1996). And it requires energy, tremendous amounts of energy from all
involved. It is no easy task (W. A. Brown & Pritchard, 2006; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009).
Final Thoughts
Legal duties seem to be clearly defined, but in practice compliance can be difficult to
assess. There are many theories of governance, but no single theory adequately accounts for all
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of the traditional roles and responsibilities of boards of directors/trustees. There is substantial
agreement that boards should govern ethically, but how board ethics are defined varies among
organizations. There are models, prescriptions, and protocols for governance. All make claims
but none are universally accepted. There is evidence to suggest that much about boards and the
process of governance is ceremonial, yet there is also evidence that at least some boards clearly
contribute to organizational effectiveness.
Because this study used grounded theory methodology, data collected from individuals
who experienced the phenomenon rather than existing theory guided the process. The method
required an openness that allowed theoretical propositions to emerge from the experiences of
participants. Grounded theory and the specific design of the study is addressed in Chapter III.
Through the process of data collection and analysis occasions to return to the literature emerged.
This additional literature is addressed in Chapter V.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Research on boards of directors is considerable but with substantial limitations. Because
boards usually operate behind closed doors, most of the available research is based on archived
data from publically accessible sources. Only a small number of empirical studies address boards
of organizations facing crisis. There are single and multiple case studies that include observation
of board meetings and/or interviews with individual board members about their activities during
a crisis but none focus specifically on board processes or interactions. Theories proposed in the
cases are also limited in that they are based on mostly single, but no more than four
organizations.
Since existing theories of governing in crisis were primarily limited to the experience of
single organizations, using informants from multiple organizations had the potential to provide
new and valuable perspectives. Strategically choosing an inductive approach illuminated the
phenomenon in a way that led to the identification of patterns and that suggested a theory of
action (Edmondson & McManus, 2007).
Methodological Justification
Grounded theory provided a way to systematically analyze board members’ reflections
on board processes with the purpose of creating theoretical models to help explain a board’s role
in crisis situations. It was an appropriate approach for answering the question how board
members experienced an organizational crisis in a way that provided meaningful information
from a vantage point different from what was currently available in the research. Charmaz’s
(2006) constructive approach to grounded theory facilitated a systematic analysis of board
members reflections and provided a different vantage point for understanding why recognizing
and responding to crisis is so difficult for a board of directors. In the next section, I begin with a
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discussion of history and methods subsumed under the grounded theory approach as the method
employed in the study.
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory, originally detailed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as a strategy for
qualitative research, combines the competing traditions of Glaser’s positivism and Strauss’s
Chicago school pragmatism (Charmaz, 2006). While there has been considerable controversy
from those who advocate for positivist versus constructivist orientation of the method, I chose to
approach this study using Charamz’s (2006) constructive approach to systematically analyze
board members’ reflections of how their boards dealt with crisis situations. Grounded theory
offered a means to uncover some of the invisible processes that influenced the way individual
board members experience a crisis (Star, 2007, p. 79). The philosophical foundation in
pragmatism (Mead, 1934) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969) couch grounded theory
with an appropriate framework for uncovering basic social processes in a phenomenon.
Pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. Pragmatists see reality as many truths
created through a continuous process of human activity (Given, 2008; Strubing, 2007). They
come from the perspective that reality grows from consequences rather than antecedents (Star,
2007). Symbolic interactionism is a natural progression from pragmatism, viewing meaning as a
social product defined by interpreting the acts of others (Blumer, 1969). “People at different
points do something, and what they do is a result of how they define the situation” (Blumer,
1969, p. 19). Symbolic interactionism suggests that it is the “social process in group life that
creates and upholds the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life” (Blumer, 1969,
p. 9), a particularly relevant context for understanding the social processes, antecedents, and
consequences of board actions on members.
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Symbolic interactionism influenced Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) original grounded theory
as a systematic qualitative procedure for simultaneously collecting and analyzing data. Theory is
generated from the data and modified based on emergent theoretical understanding of the
participants’ perspectives. Rather than a prescriptive package or recipe for doing qualitative
research, grounded theory provides a set of guiding principles for generating theory (Charmaz,
2002, 2006). As detailed by Charmaz, theory is not discovered but rather constructed through
the lens of past experiences and interactions. This study was designed to develop an
understanding of how board members who experienced an organizational crisis during their term
of service constructed that reality.
Dimensional analysis. In grounded theory, the constant comparison method during the
process of data collection, coding, and analysis of new and previous data, allows elements of the
theory to emerge. Dimensional analysis adds a means to structure that analysis early in the
process. With its assumption that reality is “(1) socially constructed; (2) always defined from a
particular perspective; and (3) contextually situated” (Caron & Bowers, 2000, p. 288)
dimensional analysis guided each step of the research and analysis. As potential dimensions
emerged from the data a table for each was constructed identifying the conceptual components of
context, conditions, processes, and consequences (Kools, McCarthy, Durham, & Robrecht, 1996;
Schatzman, 1991). Because the process is dynamic, dimensions changed with the addition of
additional data. Dimension tables were constructed and reconstructed. These multiple
dimensions of the complex phenomenon from multiple perspectives allowed core and primary
dimensions and ultimately a final model to emerge. The ability to focus the data on theoretical
issues early in the process was critical for dealing with what ended up being an extremely
complex question (Schatzman, 1991, p. 308). Returning back to earlier data each time a new
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puzzle piece emerged, while time consuming, also uncovered interesting aspects missed in initial
reviews.
Method of the Study
The study addressed the research question through a constructivist grounded theory
approach as described by Charmaz (2006). Charmaz emphasizes the principles and practices of
grounded theory while including for the researcher co-construction of meaning with the
participants. In this section I discuss the research design including participants, procedures, and
data analysis.
Participants. Qualitative research requires finding participants who have experienced the
phenomenon of interest to the study (Morse, 2007). Before soliciting participants for a
purposeful sample, definitions were established and criteria to guide selection were determined.
For the study a crisis was defined as a major incident or series of incidents that has the potential
to harm the well being of organizational stakeholders and threatens the legitimacy of the
institution (adapted from Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). I wanted to identify individuals who had
served a board term with a nonprofit organization during a crisis (Charmaz, 2006; Stern, 2007).
I also wanted to restrict the study to nonprofit organizations of sufficient size and stature with the
expectation that board members would be knowledgeable of both business and governance
practices. Nonprofit organizations in this study included health care organizations, education
institutions, and IRS 501(c)(3) organizations with annual revenues of at least $1,000,000.
An initial group of individuals was identified from personal contacts and
recommendations from colleagues and friends as potentially appropriate participants. Potential
interviewees were provided with a document (Appendix A) that included a brief questionnaire
and a description of the purpose of the study: to understand the experience of board members
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who had to deal with a major incident or series of incidents that had the potential to harm the
well being of organizational stakeholders and threatened the legitimacy of the organization
(Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). The original group was evaluated in terms of the stated organizational
criteria as well as their willingness to participate and their availability. Not all participated, but
some who did not meet the criteria were able to recommend others. Once interviewing began a
snowballing approach was used to identify additional interviewees. In this approach original
interviewees were asked to identify others they knew who had experienced a crisis situation
while serving on a nonprofit board. The snowball sample technique provided a way to identify
and access individuals who had experienced this rather unique phenomenon (Morse, 2007).
Procedures. Because of the nature of the question I had some trepidation about how to
approach the topic of interest in a nonthreatening way. Before the actual study began I
conducted three practice interviews with experienced board members I knew who had been
through a crisis while serving. These interviews allowed me to formulate open ended questions
in a way that encouraged reflection on thoughts, feelings, and actions. From those preliminary
interviews two questions were identified to begin each interview. Interviewees were first asked
to tell me about their board experience. The second question: I am interested in your experience
as a board member when faced with an organizational crisis; would you tell me about the crisis
you experienced during your board service?
Interviews. Based on location half of the 20 interviews were conducted in person and
half by telephone. Interviewees and organization characteristics are summarized in Table 3.1.
Participants were selected because of their association with a single organization that had
experienced a crisis. However, it became apparent during the interviews that every participant
had served on at least one other board and many had experienced more than one crisis on more
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than one board. As a result the interviews often included stories related to multiple boards. A
total of 20 individuals were interviewed, and they discussed serving on a total of 37 different
nonprofit organization boards. Organizations were located in ten different states from
throughout the US and of the 37 organizations referenced in the interviews, 26 had experienced
an organizational crisis. The other 11 organizations were identified by participants in an effort to
provide a comparison of board processes when an organization was not in crisis.
Of the 26 organizations that experienced a crisis, 22 of the crises involved financial
issues, 14 CEO issues, and 4 had strategic issues. Twelve were single issues crises (nine
financial, 2 CEO, 1 strategic). CEO issues were complex. In three cases financial irregularities
were attributed to CEO malfeasance and all resulted in the dismissal of the CEO. Another four
of the CEO issues involved long term CEOs who the board was reluctant to take action against
because of a history of success.
Interviews began with the participant being asked to talk about his/her board experience
and then about the specific crisis experienced during their term. Listening deeply, focusing on
the participant’s narrative allowed additional questions to emerge as the interviews progressed.
Interviewees were encouraged to reflect on their experience and interpretation of what had
happened.
Since analysis began at the start of data collection specific issues identified early in the
process were explored in more depth in later interviews. Interviews continued until categories
were saturated. During the analysis it was evident that the role of former CEO on boards may
have a particular influence on board processes. Therefore, in accordance with grounded theory
theoretical sampling procedures, three interviews were conducted to focus on the specific issue
of how an individual’s own experience as a CEO impacted the way he/she perceived his/her role
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as a board member. Each CEO related complex stories to situate themselves in multiple
organizations and these interviews were added to the dataset.
Table 3.1
Interviewee and Organization Characteristics
Interview

Gender

Nonprofit
CEO

For-profit
CEO

For-profit
Board

Organization
Type

Crisis

1
1
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
7
8
9
9
10
10
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
14
14
15
16
16
17
17
17
18
19
20

female

no

no

no

female
female

no
yes

no
no

no
yes

male

no

yes

yes

male

no

yes

yes

female

no

no

no

male
male
male

no
no
no

no
no
yes

yes
no
yes

male

yes

no

no

male
male

no
no

yes
yes

yes
no

female

no

no

no

female

no

no

no

female
male

yes
yes

no
no

no
no

male

no

yes

yes

female
female
female

no
no
yes

no
no
no

yes
no
no

501(c)(3)
education
education
health care
education
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
education
health care
501(c)(3)
education
health care
education
501(c)(3)
education
education
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
health care
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
education
education
501(c)(3)
education
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)
501(c)(3)

yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Chair
Thru
Crisis
no
no
no
no
N/A
yes
yes
N/A
N/A
yes
yes
yes
N/A
no
N/A
yes
no
N/A
no
no
no
yes
no
N/A
no
N/A
no
no
N/A
no
yes
no
N/A
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
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Transcription. All interviews were recorded with permission of the interviewee as
detailed in the informed consent procedure (Appendix B). Because of the nature of the inquiry
confidentiality was a critical requirement for most participants. Names, locations, and
organizations are not identified or included in this report. The only classification identified is
whether the organization was involved in health care, education, or with a 501(c)(3)
organization.
Recordings were transcribed by a confidential transcription service with instructions to
record pauses, laughter, and interruptions. I verified each transcript with the recording and made
corrections as necessary. Participants were provided with corrected transcripts providing an
opportunity to clarify or correct any statement in the interview. Two responded with some
clarification and expansion of their comments and this additional information was incorporated
into the interview transcript. Corrected transcripts were imported into NVivo for coding.
Analysis. The constant comparison method began with receipt of the first interview
transcript and continued throughout the data collection. Beginning the analysis right from the
start allowed emergent information to guide adjustments in subsequent interviews. As
anticipated, initial interviews generated a wide range of ideas shaping the frame from which
analysis was built (Charmaz, 2006). Lower-level codes and categories merged rather quickly
during the early phases of data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Data was constantly
compared, and interview questions were adjusted to address questions that surfaced through the
analysis. Codes and categories shifted. Dimensional analysis aided in the process.
Coding. Five fellow students familiar with the coding processes required for grounded
theory served as the coding team. Interview transcripts were initially coded using a line by line
coding process. The first four interviews were coded by at least three individuals and the other
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interviews were coded by me and one other person. Conference calls with adviser Dr. Elizabeth
Holloway and the whole team were held before coding began and then after the first three
interviews. From that point email and individual phone calls with members of the coding team
clarified conflicts and differing opinions. When possible, team members coded right into NVivo
and their codes were imported directly into the master file. Because coding team members were
using two versions of the program those working with the older version of NVivo coded in word
and codes were manually entered into the master NVivo file.
When line by line coding on the fifth interview was complete some initial consolidation
of nodes began. Within NVivo duplicates were merged, and where appropriate combined. After
each subsequent interview codes were reviewed and consolidated where appropriate. Coding
became more conceptual and by the tenth interview categories had become more theoretical and
a number of potential dimensions were identified. At that point coding was directed toward the
emerging dimensions. A member of the coding team served as a partner through the process of
conceptualization, helping to talk through combining codes and then about the potential
dimensions.
Memoing. Memoing began before the data collection and continued throughout the
interviewing and model construction processes. A memo was prepared after each interview,
reacting to and reflecting on the interview content. Memos were prepared after phone calls with
coding team members and as the codes were consolidated. They detailed early thoughts about
the conceptual framework and identified possible dimensions. Memos became part of the
constant comparison, from the original categories to possible dimensions and ultimately to the
final theoretical model.
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Dimensionalizing the categories. Constructing, destructing, and reconstructing
dimensions from multiple perspectives gave structure to the analysis and comparisons in a way
that would not have otherwise been possible with the complexity of the phenomenon (Kools et
al., 1996). Primary dimensions eventually emerged. Each primary dimensions was then tested
for its ability to provide perspective and from that analysis the core dimension was identified. As
a dimension was identified an explanatory matrix that addressed context, conditions, processes,
and consequences was developed (Kools et al., 1996; Schatzman, 1991). Conceptual and
theoretical memos detailed the thinking that went in to all of these activities.
Saturating the theoretical dimensions. In grounded theory, saturation is achieved when
categories are saturated, that is “when gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical
insights, or reveals new properties of …core theoretical categories” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 113).
Signs of saturation occurred with interview 12. Two additional interviews were already
scheduled with individuals from the same board—the chair elect through the early stages of the
crisis and another board member who was not part of the executive committee. These additional
two interviews provided a chance to assess how different individuals viewed the same situation.
Both interviewees warned that the other party might not see the crisis the same way, yet the
stories related were virtually identical.
During the analysis of the last group of interviews perceptual differences in recognizing
and responding to a crisis was noted in the responses of those with CEO experience. Theoretical
interviews to explore the question were scheduled with three additional CEO participants—one
with for-profit and two with nonprofit CEO experience. In the preliminary conversation with
one of these CEOs it turned out that the individual had also served as board chair through a crisis
related in an earlier interview so that actual interview was able to address both the CEO aspect as
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well as provide a second intraboard perspective. These theoretical interviews provided
additional insight.
When the final theoretical model emerged it was apparent that information collected in
the three practice interviews supported the model. The IRB application was revised to include
these practice interviews and approved by the IRB chair (Appendix C). The three individuals
were contacted and provided the study requirements and informed consent information
(Appendix B). All were provided interview transcripts and signed informed consent forms. The
interview codes from the three additional interviews were added to the data to provide additional
support.
Relating the Method to the Story
Grounded theory proved to be an effective tool for learning about how board members
experience a crisis. Interviewees related fascinating stories, many of which could provide the
basis for a novel as easily as a research model. Dissecting the narratives line by line exposed
nuances that would have been easily overlooked with a purely thematic analysis. Coding to such
detail helped minimize the impact of personal biases when a single sentence was allowed to
stand alone. Continuously returning to previous data each time a new interview was added
changed the frames and focus of analysis multiple times. Dimensions were identified and
abandoned, but each rearrangement expanded my view and eventually forced me to think in
theoretical terms.
Not all of the collected data was useful in terms of the model, but it was hard to leave the
stories behind. The results of a grounded theory focus on theoretical understanding rather than
individual narratives. Using pieces of the narratives to detail the aspects of each dimension in
the chapter that follows does, however, provide an opportunity to relate the stories in a way that
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conveys a sense of the complexity of the problem. Grounded theory provided an effective
manner of dealing with this complexity.
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Chapter IV: Results
The purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of board members experience
during a time of organizational crisis. From the dimensional analysis of the interviews, four
major dimensions emerged: the Tangled Web; Recognizing; Responding; and Stepping Up. In
dimensional analysis one central or core dimension provides the best perspective from which to
build an understanding of the context, conditions, processes, and consequences of the social
processes in the phenomenon. In this analysis, each of the four dimensions was given the
opportunity to serve as the core and provide the perspective for theory. Ultimately the Tangled
Web emerged as the core dimension from which the other three, now classified as primary
dimensions, interacted.
In this chapter I will begin with an overview of types of organizations that were discussed
in the interviews. The information on the organizations will provide a foundation for
understanding the context in which the participants served as board members. Next I will discuss
the interpretive meaning of the core dimension and primary dimensions that emerged from the
analysis. The core dimension, the Tangled Web and each primary dimension—Recognizing,
Responding, and Stepping Up—will be presented, summarized in a table including categories that
describe the rich detail of the dimension’s meaning. A description of the model of board
members’ experiences during a time of organizational crisis that was conceptualized from these
dimensions will be detailed in Chapter V.
Participants and Organizations
Serving as a nonprofit board member is both challenging and gratifying. Most
interviewees admitted that it required far more time than they originally anticipated, particularly
during crisis situations. Sometimes the details were sketchy, but in many cases interviewees
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related details of a situation that had taken place several years before with amazing clarity. It is
important, though, to recognize that the stories related in the interviews were retrospective and
represent the perceptions and interpretations of individuals who served on a nonprofit board of
directors during or immediately following a crisis in the organization. Their interpretations may
or may not be completely accurate but are rather an indication of how these individuals made
sense of the experience. In an effort to contrast perspectives of individuals on the same board
and in different roles, interviews were conducted with a second individual, either chair or vice
chair, from two of the organizations. The recollections and interpretation of both board members
were consistent in details and interpretation with the respective board officer interviewed.
Because of the nature and notoriety of some of the stories of crisis, interviewees were
quite concerned that the anonymity of those organizations for which they served be preserved.
Those wishes have been respected in the presentation of the findings; however, the provision of
general characteristics will enhance an understanding of the context in which the board members
served. Therefore, organizations have been categorized by industry and revenue. All of the
organizations were classified as health care, education, or as IRS section 501(c)(3) exempt
institutions and all had annual revenues of over $1 million dollars. Although no additional
information about the financial specifics was solicited, some participants offered detailed
financial information and gave permission to use this information because of the importance in
characterizing the crisis. Some of this information is included in quotations when it is relevant to
understanding the social processes among board members that incurred. Demographic
characteristics of interviewees and the organizations are summarized on Table 3.1.
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Overview of the Dimensions
Dimensional analysis assumes that reality is “(1) socially constructed; (2) always defined
from a particular perspective; and (3) contextually situated” (Caron & Bowers, 2000, p. 288).
Dimensions help to focus the data on theoretical issues early in the process. Once the primary
dimensions in the data are identified, explanatory matrices are created using the dimensions and
their categories to provide “a structure of terms that totally frame and give direction or
methodological perspective to analysis” (Schatzman, 1991, p. 308). The explanatory matrix that
emerged in this study is shown in table form and includes context, conditions, processes, and
outcomes. Each of the primary dimensions is also treated the same way. The explanatory
matrices for the primary dimensions gave rise to the “core dimension”—that dimension that
proved to be central and provided the context and/or conditions for the primary dimensions—of
the project. The core dimension, the Tangled Web, provided context for the primary dimensions.
The context and conditions of this tangled web are best illustrated through the narratives
of interviewees. As a result the details of context and conditions as described by participants are
discussed first, providing a useful background for considering the core dimension—the Tangled
Web.
Because of the variety of titles used in the organizations some common terminology was
adopted. Chief executive officer (CEO) is used to identify the single individual employed by and
answering to the board regardless of title. Board chair identifies the individual elected by the
board to serve as the executive or chief spokesperson for the board. When the term vice chair is
included it involves a board where the vice chair is the heir to the chair, and in those cases the
vice chair became chair during or immediately following the crisis. Other generic identifiers

50

utilized in direct quotations are presented within brackets. Interviews were numbered in the
order completed. Quotations from the transcripts are identified by interview number.
Core Dimension: The Tangled Web
The ability of a board to recognize and respond to a crisis takes place within a complex
web of individual and group perceptions that can obscure the most basic of information
necessary for effective governance. The composition of the board, with all of the attributes and
experiences that individual board members brought to the table, influenced how members
viewed their role and responsibilities to the board and the organization. Customs and norms of
the group influenced how a board related to the CEO and responded to the information presented
as the basis for decisions. Congeniality, real or imposed, was often valued over decision quality
and the perceptions of all involved from board members to CEO’s to the staff of the
organization.
The processes involved in board interactions were difficult for interviewees to explain. It
brought to mind the first line of a Walter Scott (1808) poem—“oh what a tangled web we weave,
when we first practice to deceive.” It is not a suggestion that boards deliberately try to deceive
but rather that much about the governance processes described suggest obfuscation. The actions
of individual board members and their attempts to function as a governing body do create a
tangled web. When viewed through the lens of a tangled web of perceptions and hazy
understanding of what was expected, a board’s failure to miss signals of impending crisis in
some of the newsworthy stories now seemed plausible.
There are limits to what boards can do and how well they can function. First and
foremost in the nonprofit environment most board members are volunteers. They have limited
time, limited training and orientation to their roles, and often limited understanding of the
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business in which the organization they govern is engaged. The board relies on the chief
executive for adequate information and explanations for matters the board must decide. Many
often feel they do not know enough to disagree with what has been proposed. Some board
members perceive their role as primarily fund raising. Others serve for the prestige, but most are
there because they believe in the organization and see board service as a chance to give back.
It is within this Tangled Web of unstructured roles and responsibilities that boards of
directors are expected to Recognize and Respond to even the most obscure signals that something
could be wrong. The Tangled Web as the core dimension provides context and conditions for the
primary dimensions of Recognizing, Responding and Stepping Up. Table 4.1 summarizes the
context, conditions, processes and outcomes that situate and describe the core dimension.
Table 4.1
Core Dimension: The Tangled Web
Context

Conditions

Processes

Outcomes

individuals on the board

it’s about the
money

monitoring
conditions

failing organization

board as a group

CEO issues

recognizing

"just existing" or
muddling organization

policies and processes

changing
directions

responding

thriving organization

limited time and information

environmental
issues

stepping up

Context. The boards discussed by interviewees operated in a variety of ways and
structures. Individual and group perceptions and relationships all influenced the complex and
often confusing environment identified as the Tangled Web. Understanding the context for the
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Tangled Web includes the categories: individuals on the board; the board as a group; policies
and processes; and limited time and information.
Individuals on the board. A nonprofit board is made up of individuals who bring their
own perspectives and views to their service on a nonprofit board of directors. The first
characteristic of context for the Tangled Web is individuals on the board. Categories included in
individuals on the board include member skills, experience and expectations; CEO experience;
and gender as summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2
The Tangled Web Context: Individuals on the Board
Individuals on the Board
Member skills, experience, and expectations
CEO experience
Gender
Participants volunteered to serve for a variety of reasons. Most did it as a way to give
back, often because of a special commitment to the organization. For some, employers
encouraged employees to get involved and actually nominated them for community board
appointments. Interviewees described some fellow board members who they believed
volunteered to enhance their reputation. Many admitted they volunteer because they enjoy the
experience.
Well first of all the number one reason that I do it is that I enjoy it. And I can give you
all sorts of noble sounding platitudes about why, but I do enjoy it. And I see it as
sharpening my management and business skills because often it's harder to run a
nonprofit than it is a for-profit company. (I-5)
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Nonprofit board members are generally not paid for their service yet they were expected
to take on considerable responsibility.
There was a time when most nonprofit boards were more social and it was more of a
status…so it had more to do with your bragging rights at the country club than it
necessarily did about fiduciary responsibilities. But as businesses got more complicated
and times have gotten more challenging and we have a proliferation of nonprofits all
competing for the same pot of dollars, it has become more and more complicated. (I-5)
Another participant identified an issue arising from those demands.
What I’ve come to understand is there are a lot of people who get on boards because they
want their names to be on things and they really don’t want to do the work. Or they’re
overwhelmed by the work or they may have started out with great seriousness and
earnestness and it, it’s too much for them and they don’t know how to get out of it….
They just feel like, “What’s the worst that can happen if I hang around?” (I-1)
The category of individuals on the board can be further broken down to a number of
factors. The most notable of those factors include member skills, experience, and expectations;
CEO experience; and gender.
Member skills, experience, and expectations. Because of the scrutiny and responsibility
involved it was not unusual for boards to seek specific skills when looking for new board
members:
Something that I've learned to try to do with nonprofits is to make a list of all of the skills
that are necessary for this organization to function: risk management, operations,
marketing, advertising, public relations. And try to fill the board with people with that
expertise. You find more of that has been done in for-profit companies. (I-5)
Accountants, lawyers, physicians, executives, and other professionals can provide
professional expertise for the organization but that knowledge was a source of annoyance to
other board members.
Now what board members tend to do in my opinion…they tend to take their skills and
they want to show everybody off on the board. If they’re CPA’s they want to… nitpick
the budget. If they’re attorneys…they want to say now you know you could get sued on
this….It’s really interfering with the workings of the board. (I-3)
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Another related a similar situation that demonstrated how difficult it was for the board to make
progress.
Six lawyers in a room talking about issues was one of the most painful experiences of my
life. My first board meeting they had 30 items on the agenda…and the first item took 22
minutes…. I said, “opine you’re all smart but you can’t debate this many issues and move
forward as a board it’s just not productive.” (I-11)
Experience and expectations created inconsistencies in how individuals viewed a board’s
primary duty. Some participants believed that their primary responsibility was to the
organization and all decisions should be framed by what was best for the organization. Others
saw their role as representing some constituency and as a result framed decisions from the
perspective of what was best for the particular stakeholder group they represented. Still others
felt their role was to do what was best for the community at large even if it meant a decision may
not be in the organization’s best interest.
As a board member you’re usually there out of some sort of specified role. For example,
I’m a community member on [a health care organization] board…There are physicians
that are on that board, they represent the medical community… it’s their job to represent
the medical community. My job is to represent the community interest. (I-10)
And another commented: “you’re supposed to represent the organization structure. You should
figure out what you can do that’s for the good of all of us as opposed to the good of yourself. I
think a lot of people forget that” (I-4).
Another board member, describing a terribly dysfunctional board that was in the final
stages of trying to salvage the organization, described a small group of board members: “they
just didn’t seem that willing to cooperate at all, and their attitude was we’re the only people that
are important here…If it requires some effort on our part, or something that we can do
differently, we’re not interested” (I-8). While most board members are not motivated by self-
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interest, a lack of clarity as to whom a board member owed primary duty created some confusion
during board deliberations.
CEO experience. Individuals with CEO experience are attractive potential board
members. Having board members with CEO experience whether in for-profit or nonprofit
organizations enhanced the status of the board and the organization. CEO’s felt they brought
valuable information and helped to broaden the boards’ perspective. They also provided a
unique kind of support for the organization’s CEO.
I articulate to the rest of the board members their proper roles and responsibilities to that
CEO. I wind up being a protector but not one who is unwilling to remind the CEO when
things aren’t right.... And so I’m a nice voice to have if you’re a CEO, because as a board
member, I say “hey, it’s not appropriate for you to contact the vice-president.” (I-10)
Another individual who had served as a CEO in a nonprofit organization stated:
I’ve always been a proponent of the CEO because I know that …board members call,
beat on him wanting this, wanting that, wanted their vote, wanted their favor. So I
understood all the back room kind of things that went on with the CEO. (I-3)
But experienced CEOs from other organizations were also disruptive and difficult for the
organization’s CEO as well. One CEO talked about another CEO board member: “he used the
credibility of having been the president to say, well this is what you’re supposed to do. I know
because I was in that job. And that’s a slippery slope” (I-10).
CEOs and former CEOs brought considerable skill and understanding to boards. They
both helped and occasionally hindered the organization’s CEO. They also used their influence in
both positive and negative ways.
Gender. Gender had an impact on how women experienced board service and on how
board roles and responsibilities should be carried out. The issue of gender emerged early in the
interviews with women. As a result in subsequent interviews if the topic of gender had not come
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up by the end of the interview, the participant was asked whether it was an issue. Seven of the
ten women interviewed brought up gender. Not one of the ten men did and even after asked
specifically whether gender mattered, only one of the men had anything to say about gender as
an issue. To some of the women it felt like many boards still operated primarily as a good old
boy network.
Oh, believe me, I was their token female (laughter)…And I sat in these meetings with all
these old men, who half of them slept through the board meetings, and who really had no
passion for the [organization]… and every once in awhile they’d turn to the other end of
the table and say “[Sue] so what do you think?” (I-14)
Another woman described male board colleagues:
I found that, business men are great at analyzing and telling you what’s wrong with the
place but they “ain’t” great at getting off their duffs to ask for money and doing the real
hard work that has to be done… It goes all back to the women that are left on the board.
(I-6)
A woman who was bypassed for reappointment to a board despite her interest, extensive
background and experience, and the considerable success of her activities in support of the
organization, expressed hurt feelings and a feeling that gender was involved: “no one likes
rejection but I took it as that I spoke up and I think men can speak up and be looked at differently
but when women speak up” (I-3).
While men did not bring gender up, when asked, the perceptions related were often quite
different. One man had a concern about fund raising. “Not all women are willing to ask for
money. And I don't mean to paint a broad brush, but there are probably more men that are
willing to ask for money than there are women” (I-5). Most noted little difference between men
and women on boards.
I worked with women all my life. And I find that it’s in the temperament one way or
another it wasn’t necessarily defined by gender.… I haven’t seen that much

57

difference…Some of them like any individual, are better prepared and work harder. I can
see that from both genders. (I-12)
Another man related a story about a woman board colleague who was never considered to
replace him as board chair. He had participated in the decision and explained that she
…was furious that she was never given even a consideration…. I thought she was too
busy for it because she had, she still has a pretty high-powered job, travels internationally
a lot…I didn’t think of the person as really having the time….And she was pretty bent up
for a while. We had to do a lot of mending. (I-11)
Some of the comments from men, while not intended as derogatory, could be interpreted
as condescending.
I have never been in a situation where I felt there was… a female board member that
didn’t have the best interest of the organization at heart. If there were issues, it was
probably more an issue of the level of sophistication. (I-16)
Another acknowledged some gender differences in a positive manner but then prefaced a
compliment with a comment that could be interpreted in a different way.
I think women will sometimes give more time and more serious thought to boards. Men,
particularly successful businessmen tend to lose patience....I don't mean to sound
chauvinistic, but women are more comfortable with a two or a two-and-a-half hour
meeting than men are. They are more patient. (I-5)
An aspect of gender that cannot be denied is that nonprofit board service does provide
opportunities for women that may not be as available in the corporate world. A woman with
extensive corporate and board experience talked about perceived limits for women in her
industry and how her board service has provided opportunities she did not have in business.
I retired after 32 years by choice so that I could do full-time volunteer work. So I think
maybe in the back of my mind a little bit, I’m just sort of like getting even or proving,
I’m proving that I’m good at what I do and I’m using the exact same skills that I used in
the corporate world, and they’re working here. I’m going to make this a success. (I-14)
Successful women do find opportunities through board service and often learn valuable skills.
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And if I had a word of wisdom for women, don’t be afraid of the bullies. I have never
been bullied more than I have in my board service. And I am, having been all those years
in business, I am not fearful of bullies….You don’t have to be a jerk, but don’t be bullied
into accepting something you don’t think is right….Women I think tend to get bullied.
(I-13)
Gender does have some impact on how communications and actions are interpreted
within a board of directors. These gendered perceptions were confusing and inconsistent and
seemed to have some effect on how individuals function on a board. Perspectives clearly
differed not just with gender but with member skills, expectations, and experience, and CEO
experience. These were the individuals that came to the board. How they functioned as a board
leads to the next contextual category, board as a group.
Table 4.3
The Tangled Web Context: Board as a Group
Board as a Group
Orientation
Operating
Board meetings
Disagreements
Board as a group. Putting a group of skilled individuals together does not guarantee that
they will function as an effective board. The second context characteristic summarized on Table
4.3 is board as a group and includes the categories orientation; operating; board meetings; and
disagreements.
Orientation. Perceptions of how the group operated and their own understanding of
specific board responsibilities often were all individual board members had to guide them.
There’s no real orientation, you just kind of showed up at meetings and they had sent you
a little reading material beforehand which how can you be expected to step in and just
somehow by osmosis know what the topic of conversation was going to be. (I-16)
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One interviewee, an experienced board member, talked about his experience on his first board:
I had never been on and knew nothing, knew absolutely nothing about [the organization
and its business]. It was my first board… and I suddenly realized that I had no frame of
reference….I didn't know where in a city this size with the budget that they had whether
or not they should be serving twice as many people. (I-5)
Many interviewees expressed frustration with fellow board members who were really not
clear about the organization or the environment in which it operated. Board members should
“learn as much as you can about the organization and about the business that they are in, not just
the organization” (I-4). Another reported that “there are a number of people that shock me how
little they know about what the organization is doing day to day and even less so what’s the
vision for the future. And that’s not very helpful” (I-11). The consensus among interviewees
was that individuals who agree to serve on a nonprofit board have an obligation to learn more
about their role and that of the organization even if the organization fails to provide that kind of
orientation and training. “Boards have to take on self-responsibility of educating themselves, so
they understand how the operation of the organization works. If they don’t do that, you’re in a
hell of a problem” (I-12).
One interviewee in discussing the primary organization that was the subject of the
interview related a situation experienced as a member of another board facing a crisis:
It was a dysfunctional working board. So…for about a year, we went through board boot
camp. We were never allowed to be in committee meetings….We always worked
together until we agreed that the committees could be resumed because we would trust
the results would be in the best interest of [the organization]. (I-1)
Unfortunately when that technique was suggested to the primary organization in similar
circumstances, there was no interest in additional involvement for the board.
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Boards need to be aware of how they select and assimilate new members, keep
developing existing members to roles and responsibilities, and develop appropriate policies and
procedures to ensure it happens. Some of those discussed did, but many did not. One
interviewee explained the process: “New board members come on, the nominating committee
has nominated them, somebody has taken them to lunch there has been some discussion…maybe
they feel like that’s the orientation—that interview lunch” (I-20). Another explains why it is
often difficult for new board members to understand what is acceptable.
The first year I was new I just sat and listened. I was not going to make any waves, I just
rode them…. The third year I started to notice the pattern. What’s going on? Maybe I
missed something. Sometimes it's a matter of you don’t even know what questions to
ask. (I-18)
Failing to adequately assimilate new board members has the potential to impact a board’s ability
to deal with and operate in a crisis situation.
Operating. Interviewees saw their boards in a variety of ways that indicate just how the
board functioned as a group.
When we’re together we do have our internal battles and I think that right now, especially
we’ve got an excellent board and I think we have some very strong people on there, and
in the past and we’ve got some people that have not necessarily contributed successfully
on the board, but they decided to leave so that was good. (I-12)
Another described the perception of the board in the community. It’s “considered an old time
snooty board, filled with old… names, but not much action. And we developed a persona, I
believe within the community of being… aloof” (I-13). Maintaining the status quo was easier
when the community bought into the excuse of that is the way it is done.
Board meetings. The most fundamental of board activities is the scheduled board
meeting. This is where the ongoing business of the board is supposed to take place. Meeting
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agendas and protocols and how they were carried out shaped director behavior and impacted
decisions.
Board meetings functioned in a variety of ways. Some were quite congenial. One
interviewee said “you feel good while you’re there—it’s always a comfortable room” (I-2).
Another stated “I just know that when I go to the board meetings before the meeting starts
everybody is glad to see everybody else and we chat and find out how the families are doing and
it’s a really good situation” (I-17). Others mentioned more specifics from their experiences.
I think we genuinely like and respect one another. That too is important and we go
through the vetting process, we spend a lot of time on the personality fit. We’re not
trying to, we’re trying to be diverse in both how we look and how people think but we’re
not trying to bring any firebrand in there to straighten everything up, you know. (I-11)
And another described one of the boards in interesting terms: “the board was, acted in many
ways when they were together, extremely professional. So there was always a courtesy and an
elegance concerning that board. People did not get into screaming matches, anything like that”
(I-3).
Some boards experienced little participation from directors. “Some people will sit
around and never say a word. You don’t even know if they have a voice…I used to complain
about sitting in those board meetings because nothing ever happened” (I-4). Another explained
in detail a fascinating observation:
One of the observations that I made early on was that the CEO had made intentional
recruits out of people who would look good on letterhead, but he was fairly clear would
never show up… of that group of people that were there, a handful of folks that literally
never opened their mouth. Never said a word, didn’t complain, didn’t praise, didn’t talk
about the financials, didn’t talk about anything. They came, they sat, they ate a doughnut,
they left. (I-1)
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Lack of engagement and perceived rubber stamping led to questions for those board members
who saw problems within the organization but felt that fellow board members were not paying
enough attention. A new board member described the situation:
They were just rubberstamping everything the [CEO] put in front of them. A lot of the
early board members didn’t show up for meetings. I mean it was difficult for me to even
know who was on the board because the same three or four people showed up but I
learned later there were like seven people on the board and I never met some of them.
(I-19)
A nonprofit CEO who also sits on a very engaged board of another community
organization wished his somewhat uninvolved board was more like the board on which he
serves.
These are people who are engaged, and they show up…. You’ve got people who are
putting in lots and lots of extra hours, and they’re doing amazing kinds of things. And
you know [the CEO] every now and then he gets kind of concerned about somebody, but
it’s much much easier to channel the energy than to ignite the energy in board members.
(I-10)
For a variety of reasons the meetings were not always productive and actually became
uncomfortable for some. One individual related the experience rather succinctly: “I’ve seen
fractiousness. I’ve seen people just be jerks. I’ve seen people calling and making ploys behind
their back; you know political movements behind the back” (I-13). Another individual with
nonprofit CEO experience described an interesting phenomenon. “A lot of board members loved
to come in with surprises because they think that elevates them with the board and all this other
stuff or they speak off the cuff because they didn’t do their homework or whatever” (I-3).
Some boards that were described lacked focus, a situation that made dealing with a crisis
even more difficult.
The meetings tend to get out of hand and to me on occasion people just start dialoging
about something and then the chair tries to get it back to some sense of Ok, Ok. Ok what
are we talking about here? Let’s focus. (I-20)
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A similar situation was described in humorous terms: “a lot of them are talking because they
need a life, and this is an opportunity to demonstrate their importance. You know it’s part of
their 15 minutes, part of Andy Warhol’s 15 minutes of fame” (I-4).
One interviewee speculated about why attendance at meetings kept dwindling, making
board members less likely to participate in board activities.
We got this numbers guy and he was so boring. His reports, they would go on and on ad
infinitum. And just, we get it (laughter). We don’t have to go over every minutia and see
that everything is negative, negative, negative… and I think I definitely in the last four
years, five years have seen a decrease in the number of members that come. (I-6)
Several used the term “pontificate” to describe how some board members came across in
nonproductive meetings. No matter the term when board discussions were perceived as overkill,
meetings became difficult and that caused some directors to disengage. Similar observations
were mentioned in the discussion of disagreement.
Disagreements. Disagreement among board members can be uncomfortable and as a
result minor issues with the potential to become major may not surface early enough to prevent
harm. When asked if there were disagreements on the board one interviewee replied “you
know, there probably should be but they never, people might have a difference of opinion but it’s
a very sort of harmonious situation. I’m not sure if that’s good or bad” (I-17). Another
interviewee expressed frustration with the unwillingness of board colleagues to openly question
or disagree, choosing instead to complain behind the scenes.
People…should feel that they had the right and the ability to voice dissention if they
think you’re going in the wrong direction. Most non-profit boards don’t do that. People
either have sidebar conversations, or go gripe to one another afterwards. (I-14)
Lack of open disagreement did not equate to a board in agreement in many of the situations
discussed.
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An unfortunate situation was related by an individual who served as board chair when a
board member violated the trust of fellow board members by going public with confidential
board discussion. The board was contemplating a strategic change in direction and had agreed
not to publicly discuss the change until they finalized a plan to move forward with the proposal.
One board member kind of was in the background torpedoing what we were, or just
going against… to the point where the, somebody, I don’t know if it was this guy or
somebody else, but someone alerted the media and so there was all of a sudden there was
a big column in the local paper…. saying this is happening…and “ain’t” it a terrible
thing. (I-7)
Another example of how difficult it can be for a board when one member exhibits bad behavior.
We had a break-in, with a stolen big-screen TV that ended up in the hands of another
board member…as in buying it as stolen property….Turns out that he did tell us that he
thought it was damaged and he replaced it but we haven't seen him since. He hadn't
shown up in probably 10 months to any in board meetings. (I-19)
Whether out of embarrassment or fear of prosecution the fact that the individual never showed
up again did save the board from having to take action on something controversial.
There were other participants who talked about how personalities and disagreement
created tension and caused discomfort for some.
And it got stressful. There was so much tension between the president and a couple of
the vice-presidents. It’s like the gang of three that really knocked heads with the CEO,
and you know, there’d be snotty little comments thrown out. (I-6)
In another instance the board chair’s angry outbreaks caused the interviewee to speak up.
At the beginning of this board the chair was a woman who was really a strong willed
control freak. And constantly injecting her reactions—actually getting into some pretty
intense shouting matches. And I really took it upon myself to say “look, this is how this
works, guys. If you have differences we can figure it out. But if you air them in the
public like that the rest of the board is saying ‘I don’t really want to be a part of this.’”
(I-11)
Separating the behavior of a dysfunctional individual from that of the board as a whole brought
some understanding for a participant. “Normally when you got a loose cannon in an
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organization like that, do negative things from what the majority of the board supported, I mean
that’s just bad behavior” (I-7).
Probably the most elaborate example of how things can go wrong with a board involved a
very difficult situation that resulted in anger and negative consequences for one member of a
board who did not come through with a promised vote on a major decision.
And when it finally came down for a vote…there was like six, seven, eight of us who
voted against it and [Fred] didn’t….Well there were some angry reactions…. I remember
[another board member] telling me wait till he asks me for money and [Fred’s
organization] he’s not getting it….He was a turncoat in his vote and so some people were
angry at him because when you counted the votes you counted him as a no. (I-3)
There were boards that were able to successfully deal with disagreement. In one case
there was a perception among the members that healthy disagreement was part of the job.
There’s never heated discussions. There’s animated vigorous but open discussion,
because what’s held all of this together is the, without regards of philosophical
differences, the board has huge respect for each other as individuals. And so there’s not a
belief that there’s reason to be suspect of anybody on the board. (I-10)
Another board got better as a result of a similar discussion that took place at a board retreat:
One of our board members asked to speak up because she was very frustrated with
something.... for the most part, we feel that one, we can say things, that perhaps in the
past could not say, and that they won’t be held against us, at least by most people. (I-14)
Bad board behaviors, especially those that cause discomfort, influence individuals’
willingness to serve. In terms of crisis, they have the potential to be not only the root of the
crisis but to obstruct a board’s ability to recognize that the organization is on the brink of
disaster. When boards are comfortable dealing with disagreement decision making has a better
chance of being effective.
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Table 4.4
The Tangled Web Context
The Tangled Web Context
Individuals on the board
Board as a group
Policies and processes
Limited time and information
Policies and processes. Board policies and processes are the third characteristic of
context as summarized on Table 4.4 for the Tangled Web. The relative effectiveness of the
policies and procedures varied considerably according to the interviewees. “Well, as far as the
how it’s written on paper yes, it’s very clear…but in reality it doesn’t necessarily play out that
way” (I-4). While it is not uncommon to find less experienced board members unsure about how
one goes about serving on a board of directors, the organizations discussed were all fairly
sizeable in terms of revenue and other assets. Few had formal orientation for new board
members or continuous training required for all. Many had a formal board evaluation process
with clearly defined expectations for members, but in several cases that definition was primarily
with regard to fundraising. All had defined bylaws and policies but not always complete or
effective or even understood. One individual currently serving as the CEO of a nonprofit
organization discussed previous experiences and the way they were handled through policy.
Policy governance if I remember correctly took the position that normally in writing a job
description for president, you told the president what they were empowered to do. Under
policy governance, you turn that around. In policy governance you told the president
what they were not allowed to do. And anything beyond that then, was left to the
discretion of the president. (I-16)
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Another talked about accepted practice and the lack of impact of official board policies and
procedures. “You had some people who really had no idea what you meant by bylaws or
whatever. They were going to vote “yes”, they were going to vote with the chair” (I-3).
Virtually all of the boards discussed in detail had a defined committee structure, and
some committees were quite powerful. Executive committees often made the major decisions
and then shared with the full board for a vote, or not.
Decisions are made outside of the board meeting, and some executive committees are
very, very powerful. To me they should be a steering committee, setting the agenda,
making sure what needs to be addressed gets addressed, not, and even though most of the
by-laws say they can make decisions between meetings if they need to, seldom is there
that kind of urgency that you cannot bring something up to the board. But I think what
happens is… a lot of board members feel disengaged. (I-14)
A new board member described an almost unbelievable situation when he raised a question in a
board meeting:
There were these blank looks from the executive committee. Because the executive
committee had sat down and had a lengthy conversation about how they were going to
manage the investments of the board, but they had never put it in writing…. And we were
sitting there listening to this conversation about an investment committee and about the
investment policy and I was the only one that raised my hand and said “can somebody
share that with me. I’d really like to see what we’re doing here.” (I-16)
An investment policy, a policy that would seem to be fairly significant to a board of directors and
to the organization it governs, had been discussed and apparently agreed on by the executive
committee, but there was no documentation, only the scattered memories of the individuals who
had participated.
Other problems surfaced when a small group made decisions and then failed to
adequately inform the entire board about the decisions.
They had 16 vice presidents who served on their executive committee. And they made
all the decisions, and then they kind of informed us. And sometimes they would surprise
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us, you know like I always felt surprised “Oh my God, we’re $3.5 million behind
budget.” (I-13)
It was not always an executive committee. In other situations there was just a small group of
board members, not necessarily the executive committee or if so only a portion of it, that seemed
to control the full board.
When they chose the new CEO, when they chose Jack, a few board members chose him
so it was…basically I would say probably one of those traditional boards that a few
people made all the decisions and it was very hard getting into the mainstream of that.
(I-3)
Another interviewee discussed the small group unofficially controlling the board: “I
think everyone was pretty disgusted with them. But, you didn’t speak up. I mean the only one
that challenged them was the fellow from out of town” (I-8). A woman related a similar story of
small group board members: “and they were running it, the good old boy way. They were
making the decisions, or they thought they were making decisions and then they would present it
to the board” (I-14).
While term limits can be a much debated topic on boards, an absence of term limits can
lead to the creation of a group that fails to actually govern.
The negative to having term limits is that the [CEO]… can stack the board with all their
people. And that happens frequently and people profit on boards, there’s never anybody
on that board that says no. There’s never anybody on that board who has institutional
history. They have allegiance to the president. (I-15)
The ability of a group of individuals to operate as an effective board depended on how
unique experiences and perceptions of group members allowed them to interact and process the
information available. Board policies and procedures should, but often did not assist in that
process.
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Limited time and information. The fourth and final characteristic in the context of the
Tangled Web as summarized on Table 4.4 is limited time and information. “Like many
nonprofit boards, they are at the mercy of the information provided by the management” (I-5).
The availability of relevant information was often a concern to board members. Nonprofit board
members are for the most part outsiders who have no access to anything but what is provided to
the board for discussion. Some felt too much time is spent reporting details when “all of this
information can be already exchanged before we get there” (I-4). Providing the information
ahead of time would require members to invest more time to prepare for meetings and increase
the time required to serve.
All board members did not have access to the same information in many of the stories
related by participants.
Some of the work of the board is not done in full view of the entire board. If you ask me
the question ‘were there some side deals’, I suspect there were; did I know that they were
going on, I didn’t. But I’m sure there were side deals. (I-3)
The same individual goes on to further explain:
There’s always a chosen few who had all the information. The CEO was the type of
person who wasn’t always telling the board what was going on. And he was only sharing
things with a few people and that was making board members very, very upset. (I-3)
Another interviewee described the information available to board members. “So there was a lot
of cloaking, there was a lot of secrecy, a lot of hiding” (I-1) and that prevented the board from
recognizing signs of trouble.
Time was at a premium for most boards. While the board members interviewed
recognized the importance of the board’s actions, they were also quick to mention the
extraordinary amount of time required in an organizational crisis. While those interviewed for
the most part acknowledged the pride they felt when efforts to turn the organization around were
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successful, most also acknowledged that the time and sometimes personal costs involved in
doing so were overwhelming.
Lack of time and inadequate information increase the number of tangles in the web and
make monitoring organizational performance next to impossible for many boards. Along with
the individuals and the groups they comprise and the policies and procedures in effect, time and
information constraints are the characteristics of context in the dimension of the Tangled Web.
Conditions. The context of the Tangled Web addressed nonprofit organization boards
that ultimately faced crisis, the conditions of the Tangled Web impacted actions or inactions of
the board during the crisis (Kools et al., 1996). Conditions in the Tangled Web dimension as
summarized in Table 4.5 include the categories: finance and fundraising, CEO performance,
strategic direction, and environment. Each is discussed in detail.
Table 4.5
The Tangled Web Conditions
The Tangled Web Conditions
It’s about the money
CEO issues
Changing directions
Environmental issues
It’s about the money. The importance of finance and fundraising was noted by a number
of participants who cautioned that in a nonprofit it’s always about the money. The first condition
in the Tangled Web is its about the money or more traditionally finances and fundraising.
Finances were consistently cited by interviewees as the primary challenge in nonprofit
governance. “Since I’ve been on the board, we’ve had significant ups and downs and we have
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always had financial crisis” (I-13). Another participant brought a somewhat different
perspective.
And the biggest thing you deal with, probably more than anything else is budget.
Everything else centers around that. I don’t care who the president hires, fires for what
reason, okay, but I do want to know how he’s expending funds. Are we providing the
services that are appropriate to the community, and using our resources correctly? And
so many times I think the failure of the board is not having enough insight into the
budgetary process. (I-12)
One of the interviewees succinctly explained how it all comes down to cash. “The most
important thing about cash is when you run out of it, you’re out of business” (I-17).
It’s about the money, but that adage about running out of cash did not necessarily hold up
in nonprofits. Several interviewees described organizations that had gone on for years of
“robbing Peter to pay Paul,” always finding a way to pull out of financial shortfalls until
something major happened. Having adequate resources and a history of success allowed an
organization to cover mistakes and failures with minimal board interference and few questions, a
real plus when an opportunity to pursue something innovative presented.
So when they wanted to do [a project] or they wanted to do anything new or being on the
cutting edge they had the money to do it, which is a real difference when you’re on the
board that can absolve any mistakes that are made. (I-3)
When finances get tight, however, boards tend to pay more attention.
On many of the boards discussed, fundraising was viewed as a major responsibility of the
board. Many had a price tag for serving. The “give, get, or get off” mentality often determined
who was invited to the board and who was reappointed when terms were complete. In some
instances interviewees spoke of specific amounts required ranging from $2,500 of give or get per
year to $25,000 a year in personal contributions.
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I don’t have money but I know people with money. (Laughs) I’m a country club honey.
I have been around…I tell my friends who go on a board…you go on to a board they
can’t ask you for money before you go but get prepared when you get there. (I-2)
Another experienced board member warned of the same thing. “That means asking people for
money, and if you’re the, least bit squeamish about that, don’t go on” (I-6).
Interviewees with give or get requirements accepted the reality of taking advantage of
friends and associates.
And on some level you use so much your personal relationships that try to hit up and
during the day we all end up hitting each other up. Right? You pay for mine and I’ll pay
for yours. So I always feel…that there’s sort of this zero sum thing that goes on. And we
all kind of go to each other’s events and we see each other at the same events and I’m
never sure what progress is really being made. (I-11)
The problem identified by some participants was while they were expected to raise funds
they had little input into board decisions. There were reports of how much was raised, but
providing guidance or even input on how the money was spent was often not on the table for
discussion with the entire board. As on interviewee described it “they loved me. I could raise
$150,000, but I knew my opinion was not important” (I-12). Eventually that caused a sense of
frustration for some.
Successful fund-raising efforts in one instance served to mask a conflict of interest. The
interviewee related the story of a fellow board member who personally did significant business
with the organization. “I think it was under the table… there’s something, okay that never came
to the board meeting…his wife has raised a million dollars as a volunteer.… The way I look at
it…its about the dollars” (I-3). The same interviewee goes on to explain why this can happen
And I think that’s what happens in boards, if you don’t have people do the right things
then you have this happening. Yeah and having enough people who would stand up for
it...I mean you have a lot of people on the board who would do the right thing, but they’re
just tired of fighting the issues or whatever. (I-3)
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On the other hand, failing to contribute, financially and otherwise, was mentioned as a criticism
on some boards.
If they’re not willing to write a check, I don’t want them. I’m sorry, but if, whatever
they’re able to do, but they have to be financially committed. If it’s $25, it’s $25. I don’t
care. But they have to make a financial commitment; they have to make a commitment
to promote the organization. (I-17)
CEO issues. The second condition of the Tangled Web summarized in Table 4.5 is CEO
issues. Whether the individual in charge of a nonprofit organization had the title of director,
executive director, president, or chief executive officer, just as in the for-profit world power
issues were involved. Agency theory places the CEO as agent for the board. While in theory the
CEO reports to the board it often seemed like it was the other way around particularly with long
term CEOs who had established relationships and a strong reputation in the community. CEO
issues were identified as contributing to the crisis in 14 of the organizations. Terms like a
“foundation darling” or “a God in the community” were used by interviewees to describe the
organization’s CEO. Those aspects of CEO reputation along with the egos involved made
dealing with executive problems extremely difficult.
Boards tended to rely on the information and recommendations of the CEO in conducting
the organization’s business. “I think what our board runs a risk of and is true with many boards
is…putting complete faith in what the CEO tells us because she’s the only person in that board
meeting from inside the organization” (I-20). Issues with the CEO ranged from personality and
ability to relate to board members to a tendency to spin the facts to incompetence to malfeasance.
CEOs who ignored board members who asked questions or who over reacted to member
concerns limited a board’s ability to recognize that a crisis exists.
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I wanted to raise the question. I wanted more information. And he was very
discomforted by that because in his heart and in his background he’s a political guy. And
he was not used to this. Not used to this—did not like this. (I-1)
An individual who had served as board chair with a CEO unfamiliar or uncomfortable working
with the board described the CEO:
This CEO was, spared no, we’ll put it this way, was very intemperate in expressing
displeasure with board members who didn’t agree with the CEO, and when I was the
chair, wanted those people off the board. “We need to figure out a way to get rid of
blank blank” and I said “because they disagree with you?” “Well, yeah, that’s disruptive,
that just brings the board into chaos.” And I said “You know that’s what board members
are supposed to do. They’re supposed to be the alternative voice. If we got rid of all the
alternative voices, than we’re going to be down the road with blinders on and that is not
going to be good.” (I-10)
Another board member brought in to help clean up a serious financial situation described the
CEO who was let go as “well-respected, but he drove it into the ground. I mean there’s nothing
you can say other than that and that’s the sad part… I liked the guy. It was just one of those
things” (I-17). Interviewees who had served on for-profit boards sensed that nonprofit boards
tended to rely more on the CEO to tell them what to do than for-profit boards.
Changing strategic direction. The third condition in the Tangled Web involves the
strategic direction of the organization. “The main thing that board members should be looking at
is not their routine, its where is this organization going to move in two, three, four, five. What
are the strategic positions and moves that these organizations should be” (I-3). Boards that did it
well thought beyond the usual concerns of making it through another year. Boards that tried to
anticipate future needs and think in terms of changing direction sometimes faced controversy,
something that made boards quite cautious.
It had been talked about at the board level for, I’d say seriously for a year, but it was done
quietly. It was not something that we made public, because I think we felt that it
probably, there could be a negative reaction, and we didn’t want to get people into a
panic if we weren’t really going to go forward with this….It got to the point where it
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seemed like it was going to be the right time to do it because things were in a good way
for the [organization] and that’s the position we wanted to be in to make such a
significant change. (I-7)
The downside was that the board was then faulted for a lack of transparency.
While setting strategic direction is a responsibility of the board, in many organizations it
was actually the CEO and staff who took on that responsibility with the board merely affirming
their direction. CEO’s are the experts in the field and board members tended to be more than
willing to rely on the CEO’s judgment particularly in organizations that had a history of success.
Environment. The fourth and final condition of the Tangled Web summarized in Table
4.5 is the environment. Community characteristics, population shifts, and demographics change
over time, and some organizations had trouble understanding the potential impact on the
organization. Facilities and locations became liabilities and created major problems for some
organizations. One interviewee described the organization’s predicament: “so now this building
25 years later while gorgeous becomes an albatross” (I-13). Another interviewee described the
impact of location on the ability to meet the mission as “losing our franchise” (I-14). The same
individual goes on to explain how the location impacted the organization’s ability to reach the
intended stakeholders because of population shifts in the community.
We had large concentrations from the east side, but there was a growth of population…to
the south and to the west, and…the thought of them coming and literally not just driving
downtown, but driving into inner city, eastern side of [the community]. (I-14)
Clients who moved to the other side of town were unwilling to drive back through town to what
was perceived as an inner city location, but several board members were strongly opposed to
relocating to a more central location. Changing the location proved to be a painful decision
particularly for those board members who valued tradition. In the end the move not only
rejuvenated the organization but led to growth and considerable success.
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Processes. In dimensional analysis primary dimensions are often part of the basic social
processes that intersect with the core processes. The dimensions weave together with some
unique and some overlapping categories. Here in the core dimension of the Tangled Web
summarized in Table 4.6 processes include monitoring conditions, Recognizing, Responding and
Stepping Up. Monitoring conditions will be discussed here. The processes of Recognizing,
Responding, and Stepping Up each rise to the level of primary dimensions, and will be discussed
in more detail in the section on primary dimensions that follows.
Table 4.6
The Tangled Web Processes
The Tangled Web Processes
Monitoring conditions
Recognizing
Responding
Stepping Up
Monitoring. A board’s ability to monitor conditions is the next piece of the Tangled Web
dimension. Monitoring conditions is the first process in the Tangled Web. Traditionally boards
are responsible for monitoring the performance of the organization to ensure the mission and
needs of stakeholders are being met. Duties for which the board was responsible according to
interviewees and consistent with governance theory included monitoring the financial position of
the organization. On many boards that included a substantial commitment to fundraising.
Boards also hired, monitored, and fired the CEO and set strategic direction for the organization
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as well. These activities required board members to at least be aware of the external
environment in which the organization operated.
Monitoring was complicated by the board’s dependence on the CEO to provide the
information necessary and by the lack of universally understood measures of acceptable
performance. Absent the profit motive, performance in nonprofit organizations was far more
difficult to evaluate. While board members were quick to point out that they held the CEO
accountable, out of necessity they relied on the CEO to tell the board what it needed to know.
Board members seemed to think that nonprofit CEOs preferred it that way and time-crunched
boards of volunteers were often more than willing to go along with that preference. Greenleaf
(1975) indicates that nonprofit boards are primarily ceremonial, and many of the interviewees’
comments supported that. CEOs had the ability to limit the information the board received to
that which confirmed whatever message the CEO wanted the board to have. As one interviewee
explained about boards, “they, like everything else, evolve over time to reflect the CEO” (I-1).
Long term CEO’s amassed a lot of power, and that power seemed to impact how effectively a
board monitored.
Summary of core dimension. Trapped in a web—that is the way that most boards
appear to function a lot of the time. These are just a sampling of the stories. Every participant
was able to relate multiple examples of how the things that go on between and among members
both within and outside the board room limited the ability of any board member to fully
understand the signals warning of a potential crisis. This complex maze of what is right and
what is wrong, what is expected and what is ignored, who has a say and who does not, and who
is in and who is out is influenced by skills, experience, and abilities of the individuals involved
and how they function as a group.
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It is within this Tangled Web of perceptions and behaviors summarized in Table 4.1 that
boards attempt to function. For that reason the Tangled Web serves as the core dimension for
boards facing crisis, providing not only perspective for the other primary dimensions of
Recognizing, Responding and Stepping Up, but also serves as context and defines conditions. In
good times serving on a nonprofit board was a positive experience and boards were willing and
almost eager to just do the minimum. Vigilance requires time and energy that boards and
organization leadership often lacked. The Tangled Web provides a frame for understanding how
a board misses signals that the organization is headed for trouble and why the board often fails to
get involved until the organization is on the brink of disaster.
The Tangled Web processes of Recognizing, Responding, and Stepping Up serve as the
primary dimensions for explaining the ways that board members experience and make meaning
of a crisis in the organization they serve. Each of the processes will be explained in terms of
their dimensional matrices in the next sections followed by a discussion of the outcomes of the
core dimension.
Primary Dimension: Recognizing
The primary dimension of Recognizing a crisis takes place within the context and
conditions of the Tangled Web. The processes involved in the Recognizing dimension are asking
questions; hiding behind the curtain; and acknowledging signals. The ability to detect the
signals of trouble determine the outcome of Recognizing, whether the board remains Tangled
within the Web or moves to its outer edges where signals are clearer and decisive action to solve
a problem becomes possible. The Recognizing dimensional matrix is illustrated in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7
Primary Dimension: Recognizing
Context

Conditions

the tangled web

Processes

Outcomes

asking questions

moving to edges of the web

hiding behind the curtain

staying tangled within the web

acknowledging signals

Context and conditions. Recognizing the signs of crisis takes place in a Tangled Web,
wrapping in, out, over, and through in a way that can obscure problems. The composition and
experience of members as well as how they related to each other and to the CEO impacted the
way a board received and interpreted information about the organization. Detecting signals that
it’s about the money, that there are issues with the CEO, that there is a need for changing
directions, or that there are environmental issues should on the surface be rather straightforward.
Reality was far more complex and often significant periods of time were required for a board to
determine something was wrong. Financial information can be difficult to interpret under any
circumstance. Performance issues with a CEO who had become a friend to many on the board
were easily ignored. Changing strategic direction was often painful and prone to creating
controversy. All were framed within an external environment that could not be controlled.
Meeting time was limited so that debating how to respond to a controversial or poorly
understood issue was easy to avoid. Board size as well as board processes and norms that favor
congeniality over conflict complicated matters even more. “Wait and see if it goes away or fixes
itself” was a tempting response, but issues ignored for long enough quickly escalated to a full
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blown crisis. Making meaning of the available information was neither simple nor
straightforward within the web.
Diversity of thought improved the chances that a board would detect and recognize
signals that something was not quite right. Fear of micromanaging or interfering in operations,
however, inhibited that recognition. Unfortunately in this day and age when boards are under
attack for failing to detect problems the line between interfering and fiduciary duty was thin and
not necessarily straight. “If we don’t know where that line is about micromanaging and over
speaking and establishing policy we might miss something” (I-20).
Another interviewee expressed concern about the need of a board to understand fiduciary
duty.
For some reason they felt that the fiduciary responsibilities of the director in a nonprofit
were somehow different than the responsibilities in a for-profit. While this same crisis
might have caused more alarm in a for-profit company, it didn't seem—and I've seen this
happen time and time again—it didn't seem to raise the level of concern that it would
have justified. (I-5)
When in doubt, board members with a concern about fiduciary duty felt that even when there
was perceived pressure to ignore a situation a board member had an obligation to express
concern. “Well I think if there’s issues, I don’t think for the sake of speaking up but I think as a
board member that you have to stand up for certain issues” (I-3). An experienced board member
talked about how to develop that ability.
I think over the years you learn how to do it without being offensive… I think you have
to allow people a voice and not get angry about what they say, understand what they’re
saying….You’ve got to keep people in power who won’t agree with you. That’s so
important. You don’t become really good at what you do when you’re around yes
people. It’s the people who give you a hard time. (I-2)
The context and conditions make the recognition of crisis a challenge for many boards.
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Processes. The processes involved in the Recognizing dimension summarized in Table
4.8 include asking questions, hiding behind the curtain, and acknowledging signals.
Table 4.8
Responding Processes
Responding Processes
Asking questions
Hiding behind the curtain
Acknowledging signals
Asking questions. Questioning or even speaking up in meetings was not always an
accepted practice for board members even though the right questions can actually move the
board to the edges of the Tangled Web where more effective action is possible. There was
considerable pressure to make sure that meetings were brief and progressed efficiently. In many
instances the CEO or a committee had already made the decision and the full board was expected
to affirm the decision. Asking questions slowed down the meeting. Questions were viewed as
trouble and that led to questions about how board members developed the requisite
understanding of a situation sufficient to make good decisions.
They didn’t want me there because I was asking questions. Because every time
something would happen I would go do research. I was on Guidestar, I was looking at all
these nonprofit leadership things saying this just doesn’t smell right to me. This doesn’t,
well aside from the fact that I would ask those question they had absolutely no problem
using my name, my title, and my affiliation on letterhead. And my attitude about that
was if I represent that organization I need to be able to say to the president of my
organization if some sort of financial scandal erupts I did everything I could to try to
bring this to light. (I-1)
But sometimes individual board members, particularly those new to a board, were afraid
to ask questions. “You know we know and yet we are afraid to bring it up….we've been afraid
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to question and we know better” (I-18). Some interviewees were quite reflective about what they
missed or might have been able to do had they acted sooner.
And as the new board member I think I should have been asking that question. So I had
the question in my mind but I never asked it. I think it was one of those things like that I
assumed that it was being done a certain way which is the way that it should be done and
I just didn’t ask. I feel badly about that. Because I might have missed this by at least six
months you know it could have been that we’d seen something a little bit earlier. (I-20)
Even when a new board member was asked what he/she thinks, the individual may have felt that
the question was intended to reinforce a decision and responding honestly was fruitless.
Distance and hindsight provided perspective.
The executive committee had made all the decisions along the way. And we just kept
watching, they used decline, decline, decline, decline decline, and we knew we were
going to close our doors. I mean that was it. There was nothing, nobody was
passionate…. Nobody was passionate for the institution and no one really cared. (I-14)
Questions were not always productive and based on other experiences that may have
biased individual board members. “People were asking questions, but the discussions sort of
would really get side tracked off of the agenda” (I-17). Another pointed out “there’s other
people that like to hear themselves talk, and they’ll ask every question in the world” (I-4). Even
when the right questions were asked, responses did not always provide board members with
adequate information. “I think what our board runs a risk of and is true with many boards is in
putting complete faith in what the CEO tells us because she’s the only person in that board
meeting from inside the organization” (I-20).
Even more troubling were the consequences for board members who posed difficult
questions. Marginalizing the questioner was a common tactic for responding by a group or
*individual in power, and it took a strong individual to not be intimidated.
The president of the board did not appreciate it at all. She took it as a bucking of
authority….When it became clear to me that there were issues that needed to be
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managed, then I rebuffed, I rebuffed a very specific outreach by the board chair to step
down from the board who basically challenged me in an email to me copied to the CEO
that if I was finding such difficulties working with them that perhaps it was going to be
time to step down, which I promptly copied to the entire board and said it is so
unfortunate that this kind of conversation goes on. I am very happy to be involved with
this organization. Have a nice summer. (I-1)
Too many questions actually led to a sort of coup and ultimate failure of an organization
when a small group of the board who did not like questions or comments created a new board, to
ensure that the board remained deeply embedded within the Tangled Web. In one situation it
signaled the end.
They wanted it their way, or it was no way. And so that’s what happened. And so to
make a short story long…they weren’t pleased and they somehow, they got rid of the
CEO….They took over. I think three [board members] took over and they were the
people in charge…and at that point they wanted new board members, and so they got rid
of all of us, too. And even board members that had been on there….There was all this
stuff in the paper, the [organization’s] going to survive, and I think that lasted three
months and then it really went downhill. Those board members, the new board members,
started to scatter, and then it was just all over shortly after that. (I-8)
In another situation when the board was reorganized after a difficult merger decision, a board
member who had asked questions believed that was behind the selection of those who would
remain on the board. “A lot of people who spoke up basically…people like the only black
female we had…was eliminated, people who had been on there years and years and years, the
captains of industries they were eliminated, I was eliminated” (I-3).
Asking the right questions, however, can push a board to the edges of the Tangled Web
where the opportunity for an effective response was more likely.
There were people who had questions, as to why undertake this, there was good
discussions, and the issues that were brought up, I think that by the time we took the vote
and there had been enough discussion and enough understanding of how potential and
negative things people saw about it were going to be addressed. (I-7)
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The biggest problem inside the web was that all of the relevant information never came out when
those who questioned were discouraged or in any other way shut down.
Hiding behind the curtain. When there were questions about a potential crisis situation
board members sometimes felt like they were working with the wizard of Oz, always wondering
what was hiding behind the curtain, the second Recognizing process as summarized in Table 4.8.
“The president never wanted the board to have “bad news” which in our world we’d say are
accurate financials. So there was a lot of cloaking, there was a lot of secrecy, a lot of
hiding” (I-1).
Sometimes there was just an overall lack of pertinent information available raising
questions about how the management was able to efficiently run the organization. “There were
no financial statements…it was no profit or loss statement… indicators to me that something was
wrong” (I-19). Another talked about attempting to get information from the board treasurer for
reporting purposes. “It was like impossible to get these records, and they would send the wrong
thing, the wrong years, it was just I was always really skeptical” (I-8).
Hiding behind the curtain was almost a sign of denial in the situations related by
interviewees. It was easier to accept the explanations provided and assume they must be valid
rather than Recognize and acknowledge a crisis. It enabled the board to keep on with business as
usual. As long as there was a plausible explanation a board could hope a problem would
eventually work itself out.
The first couple of years that they saw the statements, and of course the first time that
management says we're going to replace all of this and do all of these things, and then the
next year it hadn't happened. (I-5)
The same interviewee talked about another organization in crisis during his board tenure. The
board was unwilling to deal with the real issue—the competence of a likeable CEO.
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We had multiple personnel problems….And this happened not once but repeatedly…
everyone wanted to give this person every opportunity, every chance. They wanted to
restructure so that the lines of reporting were different. They kept hoping that we could
solve the problem with an organizational chart. (I-5)
One of the most difficult problems that a board faced was the troubling performance of a
long-term respected CEO. In those cases boards had a tendency to accept explanations and
excuses that would ordinarily be deemed questionable. An interviewee brought on to the board
to help turn the organization around after the CEO had been dismissed explained how the
personal relationships held the board back.
On the one hand, they had tremendous respect for him, but on the other hand, they could
see that things weren’t being done properly. The [organization] began to deteriorate…to
generate really large losses every year. The foundations that had supported the
[organization] sort of abandoned their contributions. The physical plants started to decay
because there was no money to really keep it up. (I-17)
But the interviewee seemed just as conflicted. As an experienced CEO and board member
himself he found it hard to believe that the board could deny the situation for so long. On the
other hand he also knew the former CEO and in a comment that indicated tremendous insight
and honesty acknowledged “I’m not saying that I wouldn’t have done the same thing. I don’t
know” (I-17).
Acknowledging signals. Effective boards did question troublesome signals. The
challenge, the thing that could drive the board to the outer edges of the Tangled Web, was to
acknowledge the signals and understand that some action is necessary. This third process of
Recognizing as summarized in Table 4.8 often involved committing what has been portrayed as
the capital sin of board service, interfering in operations.
As a board we need to feel free and open to ask questions. Even if they’re, even if it’s
just part of the discussion…better to step into operations and have the discussion and
realize we need to step back than to never have the discussion….What worries me is if
we knew, if I knew clearly that there was potentially even [the issue] that was reported to
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me and I didn’t do anything about it then I felt like I was not holding up my responsibility
as a board member. (I-20)
In many of the stories it took the operational involvement of board members before the board
recognized how serious the situation was and respond accordingly.
Acknowledging issues may not be enough to save an organization dealing with a crisis
that threatens its existence, but when it led to a firm understanding of the situation the ultimate
result was less painful. Changes in the community or environment decreased the need for
provided services or made the cost of the services provided no longer justifiable. A board that
recognized that was able to phase out in a way that minimized pain for all involved.
We were essentially robbing Peter to pay Paul as it was related to our expenses and our
income. And we had a couple, we had three events throughout the year that generated
revenue to give us a batch of revenue… and we could defer the payments to our
suppliers. But we were just kind of pushing the rat down the snake. We knew at some
end it was going to…come out the other end…the whole board saw it coming. (I-4)
With this recognition the board planed a systematic phase out of the organization in a way that
was equitable and minimized negative consequences for all stakeholders. Recognizing the need
to move on was not easy, but a board able to do so was able to change the perspective of the
outcome from failure to that of a natural progression.
The processes of asking questions, hiding behind the curtain, and acknowledging signals
often played out like a dance with questions asked, and incomplete responses accepted.
Additional questions were dismissed as irrelevant and questioners who persisted were often
marginalized for asking. When boards ignored the signals or avoided the discussions they
remained confined within the web. It was only when one or more members continued to push
the issues and insist that the board acknowledge that problems exist that a board could move to
the outer margins of the web. While moving to the edges of the web did not ensure a positive
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outcome, accepting that a crisis exists was the first step. A board must acknowledge that the
issue is real.
Outcomes. The Recognizing dimension has two potential outcomes: moving to the edge
of the web, and staying tangled within the web. Recognizing outcomes influence the ultimate
outcome for the organization. Boards that asked the questions and acknowledged the signs of
crisis were more likely to move to the outer edges of the web where chances for successful
Responding increased. Staying tangled within the web, failing to recognize the signals,
ultimately results in a failing organization.
Summary of recognizing dimension. In the end it was the ability of a board to recognize
the signs of crisis and to acknowledge the issues and need for action that determined whether an
organization was able to recover. Seeing the issue clearly was not likely to happen deep within
the web and boards that could not get through that were at a disadvantage. At some point a
board needs to move out of the tangled maze to the outer edges of the web into the responding
dimension to determine what comes next.
Primary Dimension: Responding
Recognizing signs of an impending crisis sounds easy, but for most boards it was not.
The ability to untangle some of the issues and wiggle out to the edges of the web where escape
was possible was critical for an organization to thrive. But even getting there did not guarantee
success or even the opportunity to respond. The Tangled Web defines context and conditions for
the dimension of Responding. Processes for Responding include Stepping Up; meeting
immediate needs; and changing—finances, CEO, or strategic direction. The outcomes of the
Responding dimension are failing; muddling; or thriving organization. The process of Stepping
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Up had such a substantial impact on the outcome that Stepping Up was raised to the level of a
primary dimension. Details of the Responding dimension are summarized in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9
Primary Dimension: Responding
Context

Conditions

Processes
stepping up

the tangled web

meeting immediate needs
changing finances, CEO,
strategic direction

Outcomes
failing organization-never gets out of the
tangled web
"just existing" or muddling organization steps out of the tangled web for short term fix
then slides back into the web
thriving organization- leaves the web behind
with sustained long term solutions

The primary dimension of Responding can take place within or outside the Tangled Web
but the more deeply embedded within the Web, the less likely the outcome was satisfactory.
Responses ranged from denial and doing nothing, to a quick fix that put a band aid on the injury,
to systemic changes in the way that the board and the organization functioned. First responses
generally addressed the immediate needs but sustaining the change and committing to long term
solutions took time and those efforts were difficult to sustain.
Deciding how to Respond can take place within the web but the deeper in the Tangled
Web that happens the less likely efforts will be successful. Decisions made within the web were
likely to be confusing with little clarity surrounding the issue and no real consensus about what
action was necessary. The result is likely to not just be a mess but rather result in the ultimate
failure of the organization. If a board is able to move at least to the outer edges of the Tangled
Web with some agreement as to the need for action, potential exists for someone or some group
to demonstrate the final primary dimension of Stepping Up. Stepping Up and out of the Tangled
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Web for making decisions provided the group a better chance for solutions that not only met
immediate needs but began to address the systemic issues responsible for many of the web
entanglements.
Processes. Responding is conditioned by the ability of the board to assume both short
and long term perspectives. There is clearly a need to deal with the immediate issue quickly and
effectively but in most crisis situations there is also a need to make systemic changes for the
purpose of preventing the same situation from happening again. The processes involved in the
primary dimension of Responding as summarized in Table 4.10 include meeting immediate
needs; changing finances, CEO, and/or strategic direction; and Stepping Up.
Meeting immediate needs. In many crisis scenarios there was a need to act swiftly. As
one interviewee stated quite succinctly “time is not your friend” (I-9).
There is no perfect solution, you need to move. You need to make a change, whatever,
you have to make some decisions and make a move. And it might be the wrong decision,
but you need to move. You can’t just sit, you know the expression you can’t just keep
doing what you were doing and expect different results. (I-9)
Removing a CEO who had misappropriated funds was a quick decision for one board. “I don’t
remember what the monetary implications of that was, but we decided that it doesn’t matter
whether it’s 50 bucks or $50,000, we need to go another direction…it was very straightforward”
(I-4). Few other situations resulted in such an obvious response.
When a board recognized that the organization was in a tenuous financial position that
could not continue, things had to happen quickly to stabilize the organization. “Financially there
were debts that needed to be paid. There were accounts that were in arrears. There were a lot of
issues that had to be managed” (I-1). Another related a rather straightforward and prescriptive
response.
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You need to immediately lower costs to more correctly reflect the revenues that you
have. Secondly, if the current management is not 100 percent on board with that you
need to immediately change them, and you need to bring in new management. And then
you need a strategic plan. (I-5)
Just taking the quick and obvious action was not always enough.
Some organizations with a serious financial situation had the need to raise cash quickly.
The actions necessary to do that were sometimes quite controversial.
We had a lot of issues and a building that was aging very fast and was very expensive.
To have your overhead of a million and a half just to keep the lights on, the heat going
and all that kind of stuff when you could be putting that in [services] it was very hard to
raise dollars from individuals….The sun and moon and the stars all aligned and we
thought, “Well here we can free ourselves up by selling…and we will not have to worry
about raising $36 million to renovate our building which we knew we could not do.
(I-14)
Meeting the immediate cash needs through drastic actions solved the crisis, at least in the short
term, but more had to happen to ensure long term success.
“There are good points about keeping an organization alive and there are bad parts; if you
keep it alive then people doubt that you were in trouble” (I-1). The quick action in some cases
just delayed the inevitable and prolonged the agony. “Sometimes you need to let things die….It
was the right decision and the right course. Could we have done some things better? Yes”
(I-15). The interviewee in this case as well as another interviewee from a different organization
understood that the organization had outlived its usefulness.
Getting past the immediate crisis was critical, but in many of the cases discussed it was
not enough. Short term solutions gave the organization time, but unless the structural and
systemic issues were dealt with and changes made, organizations were likely to just “muddle”
through, continuing to exist but never getting out of the Tangled Web.
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Changing. Many solutions and systemic changes take time and patience. Those things
were easier if there was some time and if the board was committed to keep the organization
alive. It was also critical to have adequate leadership to see the solution through. With time,
strategy, and committed leadership on the board and within the organization it was possible to
take an organization from the brink to a thriving organization.
Changing is a critical process in the Responding dimension as summarized in Table 4.10.
Whether the change was in the business model, the CEO, or strategic direction, it took time.
Systemic change often requires adaptive learning on the part of the board, the CEO, and at times
even in stakeholder groups. The changing process includes changing finance; changing CEO;
and changing strategic direction.
Table 4.10
Responding Processes
Responding Processes
Stepping up
Meeting immediate needs
Changing finances, CEO, strategic direction
Changing finances. Financial stability is a goal that is difficult to achieve in the current
environment. Nonprofit organizations are no exception. Many organizations are chasing the
same foundation and grant dollars. The way out of crisis for many involved developing a
sustainable business model and sound financial management.
We needed time to change the business model. And we needed a little time to get that
done….We cut the budget…by 50 percent. And we increased the number of [clients],
and we improved the product, and did it for half the amount. So once we did that and we
showed that to the foundation community, they became very supportive, and they stayed
with us and have continued to stay with us as we changed the model from so heavy with
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foundations to a model that includes more corporate support and more earned income.
(I-5)
Another told a similar story how a substantial change in business models resulted in a thriving
organization.
They were in serious, serious financial problems that was one of the boards that I wound
up chairing and established a new financial model, and now they actually are incredibly
profitable. So we rose from the ashes of that board. (I-10)
Other interviewees uncovered far more serious financial issues that had not been readily
apparent to the board.
I went in to talk to the administrative assistant and subsequently discovered that bills
weren’t being paid because he couldn’t get enough grant money so we owed a whole pile
of money. They had taken out a loan which I didn’t know about, from the bank that loan
could be called in at any time. So it was chaotic so he was let go….I wanted to fire him
immediately but you know you have a board. You have to do things like that. So he was
let go. (I-19)
These substantive changes in the way to do business take time.
It’s about managing expectations so… we established a bi-monthly finance committee
conference call where the CEO and the finance guy would report to the finance
committee. We established a finance committee…and I would always say “So what’s
your expectation for the year? Where do you think we’re going to be? (I-17)
Another common solution for nonprofit organizations facing a financial crisis was
merging or partnering with other organizations that have similar missions and goals. Multiple
interviewees identified collaborative efforts with other organizations as an option that the board
considered. “Either you gobble a little or you get gobbled” (I-3). “Nonprofits are really going to
have a hard time if they don’t partner because they do duplication of efforts” (I-2). Another
experienced change agent explained: “one of the first things that I do is look for other
organizations with whom we can collaborate or partner with or merge” (I-5). Partnering,
however, requires the right mindset from the board.
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We all have a need and we all have an asset to bring to the table. And we are
collaborators, to me it is a collaboration that plays on each of our strengths and where
there’s nobodies nose’s are out of joint…there are no egos involved. So you sort of
knock out all the things that can cause these things to go bad. (I-14)
Partnering or collaborating organizations were often attractive to foundations, and some
combinations found their financial situation improved dramatically.
We hadn’t even rehearsed anything and our energy kept getting higher and higher and
higher. Each of the three of us talked about it, the power of three and she finally put her
hand on the table and grabbed mine and she said “I want this to be power of four. We
can give you a million and a half.” It all started and it’s not even a foundation on
anybody’s radar screen. (I-14)
Increasing the ability to attract funders through some sort of collaboration was not
necessarily enough to make things happen. Strong resistance from an individual or small group
of decision makers railroaded completely viable solutions for multiple organizations.
There was actually a guy from the state…comes in to actually talk about the
consolidation process and how you do it and on and on and on. So we said sweet, we’ll
do that….The conversation went on for six months and finally, I guess, the chairman of
the board of [the other organization] said no, we’re not going to do it. So then the rest of
the board said no, we’re not going to do it. (I-4)
Another talked about how emotion adds to the issue. The individual was chair-elect when she
resigned from the board of a financially struggling organization because the board was unwilling
to consider an offer to merge or partner when approached by a similar organization.
They were just going to continue year, after year, wringing their hands struggling to find
enough money to make the lights go on….Here was an opportunity that was being given
to them….It was my first experience watching emotion and this ownership of something
that was intangible. (I-14)
Another explained his observation: “In most mergers of nonprofits the problem usually is the
executive director, the management of the organizations, and the boards. Once the organizations
are merged, it usually works very well” (I-5).
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The bottom line is often the bottom line, even in nonprofit organizations. No matter how
great the service or product provided was, without adequate funding an organization could not
survive. Particularly in times of economic uncertainty boards must insure their organizations are
operating in a fiscally responsible way.
Changing CEOs. The second kind of change, changing the chief executive, was probably
the most difficult of changes for a board to make. Stories about how the board struggled to
accommodate an executive that was clearly not a good fit abounded even when the problem was
obvious.
We want to give her another shot…She was angry. She was angry and she was
uncomfortable and she really blamed….And even after we got the survey results back
and the survey was not good and the comments were very strong and very negative about
a divide between administration and staff within the organization she still pointed
blame…that is what concerns me about her ability to see sort of her own problems.
(I-20)
It was usually the board chair who had to deal with the dysfunctional CEO.
I was chair of the board. We, basically my attitude was to mentor the person to a better
place, better space….So what I did was make sure that my successor picked up where I
left off. And his profession was as a consultant, so he was able to do that because that’s
basically a role and set of skills that he had. And at the end of his period of time, he and I,
we’re very good friends, we got together and laughed about how difficult that whole
thing was. (I-10)
In neither of these cases was the board able to actually remove the CEO.
Another participant talked about how the board struggled with a similar situation but was
totally unable to get the point across. “It was more, more getting frustrated and ringing our
hands, not knowing what to do. How many more ways can we tell him he’s got to shape up,
(laughter) try things differently” (I-6)? Even when the decision was reasonably clear to all, there
was a still a tendency to let the individual try one more time or find a way for the executive to
save face.
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It was just very clear to the entire community that it wasn’t working and we weren’t
moving ahead….We arranged a deal to save face for everybody. Because a lot of times
the reasons you dismiss somebody are not that they’re bad people, but that the fit’s
wrong, or the times are wrong and I think it’s really important to help them move on to
the next step. (I-15)
Even when the board voted to terminate a CEO, it did not necessarily mean it was over. One
board went to what seemed to be extensive lengths to allow the CEO to save face.
He did not believe that the board would actually fire him….We offered him a chance to
resign. He turned that down rather impolitely and so the board…went into executive
session, came out and on a 7-0 voted to terminate the CEO….His attorney meanwhile had
a chance to talk with him…. The CEO volunteered to resign retroactive to an earlier
date...we rescinded the termination notice and accepted his resignation. He had never
been accountable and he was, in a sense that we believed that he should be accountable
and that he should follow the lead of his board rather than leading the board. (I-16)
For any of a number of reasons even though a board recognized there was a problem with
the CEO, responding in a way that would have moved the organization forward was often a
problem. Cutting staff positions, while difficult, seemed to be much easier for a board than
cutting the CEO who reports directly to them.
Changing strategic direction. Changing directions, the third change process in the
Responding dimension, is not easy. Even engaged boards still have differences on what is an
appropriate course of action. Stakeholders will not necessarily concur with the changes. How a
board dealt with the differences impacted the ultimate resolution of not only the controversy but
also how the organization came through the crisis.
One participant talked about how the board was dealing with a controversial current issue
at the time of the interview.
There’s a philosophical split over tactics, but not over the expected results….What has
happened is that every time the board responds and the [community official] comes up
with some new set of questions or issues which of course feeds that part of the board that
believes that it will never be satisfied because this is a political agenda. It feeds that
belief, and that what I’d call a fester. (I-10)
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Another related a story about an outcry from some stakeholders about a proposed change.
So at the end of the day the board had the vote, had decided to open everything up and
have a do over in terms of looking at the whole issue of a [strategic] change….It took
about 10 months…to get constituents around to understanding why we were doing this.
(I-7)
Unionized employees also had an impact on a board’s perception of how far a strategic
change could go. That kind of battle rarely ends on a positive note and negative consequences
can impact the organization for a long time.
And it led us to a position of almost going to strike. And that was for probably the first
time in the institutions history, coming down to almost the 11th hour, and we thought
about a lot of, and still is, discontent, frustration, confusion, irritation, anger, all those
kind of emotional feelings that come out during a really incensed collective bargaining
process (I-12)
Even though it had been several months since the situation had resolved, the interviewee
admitted that there would be repercussions for a long time. He had no reservations about the
decisions made by the board but recognized that there was a price for doing what the board
believed was the right thing to do.
Outcomes. Outcomes for the Responding dimension as summarized in Table 4.9 are
failing, muddling, or thriving organizations. A discussion of these outcomes follows the details
of the Stepping Up dimension.
Summary of responding dimension. Meeting immediate needs, changing strategic
direction, changing CEO’s, financial models, and any of the other systemic changes necessary to
get an organization out of a crisis, were painful processes. There are no guarantees these actions
will ensure the long term success of the organization. It was the critical process of Stepping Up,
so significant that it rose to the level of a primary dimension, most likely to be the difference
between a thriving and a muddling organization.
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Primary Dimension: Stepping Up
Stepping Up is the process and dimension that moves the board out of a Tangled Web into
a space where clarity can be achieved. Board responses become better focused and directed
toward long term solutions. That increases the chances for positive results and a thriving
organization. It may be precipitated by a single individual, a small group of board members, or
even the CEO. Stepping Up takes place within the context and conditions of the Tangled Web.
A discussion of the processes and outcome of Stepping Up follows and is summarized in
Table 4.11. Following that is the discussion of outcomes for the Responding dimension.
Table 4.11
Primary Dimension: Stepping Up
Context

Conditions Processes
tipping point

Outcomes
moving out of the tangled web

taking charge
the tangled web

seeing it through
sliding back

“I think you’ve got to have people who drive” (I-2). Stepping Up was probably the
greatest differentiator between success and failure for a board facing an organization in crisis.
Stepping out from the edges of the Tangled Web into a clear environment where a board can
develop an understanding and come to agreement on the best possible response was the critical
factor if the organization was going to emerge from the crisis and ultimately thrive.
Context and conditions. Boards caught deep in the Tangled Web could not get a big
enough ladder to climb out. In the cases that ended well there was some individual or group of
board members Stepped Up and took charge. Whether out of frustration or because a glimpse of
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clarity forced learning, someone Stepping Up tended to pull the rest of the group up the ladder.
Outside of the Tangled Web the board was more likely to determine a clear direction and take
action. Directors who could not or choose not to join in and learn were left behind.
Processes. The processes involved in Stepping Up as summarized in Table 4.12 include
tipping point; taking charge; seeing it through; and sliding back.
Tipping point. There was often a tipping point that forced some individual or group to
Step Up and acknowledge the crisis existed. The result becomes an overwhelming need to
respond in a different way. One interviewee related the story about how the finance committee
was making decisions inconsistent with the strategic direction that the finance committee had
actually defined.
They had made a decision in a vacuum, and that was when we got vocal. And it wasn’t
just me, although I was probably the most vocal….We still talk about it to this day, those
of us that are still around. It was a tipping point. It was truly a tipping point…. They
were making the decisions, or they thought they were making decisions, and then they
would present it to the board. It was a very defining moment… we never did [anything]
like that again. (I-14)
And then there were the times when the tipping point came before the board could get a
situation under control. After studying the implications of a change in direction for over a year,
the board of one organization voted to open the potential change up for discussion with
stakeholders. Even though the vote was overwhelmingly positive someone or some small group
of board members who voted against the change decided to go viral rather than wait for the roll
out as the board had planned and they had promised.
So then there’s this big hue and cry. A lot of the [stakeholders] of course were pissed
because they find out not through the [organization], but through, they’re seeing it in
on…the news….So we lost control of the message and then of course then the other thing
that…was kind of interesting was the blogs….A small group who are dead set against the
change start getting more stuff out, so we just completely lost control of the message.
(I-7)
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The board decided on a “do-over” that ultimately resulted in the same decision, setting the
change effort back for ten months. Despite the delays a group of board members engaged and
took control of the situation in a way that ultimately strengthened the board and the organization.
There were times when the tipping point had nothing to do with the board. Something
critical in the environment changed everything and it became clear that the board had to act.
“We anticipated it coming either the end of August or the end of September of 2001. And then
something happened in September that pretty much shoved us over the edge” (I-4). Stepping Up
takes over when someone takes charge and says this is what we will do next.
Table 4.12
Stepping Up Processes
Stepping Up Processes
Tipping point
Taking charge
Seeing it through
Sliding back

Taking charge. The board’s decision to take charge of a crisis usually involved someone
Stepping Up to rally the group. In a group made up of demonstrated leaders any one individual
can decide to exert personal influence. “I sort of feel like, a lot of the things I've been the
catalyst behind them. I put the thought into other people's heads about let’s do this, let's change
this and they're all coming together” (I-18). It was sometimes a group that took charge. One
participant described the situation experienced: “it was a small group, again, at the end of the
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day it was a small coordinated group of board members, kind of, spent a long time battling the
issue and getting the message out” (I-7).
Often the individual was the board chair. Unexpected phone calls got the attention of an
individual who had reluctantly assumed the role of board chair after a series of difficult events.
Within the first week I was chair I had a call from the chairman of every other [similar]
institution saying we’ll buy you, we’ll take you over, we want you. There wasn’t one
chair that didn’t call me….So what I knew then…was that I had something that was
really valuable that they wanted, and I needed to convince the rest of the world that it’s
really valuable (I-15).
Any doubts about survival disappeared. The new chair reorganized the board into a functional
governing body.
Other participants talked about how much of their own time and influence was committed
to the organization once they made the decision to take charge.
It became almost a full-time job for one thing because there were so many areas of that
agency that were close to being illegal….You know going to the bank and begging…him,
please don’t call in our loan. You know whatever you need to do. (I-19)
Another told a similar story about using personal influence to get the organization turned around.
I had to visit with all the foundations, and we had to come to agreement with the CEO to
recognize that he was not the right person for the job, and for us to have a mutual parting
of the ways, and so that he left with some dignity.…I'm still the chair or the president of
the board, at least until I am certain that the model is working and that I have found
someone that can take over. (I-5)
Communication was also identified by multiple participants as critical piece of dealing
with the crisis.
You need to communicate. People need to know what’s going on, the good, the bad and
the ugly. They need to know exactly what is happening. And once you start telling
people what’s happening, you can’t stop, you can’t say “Oh, we’re okay now, we’ll go
back to not telling you what’s going on”. You can’t do that. Once you start
communicating, you’ve got to continue and be as effective at that as you can. (I-9)
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The new board chair who personally committed to saving the organization when other
organization chairs offered to take over talked about how she handled communication with the
board.
I made…a conscious effort to talk to every single person on the board about something,
whatever it was, during this real crisis…. It is the hours and hours of communication time
it takes by the chair to keep everybody in the same place. (I-15)
The second process of Stepping Up as summarized in Table 4.12, taking charge, often
required board members to take on different roles and relate in different ways to the
organization’s CEO. Those who were or had been CEO’s themselves were quite clear about the
respective roles:
My role as chairman of the board…is to help guide the CEO, not be the CEO but help
guide the CEO…. to have the trust of the CEO and provide counsel when requested. Or,
and/or to offer counsel when you think it’s necessary. (I-9)
Another interviewee with similar experiences had a similar approach.
If there was an issue that had the potential to have a negative impact on the entire
operation, I needed to know about it…. But it was not my role to manage the
organization. That was the role of the [CEO]. My role was to coordinate the activities
with the board and conduct the business of the board. (I-16)
Some worried that there could not be too cozy a relationship between board members and
CEO’s especially in the nonprofit environment where the CEO often has considerable input into
selection of new board members. Two other interviewees, both with board chair and CEO
experience, felt that the board needed to be clear about who was in charge. One talked about the
board in general: “board members should be your colleagues but not your best buddies” (I-5).
Another said “I think the chair of the board has to be the boss. You can be friends, you can be a
mentor, but the bottom line is you’ve got to make sure things are running right” (I-15).
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This became even more critical when the crisis was the CEO. One participant related the
story of a CEO who tried to circumvent processes the board had put in place because of
performance issues.
At one point during this whole thing the CEO wanted to meet with me to help her
develop her plan of action. And I said no…we have this process in place and I think that
would be going outside of the process. That is what she’s been accused of doing in many
ways so I didn’t want to be part of that…. She did not understand that. (I-20)
Whether the individual who Stepped Up was the board chair or another member, the
support of the rest of the board was critical for the individual in the board leadership role.
I always had great support from the board. I think they appreciated the fact that I was the
guy who was out there taking the hits….I protected some of the other board members so
that they could make…a decision that was not going to be influenced by, it was to be
made for doing the right thing, rather than being influenced by any public opinion. (I-7)
Another talked about how critical an entire supportive board was during a crisis describing board
colleagues as
…a board that felt like they wanted and saw this as an interesting challenge that could
make a difference and that they were willing to take risks and they weren’t afraid of
failure….I felt very supported, but we were all nervous. (I-15)
The individual who Stepped Up carried a heavy burden through the crisis. The challenge
of keeping the board and CEO engaged and moving in the right direction was rewarding to those
who Stepped Up but often at a huge cost personally. One thing was certain. When the individual
who took charge was not the chair at the time, he/she ultimately became the board chair.
Seeing it through. Someone taking charge was critical to getting a board out of the
Tangled Web and into the process of getting the organization back on track. It was time
intensive and often those who did paid a price for doing so. The biggest challenge though was
not just the quick fix but seeing the changes all the way through, the third process of Stepping
Up as summarized in Table 4.12. One participant described
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…a handful of board members that really took it on in terms of being a committee that
would get on the phone we want maybe six or seven who would be on the phone at least
once a week and would talk about what the strategy was going to be for going forward
and communicating it….There was a group of work horses they…really kind of
coordinated the communications…for months by meeting weekly. And over time, the…
group that had been passionately negative, kind of got less involved and less interested
and less of a force on the negative side. (I-7)
A critical piece of that longer-term orientation was succession planning. Many
interviewees talked about how important it was to bring on new board members and to plan for
other members to take over leadership of the board in the future.
We've turned over…about 60 percent of the board. And I always look for people that, I
think you need one or two or three people on the board that have the potential of
eventually being the chair….There have been times when I've converted a board member
to CEO of the organization when I saw that they took a great interest and had the ability
to manage. (I-5)
A new board chair explained how she was impacting the way the board did business after
coming out from under the crisis.
I’m adding something to the fabric of that organization that will help it move forward. I
have found my replacement, I’ve talked to him already, and he’ll take it over for me in
two years. To me…having controls in place, running it as a good business, having people
understand your decision making and why, and then engaging as many people as possible
in the discussion. (I-14)
While a single individual may have been responsible for Stepping Up, it was clear that
sustaining the changes necessary alone was not possible. It was critical that others were enlisted
to ensure that changes were fully implemented and the organization did not quickly slide back
down into the Tangled Web.
Sliding back. Sliding back, the fourth and final process of Stepping Up as summarized in
Table 4.12 sometimes happened after the initial crisis was resolved but before the changes
necessary to repair systemic issues were fully implemented. There is a natural tendency to
experience relief when the immediate crisis is over and then to slide back to the same kinds of
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things that created the issues. Getting out of the Tangled Web in the short term was easy
compared to staying out of the web. There seemed be a natural tendency for boards of
volunteers to function within a Tangled Web. It did not take long for boards to resume deferring
to the CEO. The one hour meeting standard returned. Meetings were again characterized by
ritual approvals and the reporting of good news.
Outcomes. The outcome for the Stepping Up dimension a summarized in Table 4.11 is
moving outside the web. When an individual or small group of board members stepped up the
board was able to climb out of the tangled web. Outside the web issues and options were clearer,
responses more successful, and outcomes were likely to be better. The sub-processes of seeing it
through and sliding back determined whether the ultimate outcome would be a thriving or
muddling organization.
Responding outcomes. All of the processes involved in a board’s response to a crisis,
whether from within or outside of the Tangled Web, come down to three possible outcomes. A
board that fails to get out of the Tangled Web or at least to its outer edges is likely to limit the
potential of the organization the board is bound to support. The outcomes for Responding and
for The Tangled Web are summarized in Table 4.13 and include failing; muddling; and thriving.
Table 4.13
The Tangled Web and Responding Outcomes
The Tangled Web and Responding Outcomes
Failing organization
Muddling organization
Thriving organization
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Failing. If the board cannot step out of the Tangled Web long enough to come to
agreement on a course of action the organization is likely to fail. Failures were painful for those
who participated.
They weren’t pleased and they somehow, they got rid of the CEO….Three [board
members] took over and they were the people in charge….They wanted new board
members, and so they got rid of all of us, too. And so those guys got the new board
members in…and I think that lasted three months and then it really went downhill. Those
board members, the new board members, started to scatter, and then it was just all over
shortly after that. (I-8)
Another interviewee who was part of an organization that ultimately failed talked about why the
organization was not able to recover.
And we just kept watching, they used decline, decline, decline, decline decline, and we
knew we were going to close our doors. I mean that was it. There was nothing, nobody
was passionate. Come back to that passion. Nobody was passionate for the institution
and no one really cared. (I-14)
On the other hand it was possible for a board to Recognize that the time had passed for an
organization, Step Up and out of the Tangled Web and agree that the time had come to fold.
That did not mean that it was easy for the board or its chair. An interviewee explained “I was
actually driving the ship when it ran aground….I went oh man, why did it have to happen on my
watch” (I-4)? While he laughed about it he did elaborate on how it happened and why he was in
charge.
The whole board saw it coming….And the chairmanship and the board officers were due
to change in June…but we talked about it and nobody wanted to do it. And I didn’t
blame anybody….I wouldn’t want to do it either but since I’m here I’ll just keep doing it.
I mean my signatures on the bottom line somewhere. (I-4)
The organization did wind down in a systematic fashion with no outstanding liabilities. That
would not have been possible had the board not Recognized and Responded appropriately to
changes in the environment.
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Muddling. One of the challenges for nonprofit board members is evaluating whether an
organization is doing the best it can with the resources available. Absent the profit motive,
having enough revenue to cover expenses was often seen by the board as adequate for success.
As a result many organizations just kept muddling through, never reaching full potential but
managing to exist while the board seemed to stand by and watch.
At the end of the day what started to happen was again this is the point about this CEO
being in office too long….He has other talents, there are other things he could do, he just
never was a good fit. But he outlasted all. I’m off that board and he’s still there. She’s
still the chair of the board….The balloon is losing air. They are out of money (I-1)
Somehow the organization has managed to just get by for a number of years and continues to
teeter on the brink of failure. Other stories were similar. It seemed that some nonprofit
organizations are always in some state of crisis, usually financial. The fundamental issues did
not change but somehow organizations and their boards reengaged in crisis mode and found a
way to eke out enough to stay in existence.
Thriving. Those boards that saw the systemic change necessary were often able to Step
Up and out of the web and make the right decisions to get the organization on a different path. It
might have involved a new CEO, new strategic direction, an updated business model, or even a
partnership or merger with a similar organization. “It’s grown from barely making budget, I
mean literally thinking about maybe this wasn’t a good idea until 11 years ago to where we’re
now we have probably a one and a half million dollar reserve” (I-11).
Making the changes in how the board did business contributed to the success. One
interviewee addressed the changes. “This new board is running the organization. Before we
were just there to rubberstamp—that’s my opinion. We rubberstamped what the former director
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did because she had done, she had been in that position for almost 30 years” (I-18). Another had
a similar stories talking about reinventing the board.
And that took a lot of years to do—at least three or four years to begin to turn the whole
ship to where we had a functioning board of directors and functioning agency. So the
administrative part of the agency…was able to be much more assertive instead of
reactive. (I-19)
Success could make a board chair downright giddy and forget the hours of board time put
in to turning the organization around if the result was a thriving organization that delivered for
the community. An interviewee who participated on the executive committee as vice chair
through the crisis and took over as chair to lead the revitalization efforts described the lows in
detail but then followed up with what is currently happening:
The excitement, the vision our new CEO has, the commitment on the part of our boardwe had to ante up, our board alone has already given $6 million to this project.…And it’s
a great story….Now we’re recruiting board members who want to be on our board and
people are actually enthusiastic….It doesn’t mean that life is easy…but I got to tell you,
it is so exciting. (I-14)
Participating on a board that led an organization out of a crisis and successfully turned it around
took considerable effort, but the effort was deemed worthwhile by many of those who got
through it.
A fascinating aspect shared by many participants was how much they learned from
serving on the board of an organization that made it through a crisis. A retired CEO who
actively turned three major nonprofit boards around explained why despite all the work and the
stress so many talented individuals do get involved.
It's like continuing education for all of us old folks….I think I get exactly the same
benefit as someone who is retired and now takes courses in continuing education because
they just have an interest in keeping busy and interested in things that are going on….It
adds to your breadth of knowledge and becomes valuable I think for a lot of other things
you do. (I-5)
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Another participant had some different insights about the painful and yet challenging experience
of leading a board through a crisis and on to considerable success.
I learned that the board has to be on the same page as the paid leader but that doesn’t
mean being a yes man, it just means that he needs to have the same vision. It takes a lot
of time and communication. What did I learn? I learned hard things are worth doing. (I15)
Summary of the Dimensions
The analysis of interviews identified the core dimension, the Tangled Web, summarized
in Table 4.1, and three primary dimensions, Recognizing (Table 4.7); Responding (Table 4.9);
and Stepping Up (Table 4.11). Each has been defined in terms of context, conditions, processes,
and outcomes. These dimensions provided the framework for taking the analysis of data to a
theoretical level.
Beginning with a discussion of the core dimension of the Tangled Web, the intricacies
defined by individuals who served as board members during a time of organizational crisis
provided context. The skills, abilities, experiences and expectations of individual board
members; how those individuals functioned as a group; and how they understood of their role
and responsibilities were constrained by limited time and information. Within this context,
boards had to deal with financial, CEO, strategic, and environmental issues that had potential to
create crisis situations for the organization. The primary dimensions of Recognizing,
Responding, and Stepping Up were the processes of the core dimension, the Tangled Web.
Rather than a linear progression that followed a rational decision-making process, boards
often had difficulty Recognizing and Responding to signs of trouble in the organization. The
Tangled Web provided context and conditions for these primary dimensions. The processes of
asking questions; hiding behind the curtain; and acknowledging signals characterized the
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Recognizing dimension. But Recognizing a problem did not ensure that the board would
Respond appropriately or even Respond at all. Failing to respond to a crisis was likely to result
in the demise of the organization. The organization was sometime able to muddle through for a
while, but ultimately failed.
The Responding dimension processes include Stepping Up; meeting immediate needs;
and changing finances, CEO, or strategic direction. Of these processes, Stepping Up was so
critical to the ultimate ability of the organization to recover from the crisis that it was elevated to
the level of a primary dimension. Responding did not guarantee success but organizations that
managed some response were able to at least muddle through for extended periods of time.
To move out of the Tangled Web and become a thriving organization required that some
individual or group of board members Step Up. Stepping Up did not ensure a thriving
organization since there were occasions where short term solutions solved immediate problems
and the crisis was followed by some level of success, at least for time. In the next chapter these
dimensions are combined into a theoretical model of what happens when a board of directors in a
nonprofit organization faces a crisis.
Concluding Comments
There is a strong possibility that the Tangled Web is the natural form for nonprofit
governance. Sustaining change for a few years was possible but the board members who led the
organization out of a crisis eventually moved on. Second thoughts were natural following a
difficult situation and it was not unusual for board members to have a few caveats.
Somebody else has to do some of the work. And I don’t want it to sound like I do all the
work. But I get myself in these positions where I get frustrated when I don’t see anybody
doing anything, and I start to do it myself and then six months later I look around and
say, “You know, I’m doing it. Why isn’t anybody else doing it?” (I-17)
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Another consideration expressed by multiple interviewees was to undertake due diligence before
accepting a board appointment, particularly if the organization had recently experienced
problems. An interviewee, who had agreed to serve a failing organization with the hope of
saving it for the community, was blunt.
I would never go….a board that was teetering on collapse, I’d probably think twice. I
didn’t think twice on this because I thought I’m going to rush in there and hopefully this
thing will work….I would…think with my head and not with my heart the next time.
(I-8)
Another warned “if an organization is troubled and you purposely choose to go on the board,
you're deluding yourself if you don't say to yourself I'm going to go and see if I can't help this
problem” (I-5).
Staying outside the Tangled Web requires a different way to do governance. Everything,
from the selection of prospective board members to assimilating them into a working group and
insuring that the entire board and executive staff understand the roles and responsibilities
involved for all must be done more effectively than it is at present. It is more likely that with
time and an extended period of success the board will eventually create a new Tangled Web.
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Chapter V: Model and Discussion
The fundamental research question guiding this study was what is a board member’s
experience during times of organization crisis? The goal was to uncover the basic social
processes that emerged as board members Recognized and Responded to perceived threats to the
organization. The analysis provided a broader context from which to interpret multiple
participant and organization perspectives and disciplines. Facets of crisis Recognition and
Response uncovered in the data collection process were consistent with what is known about
organization crises and about boards. Many aspects of the stories were similar, providing
additional insight into the complexities of a board environment that may not be particularly
conducive to or designed for governance.
The ability of a board to recognize and respond to a crisis takes place within a complex
Tangled Web of individual and group perceptions as well as formal and informal policies,
procedures and processes. Within this Tangled Web perceptions and actions were both
influenced and constrained by limited and/or not easily understood financial information, relative
power and dependence issues with the CEO, and internal and environmental issues as a basis for
setting strategic direction. To suggest that a board of accomplished individuals is incapable of
recognizing signs of crisis is a simplistic and convenient conclusion. Yet signals of trouble were
often missed, dismissed, or even effectively hidden from the board by individual members. It
was not easy for a group of volunteer board members to govern when the organization faced a
crisis and much of the problem was the rather Tangled Web of implicit understandings and group
processes.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the theoretical model of how a board of directors
deals with an organizational crisis. A composite story has been created to describe the model in
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a more narrative fashion. The illustrative narrative was constructed from the stories told by the
participants of this study. Following the discussion of the model are theoretical propositions that
emerged from the grounded theory method and a return to the literature. Interpreting findings
through the literature in complexity theory and complex adaptive systems, governance, crisis and
turnaround, and group process provide additional support for the model. The chapter ends with
the limitations of the study, implications for leadership and change, recommendations for future
research and some final reflections on the findings.
Visualizing the Tangled Web
The goal of a dimensional analysis is to build a model that helps explain how the primary
dimensions interact and relate conceptually to one another and the core dimension (Schatzman,
1991). The model is visually presented to depict the dynamic nature of the basic social processes
that describe and explain the phenomenon of interest to this study. Figure 1 illustrates an artist’s
rendition of the core dimension, the Tangled Web, the relation of the primary dimensions of
Recognizing, Responding, and Stepping Up, and the consequences these dimensional processes
have on the resolution of the organization’s crisis.
The model illustrates that there was not always a clear path that allowed a board to move
from the Recognizing a crisis to Responding in a way that effectively resolved the situation.
Stories related by participants identified an extensive array of ways that boards managed to avoid
dealing with the issues that led to the crisis. The lack of linearity evident in Figure 1 combined
with a tendency to avoid suggested the concept of a board as its own complex adaptive system
separate from that of the organization. This perspective of a complex system allowed for a
model that included nonlinear and dynamic relationships between dimensions (Begun, 1994).
Complexity theory also accepts paradox as a necessary consequence (Dalmau & Tideman, 2011;
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Houchin & MacLean, 2005; A. C. T. Smith & Graetz, 2006) of a reality that cycles between
chaos and order (Tsekeris, 2010). Through the lens of complexity the Tangled Web emerged as
the core dimension, the context and condition for the other primary dimensions.
Figure 5.1
Tangled Web Visualization

The large web provides a useful visual representation of an operating board. As long as
there are no real problems the board is primarily ceremonial. The Tangled Web of intricate
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relationships and ceremonial board processes makes signals of a potential crisis difficult to
detect. Primary dimensions Recognizing, Responding, and Stepping Up take place in the
convoluted and compartmentalized spaces of the Tangled Web. Individual perceptions and
skills, the ability of the board to function as a group, and the limited time and information
available all impact how the board reacts to the crisis. A hypothetical composite scenario based
on a composite of the stories related in the interviews follows as a means to demonstrate the
model.
The Story of a Crisis
This is the story of the Community Health and Education Institute (CHEI), a
comprehensive facility in a midsize Midwestern city. The institute is the dominant service
provider in the community and is well respected not just locally but at the state and regional
levels as well. The CEO and most of the management team have been in place for 10 years, and
during that period the organization experienced significant growth. CHEI is governed by a 20
member board. It is a prestigious board. Many of the members are connected through
professional and personal relationships, but in recent years there has been pressure to diversify.
At present there are three women on the board, one of color as well as one man of color. The
full board meets quarterly but all members serve on one or more committees, some of which
meet monthly while others meet every other month. The executive committee meets with the
CEO at least once a month, and phone calls are frequent with a core group of board members.
Pre-crisis. In the period prior to the crisis, the board is relatively unengaged. CHEI has a
history of success. The CHEI board trusts the CEO and management to run the organization, and
in reality the CEO runs the board. The CEO sets the board’s agenda, determines what
information will be provided to the board, and recommends decisions to the board with an
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expectation that the decisions will be affirmed. Board members are satisfied. Meetings are
relatively short and congenial. Questions about issues are brushed off as insignificant or
answered superficially and board members accept the response even when they have doubts
because they know that the CEO is in charge and understand that the board should not interfere
in operations. The policy governance model espoused by many boards states that the board must
speak with a single voice. While that stipulation is supposed to apply post decision making,
many of CHEI’s board members are under the assumption that means all votes should be
unanimous. An individual board member should not make waves.
Serving on a major nonprofit board like the CHEI’s board is an honor. It is prestigious
and not necessarily difficult or time consuming other than when actively engaged in a fund
raising effort. All board members are expected to participate in the annual fundraising gala
though only a few actually work with the staff to do the planning, solicitation, and operational
aspects of the event. There is little orientation for new board members—maybe an information
packet about CHEI and lunch with the CEO and/or a board member or two. Ongoing
development for all board members is optional, though the institute does have an annual
weekend board retreat at a golf resort in the region. Most individuals go onto a nonprofit board
with some tacit knowledge of governance and the role of a board member. CHEI’s board is no
exception but that knowledge varies considerably. The only aspect of the role of a board
member that is certain and consistent among all CHEI board members is that the board is not to
interfere in operations.
CHEI board members are there for a variety of reasons. They are appointed for their
expertise, commitment to the cause of the organization, business relationships with CHEI, and
personal relationships with the CEO or other board members. Current or retired CEOs and other
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executives with impressive titles, successful fund raisers with influential contacts and a little
diversity in terms of gender and race also enter in to board selection at CHEI. All these
individuals bring different perspectives to their role and responsibilities. There are bylaws and
board processes detailed but most members are not well-versed in what they require, and even if
they are many would agree that they are not always followed consistently. Board members are
volunteers so their time is limited. Meeting time is limited. Members are usually at the mercy of
the CEO and his/her designees for the information required when making board decisions.
Because of the history of success and confidence in the CEO and management team, CHEI board
members assume they have all the relevant information available.
The discussion and actual decision making does not necessarily go on in the full board
meeting but rather behind the scenes or in committee meetings. The CEO alone, or sometimes
with the board chair or a small group like the executive committee, make the decisions and
decide what if any information the full CHEI board needs. The full board is asked to affirm what
often has already been decided and may even have already been put in practice by the time the
board actually votes to approve. Monitoring is constrained by limited access to any information
that might conflict with the information provided to support the recommendations.
Signs of crisis. Recognizing a potential crisis on the horizon is difficult with the primary
processes identified in the Recognizing dimension. Little meaningful discussion goes on at
CHEI board meetings. Asking questions is a major point of contention. It is often frowned upon
because it makes the meeting drag on too long. As a result board members often vote without
knowing what is hiding behind the curtain. Talk of backroom deals and conflict of interest
surface on occasion with some CHEI board members but are dismissed as ridiculous just as
questions about the recommended actions are. It is easier to discount rather than acknowledge
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signals of trouble. CEOs and their boards prefer happy and supportive to doom and gloom and
go to great lengths to maintain that status. This is the backbone of the Tangled Web as visualized
in a slightly different way in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2
Full Model of the Tangled Web
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It is within this environment of the Tangled Web that issues with the organization are
presented or in some other way come to the attention of the board. Financial issues are constant
in nonprofits. While CHEI has experienced periods of financial uncertainty in the past, things
have always worked out. A history of always being able to pull through financially sensitizes
board members to the constant concern even in situations where the business model is clearly not
sustainable. Funding agencies contribute to the financial insecurity by threatening to cut funding
but in the end the money has always come through with little accountability required. When the
financial crisis hit foundation portfolios the threats became reality and the grant money actually
did disappear.
Board members appointed by the CEO, particularly a long term CEO as in CHEI, feel a
sense of loyalty to and dependence on that individual. Signs of problems are concealed and
board members who are friends of the CEO are likely to look away even when the issues become
obvious. Rather than make a change, board members tend to allow that CEO to save face and
that prolongs problems for an even longer time while the organization continues to struggle.
Recognizing signs of trouble in CHEI’s evolving external environment is challenging, but
even when there is recognition deciding on a response is difficult when constrained by the
Tangled Web of skills, relationships, and processes. If Recognizing takes too long the
organization could fail. Recognizing and Responding from inside the Tangled Web means a
quick fix to meet immediate needs and maintain the status quo. The board of CHEI would not
entertain a discussion of replacing the CEO even though there was evidence that he was
responsible for the crisis. Instead the board finds money, the board chair works with the CEO,
and strategy is adjusted enough to get over the hump. But even with all of these remedies the
board and the organization will just muddle through, doing enough to get by but encapsulating
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the CHEI board in a Tangled Web in a way that does not permit the structural substantive
changes necessary for the organization.
A board can go on indefinitely functioning within a Tangled Web. Not all crises are
overwhelming and in most cases the board will continue functioning safely encapsulated but just
on the edge of chaos. For CHEI and its board to emerge stronger and more successful something
more has to happen. A tipping point of some sort pushes an individual or small group of board
members to recognize that the situation is untenable and Step Up, taking charge of CHEI. That
process of Stepping Up, of climbing out of the web and taking charge, can engage the board and
pull it out of the web. Outside the web CHEI’s status becomes clearer. The issues become more
apparent to the board. The changes necessary for an effective response become clearer. The
CEO operates the organization but now as an employee who reports to and is accountable to the
board.
The required changes can involve changing the business model, realigning funding
options, replacing the CEO, or making a substantive change in the strategic direction, all
changes that take time and a huge commitment on the part of the board to see the changes
through to resolution. Board members often become actively involved in operations. Even if the
decision is that the organization is no longer necessary, an engaged board making decisions
outside of the web can make the difference between an orderly transfer of assets and systematic
folding of the organization as opposed to an ugly and damaging situation.
Post crisis. If changes are not fully implemented—the group loses interest or backs off
before the new model is firmly accepted and reinforced—the board slides back into the web.
CHEI got through the crisis and maintained some momentum for awhile. Unfortunately most
current CHEI board members could not continue to invest the same amount of time now as they
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had through the crisis. The CHEI board disengaged and reverted back to the Tangled Web,
settling for an existence of muddling. It is critical for those who step up to see the change
through, but it only happens rarely. Necessary changes include new board processes and
changed relationships with the CEO and management to ensure accountability and a thriving
organization. It requires a board to stay engaged, determine what to monitor, and how to make
sure that the organization continues to thrive. When the organization is thriving, the CHEI board
will be able to focus on setting a direction to ensure future success.
When things are good serving on a board is a positive experience, and the board is
willing and eager to just do the minimum and smile. Too much comfort encourages the board to
slide back to old ways, deferring to the CEO. It eventually will mean less board engagement and
the potential to create a new Tangled Web and again become vulnerable to missing the signs of
crisis. Even those boards that successfully see the change through are likely to self-organize into
a new Tangled Web. The Tangled Web seems to be the natural state for a nonprofit board of
directors, crisis or not. It is where boards most comfortably exist.
Theoretical Propositions
The model described suggests three theoretical propositions. These propositions are
detailed and then followed by a discussion of the relevant theory and research in the literature.
Nonprofit board as a complex adaptive system. A board of directors is its own
complex adaptive system interacting with and adding to the complexity of an organization trying
to deal with the complexity of the environment. A board is tasked with critical decisions for
which individual board members often have limited understanding and background. As a result
they often rely on the CEO to help them make meaning and tell them what to do. The board as a
group generally agrees but sometimes individual board members see the situation and meaning
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in a different way. Now the complex organization and environment are the background for
complex interactions within the board itself. Recognizing signs of crisis are difficult in a
complex world. Recognizing does not ensure a timely or appropriate response. These processes
intertwine and constantly evolve in a way that is not necessarily linear.
Nonprofit boards are not designed to recognize signs of crisis. Recognizing the
nuances and early warning signals is better served by questions and divergent thinking. Board
processes are designed to foster order and convergent thinking. Nonprofit boards are largely
ceremonial in terms of the operation of a large organization. They are cheerleaders and
fundraisers but do not have adequate time or information to provide guidance and oversight. As
a result nonprofit boards tend to rely on the CEO to guide their actions.
Stewardship theory in normal times; agency theory in crisis. In terms of existing
governance theory, stewardship theory best explains the board and organization in a normal
environment. Management is hired and assumed to be most committed to the success of the
organization. The CEO is given the freedom to run the organization without interference from
the board into operations. It is in time of crisis that a board’s awareness of its fiduciary duty
increases and agency theory dominates the board’s action. Board’s become more engaged in
monitoring and that can create issues with a CEO who sees questions as interfering in operations.
Grounding Emergent Theory with Supporting Literature
As is typical with grounded theory methodology where the data drives the process, it was
necessary to seek literature beyond that provided in Chapter II to provide theoretical grounding
for the emerging model. The review first positions the results in terms of complexity and then
discusses governance theories, crisis and turnaround and the social psychological aspect of group
norms with governance, crisis, turnaround and social psychology aspects following.
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Complexity theory and complex adaptive systems. The question of how board
members experience an organizational crisis provided a broad series of stories about specific
crises in specific organizations. Deconstructing those stories through line by line coding was a
relatively easy task, but putting them back together into some relevant pattern of dimensions was
not. The process of rebuilding the details into new dimensions provided insight into just how
complex the whole idea of Recognizing and Responding to crisis is for individuals who sit on a
board of directors. There were patterns for the individual dimensions but no real sequence for
the way the stories unfolded. Consistent with the findings in Mourdant and Cornforth’s (2004)
case studies of four UK nonprofits there was not necessarily a linear progression for the way a
board recognizes and responds to a crisis.
Not only were signs of linearity lacking but there was also considerable paradox—
“cognitively or socially constructed polarities that mask the simultaneity of conflicting truths”
(M. W. Lewis, 2000, p. 761). The governance literature refers to the theoretical paradox (M. W.
Lewis, 2000; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) of agency and stewardship theories as
diametrically opposed. Interviewees recognized the board role of monitor, but most were not
clear on exactly how close that monitoring should be. These nonprofit organizations were
clearly big businesses. There was no doubt in the minds of interviewees that the CEO and
executive staff should be more knowledgeable about the organization and its business than they
as board members were. Participants consistently talked about how the board should not
interfere in operations or micromanage. Yet those organizations that recovered from crisis and
went on to become thriving organizations were characterized by a board that took charge of
operations. In some cases it was a single individual and in others a small group of board
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members, but in all the board interfered in operations at least long enough to get through the
crisis and implement the necessary changes.
There was also paradox in how board members seemed to view their competence as
board members. Many complained about the lack of orientation and training, and yet all knew
that the board should not interfere in operations. When asked what interfering in operations
involved, no one could really explain but a few gave examples. One individual said that calling
vice presidents with questions rather than asking the CEO was interfering. Another said it was
talking or listening to employees. A third said telling the CEO from whom or where to purchase
goods or services under discussion was an example of interfering. The others could not come up
with anything specific, just that they should not do it. Two of the interviewees attributed this
specifically to Policy Governance (Carver, 1997) with one who had a positive impression of that
model and the other stating quite emphatically that he had no use for it.
Another example of the conflicting realities characteristic of complex systems involved
participants’ understanding of the board as a single corporate body. Most were clear that the
board only speaks as one and that individual members do not speak for the board. Some also
indicated that they had voted on issues they did not understand because speaking as one meant
that votes should be unanimous. In many cases only select board members had access to all of
the information or fully participated in decision-making but the full board was expected to affirm
by voting as directed.
Complexity theory allows for nonlinear and dynamic rather than stable relationships
(Begun, 1994). The lack of linearity, the paradoxical nature of many aspects of governance, plus
the variety and extensive array of ways that boards managed to avoid the obvious in the stories
related lead to the conclusion that a board of directors is its own complex adaptive system
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separate from that of the organization. Using complexity theory as metaphor provided the
opportunity to gain insights beyond the typical result of current research on boards in
organization crisis situations that just identifies factors (Morgan, 1997; Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001).
Viewing the dimensions through the lens of complexity allowed for a model that moved
“between order and disorder, between pure determinism and pure chaos, between simplicity and
randomness” (Tsekeris, 2010, p. 256).
Complexity allowed the identified dimensions to be considered not only from the series
of codes but also from the actual context of the interviewee’s narratives increasing the level of
credibility of the analysis and ultimately of the model (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001). There were
both formal and informal processes that seemed to be somewhat consistent from group to group
with a caveat from some that it does not always work out the way it is portrayed on paper. The
nature of the usual board responsibilities paradox, confusion, and all contribute to the
complexity. These responsibilities are carried out in relatively brief encounters at timed intervals
with limited amounts of information available.
First order complexity assumes an objective world. Second order complexity explores
thought processes about that world. This interpretive approach allows for the social construction
of first order objectivity through the narratives of study participants (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001).
The reflexive stories, as related by interviewees, provided a view of the second-order complexity
of the system.
Interviews were far more than just an individual relating a series of events. The stories
included lush descriptions that were full of interpretation. They described in detail not only of
what happened but why they believed it did. As each interview progressed the story shifted to
the participants’ views of their own role in the sequence of events. Some were the stars of the
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story while others became quite reflective wondering why they had or had not seen signs of a
developing problem or acted in a more characteristic way. There were stories of intrigue, of
backroom deals and the unequal distribution of information. There were individuals or groups
who protected the CEO long after it had become clear that the CEO was responsible for the
crisis. And there were board members eliminated because they asked too many questions. There
were also stories of incredible commitment with “workhorses” that quit or took leaves from their
own jobs to try to clean up the crisis. Another story involved a board chair who agreed to “take
the arrows” for an unpopular decision that had to be made understanding that in the end he
would have to resign. There was no doubt that each of the participants had long since made
meaning of the experience and no question that the boards of directors as described were
interacting and autonomous individuals, complex in and of themselves (Wheelan, 1996).
Through the lens of complexity, missed signals and the failure of boards to recognize
signs of an impending crisis were no longer difficult to comprehend. Even recognition was not
enough to ensure that the board would respond at all let alone respond effectively. Sarma (1994)
identified a number of factors that make decision making in complex systems difficult including
“interconnected systems, multiple objectives and constraints, dynamics…imprecise goals and
constraints, uncertainties in the environment, the counterintuitive nature of solutions, multiple
decision makers, and incomplete sharing of information” (p. 403). The rational decision-making
model traditional in business is not well suited for the ambiguous nature of complex systems (A.
C. T. Smith & Graetz, 2006).
In a crisis there was often pressure for getting the problem corrected as quickly as
possible but that created issues with
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a tension between the drive to solve problems at the altar of the “quick fix” on the one
hand and the realization that the problem is far more complicated than first thought.
Indeed there are often cohorts with varying interests around the problem, quite different
interpretations as to its nature and a growing awareness that there is no easy way of
resolving these tensions. (Dalmau & Tideman, 2011)
Crisis situations in a complex environment require a shift to adaptive learning and leadership
(Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009; Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007).
A complexity frame allowed for some glimpses of clarity about what happened in the
situations discussed and suggested that a Tangled Web is in fact that natural state for a board of
directors. Periods of instability in some cases led to changes that reshaped not only the way the
board functioned but the way the organization learned to deal with issues. Complexity suggests
that shifting between stability and instability leads to a new order (King Keenan, 2011), but that
new order is temporary as well. Governance as currently defined is from another era and not
designed to deal with a complex environment constantly on the edge chaos. Imposing technical
solutions is not an effective way to deal with adaptive challenges. It is truly time for nonprofit
boards and executives to recognize and learn to adapt to this new reality and respond with new
ways to think about leadership and organizations (Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009; Uhl-Bien
& Marion, 2009; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).
Outcomes that have not been studied in leadership previously: emergence and
adaptability. Leadership research has primarily emerged out of psychology and social
psychology, and therefore has focused heavily on individual traits and personality and
small group contexts. In so doing, we have missed out on understanding how groups of
interactive, interdependent agents can generate adaptive changes that appear as if
spontaneously generated. (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009, p. 647)
Complexity provides a different way to frame the study of governance. The adaptive
challenges inherent in a complex adaptive system require a different kind of leadership. The
impact of adaptive learning and leadership is included later in Implications for Practice.
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Governance theory. Numerous theoretical bases for governance have been espoused
over the years, but no one theory has been able to adequately address all that is expected of a
board of directors. While agency theory is the most often cited (W. A. Brown & Guo, 2010; Du
Bois et al., 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; J. L. Miller, 2003; Olsen, 2000) the results from this
study suggest that most of the time stewardship theory provides a better explanation of nonprofit
governance.
Boards that trust and rely on the CEO and management to tell the board what is best for
the organization consistent with stewardship theory are more typical at least in a pre crisis
environment (Davis et al., 1997; J. L. Miller, 2002). The study provided examples of how
boards could be desensitized to signals that things were amiss when a successful and respected
CEO provided plausible explanations (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Stewardship prevailed in
pre-crisis environments, but once a crisis was acknowledged boards were more likely to switch
to an agency perspective and become more involved in monitoring the CEO and results of
operation.
There was some evidence of resource dependency theory with board members who
provide access to resources the organization needed (J. L. Miller, 2003). Some of the boards
discussed were involved with fundraising but others were not. Where fundraising was relevant,
boards often granted special accommodation on policies and board appointments for major
donors. Several participants indicated that their board appointments were a result of significant
donations, and others because of leading successful fund raising activities. There were also cases
where the individual was invited to the board because there were signs of trouble and the
interviewees had a track record of significant boundary spanning activities with other struggling
organizations.
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Governance and the role of boards in the evolution of a crisis are complex and
convoluted. Study results support aspects of stewardship, agency, and resource dependency
theories. None applied consistently or completely explained the role of the board of directors in
governing a nonprofit organization. Other governance theories mentioned in Chapter II—
institutional and democratic—did not demonstrate any explanatory value to the model detailed
here.
Crisis and turnaround. The crises discussed in interviews certainly reflected aspects of
many of the models and stages proposed in the case study literature (Mellahi, 2005; Mordaunt &
Cornforth, 2004; Roux-Dufort, 2009; Sheppard & Chowdhury, 2005; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).
The two that specifically described board involvement were most relevant (Mellahi, 2005;
Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004).
Some of the stories described by interviewees demonstrated aspects of Mellahi’s (2005)
study of HIH. There were boards that did not really understand organization strategies. There
were CEOs and management that withheld or sanitized the information provided to the board.
Unlike the HIH situation, the concept of groupthink was not identified as relevant in any of the
situations described in this study. There were a few interviewees who had experienced or
observed marginalization of those who questioned or expressed dissent, similar to the HIH case.
There were stories of boards in this study that seemed powerless, almost paralyzed, and like the
HIH board unable to act. The HIH case resulted in the collapse and failure of the organization
while few of those in this study experienced the same fate.
Mordaunt and Cornforth’s (2004) multiple case study of four nonprofit boards was more
relevant. The authors clearly addressed the socially constructed nature of crises, and that was
confirmed in this study. Interviewees related many stories that described situations that most
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anyone would identify as a crisis. On the other hand, some of the stories were of organizations
not on the brink of disaster or collapse but rather facing uncomfortable situations that were
creating anxiety. There were stories of interviewees who had questions but acknowledged that
they felt pressure to not ask (Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). Asking the right questions and
knowing how to assess the answers provided by management are critical board skills in a
turbulent environment (Lorsch, 2009). An interesting factor identified by Mordaunt and
Cornforth (2004) that also emerged in this study was that sometimes a reluctance to ask
questions was more about board members not wanting to appear impolite. There was also a fear
in a couple situations that raising a question or identifying a problem would create more work
and require more time from the board consistent with the study (Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004).
The difficulty associated with getting the CEO and entire board to deal with the issues
was also a recurrent theme for participants in this study (Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). When
the management was implicated, directors often had to take a “hands on” approach and
temporarily get involved in the management of the organization (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989;
Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004) . The Stepping Up dimension was consistent with those themes.
Most significant in the Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) study was a mention that the
stages identified—recognition and denial, mobilization, action, and transition—were not always
linear. That was clearly confirmed in this study and in fact turned out to be the rule rather than
the exception. The final similarity from that multiple case study was that once the immediate
problem was solved, issues still remained. All too often results were temporary and superficial.
The organization slid back into business as usual mode. Change agents moved on before
changes were fully implemented. Despite the best of intentions the organization continued on a
path of just getting by until the next crisis surfaced (Fullan, 2006). The need for time to adjust
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emotionally to changes and the stress and time commitment necessary for complete resolution
(Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004) was consistent with the experience of participants in this study
and in terms of the model critical to returning to a thriving organization.
While turnaround research tends to focus on retrenchment, reposition, and reorganization
(Boyne, 2006; Boyne & Meier, 2009) those options did not prove relevant in this study. Having
adequate resources to stay in existence has historically been sufficient in the nonprofit world
(Walshe et al., 2004), but participants in this study, particularly those who have served on forprofit boards, suggested that is no longer the case. Experienced for-profit board members found
the lack of readily understandable measures of success made it difficult to assess whether the
nonprofit organization were effective.
The economic and political environment is clearly having an impact on major nonprofit
organizations. Several interviewees specifically stated that financial crisis is the norm for
nonprofits, but financial instability was identified as more acute now than any time this group of
experienced board members had ever seen. Many of the organizations in this study, particularly
those in health care and education, have heavily relied on some level of government support.
Government grants and reimbursements have contracted to a level that is forcing these
organizations to make painful cuts in services. Most of the organizations discussed were
recipients of private grants, and foundations have been forced to decrease funds awarded. As a
result governments and foundations are now demanding more accountability than this group of
nonprofits have ever experienced.
Much of the responsibility to adapt falls on management, but boards have recently come
under pressure because of the increasing number of organization failures. While the ethical and
moral responsibilities have always been a factor in the nonprofit world many of the interviewees
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mentioned their legal responsibilities and concern about the adequacy of directors and officers
liability insurance (D & O), probably a result of the failures. Fundraising responsibilities for
board members are increasing with a large number of organizations in pursuit of the same
shrinking pool of available resources.
The one turnaround factor that did emerge in this study was pressure to merge or partner
with other organizations and that proved to be a painful decision for those involved. There were
included organizations in the process of merging with varying levels of success. In two cases the
merger or partnership was a success for the organizations but with painful results for board
members. In two other situations the unwillingness of the board to consider merger resulted in
the ultimate demise of the organizations. The board specifically decided to fold rather than
merge in one of those cases. In the other where the board could not come to agreement, the
organization’s failure was even more painful. The tried and true solutions of retrenchment,
repositioning, and reorganizing identified as critical may no longer be adequate. Mergers and
acquisitions have become a painful reality for those who serve as directors or trustees on
nonprofit boards.
The available crisis and turnaround research where boards were involved offers examples
of how specific organizations responded to an organizational crisis with varying levels of
success. Understanding how other boards recognized and dealt with a crisis situation can
provide a useful frame of reference for boards and those who work with them to evaluate
difficult and often confusing circumstances.
Group process. Throughout the data collection process, it was evident that each
individual board member reacted in his/her own way in response to a unique interpretation of
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role, responsibility, and situation. As Blumer (1969) suggested, it is the social processes going
on within the web that creates the rules rather than the rules dictating the processes:
A network or institution doesn't function automatically because of some inner dynamics
or system requirements; it functions because people at different points do something, and
what they do is a result of how they define the situation-this point tends to be grossly
ignored. (p. 19)
These processes enmesh a board deep in the web and the deeper in the more difficult it becomes
for the board to recognize signs of crisis. Group norms whether intentional or implied, did enter
into the discussions with interviewees.
Group norms. Norms are guidelines or expectations about acceptable and unacceptable
behavior for members of a group (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Gold & Douvan, 1997; Levine &
Moreland, 1990). These rules are a product of the social processes that go on within a group like
a board of directors (Blumer, 1969; Stryker & Vryan, 2003). Assuming that a board of directors
is a group with some level of prestige there is an expectation that members will conform to the
norms. Punishment for failing to conform comes from the social network that established the
rule (Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004). A number of the stories related by interviewees identified
ways the norms were enforced. Sanctions were not necessarily overt or obvious to other board
members. Participants spoke of phone calls and emails criticizing unacceptable topics or
questions the individual had raised in a meeting. There were also stories of exclusion from
“secret” meetings that seemed to be a method for enforcing norms.
Each board member brings his or her own subjective mental model of how a board of
directors should operate to the boardroom based on his or her own experiences. As such they
are not necessarily consistent within the same board (Hinsz, 1995). Participants in this study had
all served on multiple boards and had expectations of what board service entailed. While
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research confirms that groups will sanction those who fail to comply (Wahrman, 2010) many of
the participants refused to change their behaviors. One interviewee explained how as a new
board member the board chair made clear that board members were not to raise questions or seek
input from others, inconsistent with the individual’s experience on other boards. Warnings
seemed to intensify when participants voiced concerns about potential issues. A few of the
interviewees admitted they paid a price for refusing to conform and detailed how difficult it was
to get the rest of the board to recognize troubling issues.
High status did not seem to affect these individuals. There were stories of individuals
who rebuffed board chair or CEO attempts to sanction the board member. Some were neither
intimidated nor willing to succumb to the group when they disagreed with the rules. Interviewees
who failed to demonstrate compliant behavior were denied reappointment to a second term
despite expressed interest in continuing. Social control of board members particularly at the
time of a crisis may contribute to the failure of a board to recognize signs of a potential crisis.
Conflict. Conflict is a factor in small groups (Levine & Moreland, 1990) but in the
stories related in the interviews conflict avoidance was more typical and possibly more
destructive (Clark, 1988). It is unfortunate that conflict has such a negative connotation since
there is considerable evidence that some conflict is productive (Clark, 1988; Kerwin, Doherty, &
Harman, 2011). Only two interviewees reported that open disagreement and vigorous debate
occurred in board deliberations, but both were quick to point out that the discussions were civil.
One of the more interesting situations arose when a board member who disagreed with a decision
opted to publish confidential board discussions about the decision through social media rather
than openly express disagreement with fellow board members.
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Others expressed concern about their own unwillingness to challenge issues or
information reported in meetings. The statement “I knew better” came up in multiple interviews
suggesting that there was almost a de-skilling in otherwise competent professionals when serving
on a board. In looking back these individuals expressed confusion, and wondered why they did
not speak up. None could recall feeling pressured to go along. From the discussion it was more
of a self-imposed censoring. There seemed to be some tacit knowledge among board members
that speaking up was not acceptable behavior. In a complex environment board members must
feel comfortable expressing concerns and asking for additional information when necessary if
boards are to recognize and effectively respond to potential crises.
Power. Power in a group, specifically in a board of directors, determines who has the
ability to influence and control the group (Levine & Moreland, 1990). Most nonprofit boards
depend on the CEO to guide the board and provide members with the information necessary for
the board to function. CEO dominated boards were present in most of the pre-crisis situations
discussed in this study. Even when the board had doubts about the CEO’s competence, the
boards discussed lacked the will to remove that CEO. Personal relationships that develop
between CEO and board members seemed to make taking action too painful to face.
There is a logical reason for this dominance of CEOs over their nonprofit boards. The
CEO generally sets the board agenda and controls what information is shared and what is hidden.
In many of the interviews board meetings involved more reports and good news than strategic
discussions and monitoring activities. In crisis situations, however, this changed (Lorsch &
MacIver, 1989; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). The dimension of Stepping Up in the model
usually meant that a formerly complacent board exhibited more interest in monitoring activities
and operational control. Boards must take an active role in setting the agenda and specifying
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expectations for the information necessary. Board chairs must not only work closely with the
CEO but also develop the skills necessary to keep fellow directors engaged in the work of the
board.
This study provided a different look at how nonprofit board members experience board
service during a period of crisis in the organization. The combination of dimensional analysis to
structure the analysis and use of rich descriptions provided in the interviews provided a unique
view of the complexity of an operating board and frustrations individuals take away from the
experience. The complexity of the environment for many of these organizations and of the
organizations themselves suggests that many of the issues boards must deal with are unique and
traditional board actions and approvals are no longer adequate. While there have been some
recent attempts to apply complexity theory to governance (Goergen, 2010) the results suggest
that further research and consideration of this topic is warranted.
Case studies presented in previous literature have sequenced the stages of crisis in
organizations and the role of the board of directors in that process. This study suggests there is
some consistency of perceptions of board members that experience the phenomena despite the
wide variety of circumstances.
Limitations of the Study
The primary limitations of the study are the small sample size, the retrospective nature
and biased perceptions of the interviews. The twenty interviewees came as recommendations
from colleagues, friends, family members and interviewees. Care was taken to seek
recommendations from geographically dispersed contacts from a variety of social and
professional circles. As a result there is some diversity in terms of location, institution type,
gender and ethnicity. Interviewees were prescreened as to the kind and size of the organization
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and the nature of the crisis situation to ensure that they met the study criteria. Beyond the basic
requirement of at least $1,000,000 in annual revenues, no additional information about the
organizations was solicited. Most of the organizations were much larger than the specified size.
Some had hundreds of millions in annual revenue. The scope of the crises varied as well with
some resulting in the complete failure of the organization while others were much less
threatening. All met the study’s definition of crisis.
The other major limitation is that the stories are retrospective and from the perspective of
a sole individual or member of the board. The goal of the study was to learn how board
members experienced an organization crisis during the time they served as a director. These
individuals had obviously given a lot of thought to and made meaning of the situation and the
way that they and the board responded. There is no assumption that their views are
representative of the entire board.
Implications for Leadership and Change
Applying complexity theory to the governance of nonprofit organizations suggests
different research approaches to the study of crisis on boards. “The limitation with complexity
theory, however, is that its explanatory value is more apparent than its prescriptive
implementation; a by-product of its very nature, that of non-linear systemic interaction.
Ostensibly, the acceptance of complexity requires the acceptance of ambiguity” (A. C. T. Smith
& Graetz, 2006, p. 852).
Volunteer board members have limited time available for training and for performing
expected duties. Compensation for nonprofit board members is controversial though some
organizations do provide modest stipends for those who serve. Consultants abound but most
focus on board and group process rather than on the business aspects associated with the
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organization. An alternative approach is to use independent facilitators knowledgeable about the
business and the organization to assist a board in determining critical metrics and interpreting
results.
Despite all the theoretical underpinnings, nonprofit governance through a board of
directors as currently practiced is not designed to ensure effective monitoring of the status of the
organization or it’s CEO. As a result the perception that boards are ceremonial is true much of
the time. Even in those organizations where the board’s primary focus is fundraising enforcing
the give, get, or get off is difficult for many boards. The implication is that there is an
overwhelming need to rethink the whole concept of governance as currently practiced. The
movement to apply design theory to this complex situation could offer some promise of a
potential way to accomplish its goals in a way that allows for divergent thinking (T. Brown &
Kātz, 2009; Verganti, 2009).
Stepping Up is not easy and can actually be a painful process. Those who practice
adaptive leadership often pay a price for doing so (Heifetz, 1994; Heifetz et al., 2009). The most
compelling story of stepping up from the study involved the board chair who recognized that
despite a firestorm of fury that escalated to overwhelming levels of negative publicity a strategic
change of direction was critical. He also knew in doing so that he would ultimately have to
resign his position but agreed to be the face of the controversy, “taking the arrows” so that the
CEO and other board members could move forward and make the changes necessary. He
acknowledged that it was a painful experience, far more painful than he expected. Despite that
he was secure in the fact that it was the right thing and as a result of that change the organization
is thriving but he paid a huge price personally for driving the process that led to success. That is
leadership but that kind of adaptive leadership usually comes at a price. Those who practice
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leadership need to be realistic about the potential consequences and find ways to remain
optimistic through challenging experiences (Heifetz et al., 2009).
Recommendations for Future Research
The question about how boards of directors make decisions in times of crisis will
continue to be a question of interest given what is at stake. Board involvement in recent crises at
Pennsylvania State University and the Susan G. Komen Foundation serve as reminders of the far
reaching implications of boards failing to recognize the signals. Those cases, just as one in the
study, also highlight how far and wide social media can spread a negative message. Boards
clearly need to be cognizant of the implications and potential impact of media attention.
While gender as a factor was not a total surprise the degree of difference in perceptions
between men and women was more pronounced than expected. The question of diversity was
not central in any of the interviews, but the term good old boy network came up more often than
expected. Two of the participants were African American—one man, one woman. Neither felt
that race was a particular issue for them but their gendered perceptions were consistent with
other male and female interviewees. Research that focuses on the gendered perception of
governance and of crisis could contribute to effective governance. While several female
participants referred to “good old boy” behavior, women seem to have slightly more opportunity
on nonprofit boards than on for-profit boards.
If I were a nonprofit CEO I would want my board heavily populated with other nonprofit
CEOs. Even in a major crisis, nonprofit CEOs interviewed in this study were very sympathetic
toward the CEO involved, even when that individual appeared to be the root of the problem.
They espoused giving the CEO more time to solve the problem and then when it became
apparent that it was not working finding a way for that CEO to save face. Whether because of
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understanding the difficulties associated with running a large nonprofit or professional courtesy,
the experienced nonprofit CEO on the board can be counted on to protect the CEO. For-profit
CEOs who participated in this study were not quite as sympathetic. Research that explores the
differences between CEO and non-CEO board members as well as nonprofit CEO and for-profit
CEO could provide insight on effectiveness of individual board members. Additional research
focusing on the complexity of the relationship between CEO and board could also provide
insight in how to assist the organization in times of crisis.
Reflections on the Findings
In my role as a faculty member as well as in the role of facilitator in a consulting
engagement, my favorite question to ask the group at the end of a session is what did you learn
that surprised you? As I complete this work I asked myself that question.
I expected to have trouble finding participants and was amazed at the willingness of so
many individuals to share difficult stories in such detail. The really ugly stories were always
prefaced by the “now no one will see this but you” but then included an amazing level of detail.
Even when they referred me to considerable press in the region where the organization was
located, several would follow up with an explanation of how the situation was much worse than
what was reported and reinforce why I could not even indicate the specific kind of organization
or the part of the country where the organization was located.
Some told of personal relationships between the players that created issues for the board.
Many of the stories involved behind the scenes activities and deals. There were stories of secret
meetings, board members going public with confidential information, political maneuvers, and
hurt feelings. Despite the dignity that I always thought applied to boards of directors, I take

140

away the understanding that there will be drama on boards just as with any other group of people
facing complex situations.
There were interesting observations from those with for-profit CEO experience. They
clearly recognized how difficult a job it is to run a nonprofit but were troubled by the lack of
speed in anything nonprofit. As one interviewee who had experienced a crisis of his own as a
CEO said, time is not your friend in a crisis. Another expressed frustration at the time it took for
a board that agreed that the CEO had to go, to actually take the vote to terminate while the
organization was teetering on the brink of collapse. Another surprise was how reflective forprofit CEOs were about the situations they described. All were quick to relate stories about their
own mistakes and what they had learned from making them and how they tried to apply that to
the nonprofit organization. One of the interviewees provided good perspective:
For-profits and you’re in the business to make money and everybody’s got to be going in
the same direction…. If you’re not cutting it or not getting the job done, then the chances
are you’re not going to be on the team, you’re going to be gone. Whereas in nonprofits… once you’re on the team, you’re on the team whether you’re pulling your
weight or not…. People’s strengths and weaknesses show up more glaringly… in the
profit world. So, non-profits, they’re nicer in general.
It seemed that for-profit CEOs were used to being under fire about results and recognize the need
to do something about it as quickly as possible. They seemed to have learned more from
mistakes or were at least more willing to share them than the nonprofit CEOs.
The overall message I take away from the stories and the analysis is that the line between
monitoring and interfering for a board is thin and not necessarily straight. The best way a board
can deal with that line is to learn as much as possible about the business of the organization. The
board should set the parameters or metrics for monitoring rather than rely on the CEO to provide
only that information he/she wants to share. And board members must insist on adequate
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information before participating in a vote, particularly when the action poses some risk for the
organization.
I cannot say enough about the dedication of the individuals who shared their board stories
as part of this study. All shared intricate details about their experience. All seemed passionate
about the organizations and about board service despite the challenges involved in working
through the issues. For most it was clearly a rewarding even though sometimes painful
experience. A board member who had experienced a major crisis on another board and
currently serving on the board of a several hundred million dollar organization summed up what
it takes:
I pray every time I go into a board meeting that God gives me wisdom, special wisdom
that day, to get the right decision, taking your fiduciary obligation seriously whether they
do or not, and whether the board does or not. I have said things sometimes that were very
painful for me to say, but I felt that if I did not say them, that I wouldn’t have been doing
the best and the highest job I could do. (I-13)
The dedication of the many board members who do “the best and highest job” possible is critical
for organizations to successfully come through a crisis.
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Appendix A - Questionnaire for Prospective Participants
Research Study about Nonprofit Boards
My name is Beth Valicenti, and I am a doctoral candidate in the Leadership and Organizational
Change program at Antioch University, Yellow Springs, Ohio. I am looking for individuals who
have served on the board of directors/trustees for an organization that faced a “crisis”.
For the purpose of this study, a crisis is defined as a major incident or series of incidents that
had the potential to harm the well being of organizational stakeholders and threatened the
legitimacy of the institution.
The kinds of organizations to be included in the study:


Hospitals and other health care organizations



Colleges, universities, or other private educational organization



IRS 501(c)(3) organizations with annual revenue of at least $1,000,000

If you feel that you can contribute to this research and are willing to participate in an interview of
approximately one hour, please provide the information below. Be advised that this information
and the information collected through interviews is confidential and neither your name nor the
name of the institution will be identified in the report.
Name:

__________________________________________________

Address:

__________________________________________________

City, State, Zip __________________________________________________
Phone:

__________________________________________________

Email:

__________________________________________________

Please feel free to contact me if you have questions
Beth Valicenti
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Appendix B - Informed Consent
Participant Consent to a Study about Nonprofit Boards
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by, Beth Valicenti, a doctoral
candidate in the Leadership and Organizational Change program at Antioch University, Yellow
Springs, Ohio.
This research involves the study of experiences and perceptions of individuals who served as
directors or trustees for nonprofit organizations that experienced a major incident or series of
incidents that had the potential to harm the well being of organizational stakeholders and
threatened the legitimacy of the organization (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 128) during their board
service.
The study involves, at a minimum, one interview about how you as a member of the board
recognized that there was a crisis and then how the board responded. The interview will be
arranged at your convenience and is expected to last about 1 hour. The interview will be taped.
Once the interview has been transcribed, I will share a copy of the transcription with you for
your review.
As the study progresses additional questions could arise. Only if there is a need and you approve
would a follow-up interview be scheduled. In that case the total time involved for the original
and follow-up interviews should be no more than 2 hours
Your name and the name of the organization will be kept confidential and will not be used in my
report. You will also have the opportunity to remove any quotations from the transcribed
interview. The results from these interviews will be incorporated into my doctoral dissertation. I
reserve the right to retain all data for potential future scholarly publications. The interview tapes
and all related research materials including signed Informed Consent Forms will be kept in a
secure file cabinet and destroyed after the completion of the relevant studies.
I hope that through this interview you may develop a greater personal awareness of your own
experience as a result of your participation in this research. The risks to you are considered
minimal. You may withdraw from this study at any time.
Should you withdraw after the interview, your data will be eliminated from the study.
There is no financial remuneration for participating in this study.

If you have any questions about any aspect of this study or your involvement, please contact Dr.
Lisa Kreeger, Chair, Institutional Review Board
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Two copies of this informed consent form have been provided. Please sign both, indicating that
you have read, understood and agreed to participate in this research. Return one to me and keep
the other for yourself.

Name of researcher (please print)

Signature of researcher

Date

Name of participant (please print)

Signature of participant

Date
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Appendix C - Application for Ethics Review
Antioch University
PhD in Leadership & Change
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Application for Ethics Review

IRB Chair comments:
Instructions


All research (by faculty and/or students) involving human participants must be reviewed
and approved prior to initiating the project.



This version of the form is intended for you to complete in Antioch Online. Once it is
completed, including the attachment of any necessary documents, please press the Submit
button. Submissions will 1) send you an email copy of the application for your own
records, 2) email the application to the Chair of the Institutional Review Board, E-mail:

NOTE: IRB Approval for projects is valid for one year only. Investigators must request a
continuation if the activity lasts for more than one year. IF APPROVAL FOR THE
PROJECT LAPSES, CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH IS A VIOLATION OF
UNIVERSITY POLICY AS WELL AS FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
1. Name and mailing address of Principal Investigator(s):
Elizabeth Valicenti

For Faculty - Other Principal Investigator:
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2. Departmental Status: Student
3. Phone Number: (a) Work (b) Home
4. Name of Core Faculty Advisor: Elizabeth Holloway
5. Name & Contact Information of other Program Faculty Involved in this Project:
a. Antioch Faculty and/or Primary Evaluator for Learning Achievement or Research
Project:
If PhD Core Faculty, please select from drop down
list.

Elizabeth Hollow ay

Otherwise type name here:

E-mail address of non-PhD faculty person:
Note to students: Please have your primary evaluator send an email to indicating his/her approval
of your research proposal.
b. If this ethics application is for your dissertation, the name of your Dissertation Chair
Dissertation

appears below.
Elizabeth Holloway

6. Learning Achievement
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Title of Project:

What Really Goes

7. Source of Funding for the project (if applicable):

*8. Expected starting date for project

N/A

06/01/2011

*9. Anticipated completion date for data collection

05/31/2010

10. Describe the proposed participants- age, number, sex, race, or other special
characteristics. (Up to 250
For my grounded theory study I will be interviewing individuals who served as directors/trustees
about their perceptions of what went on with the board during a period of organizational crisis.
Interviewees are expected to be accomplished adults experienced in expressing their positions
and opinions consistent with their board appointments. There are no set criteria for age, gender,
race, or other characteristics, just that they have served on the board of a hospital or other health
care agency, educational institution, or IRS 501(c)(3) organization with minimum annual
revenue of $1,000,000.
Interviewing will continue to saturation, with an estimate of 15-23 or more interviews required.
11. Describe how the participants are to be selected and recruited. (Up to 400 words)
NOTE: If the participants are to be drawn from an institution or organization (e.g.,
hospital, social service agency, school, etc.) which has the responsibility for the
participants, then documentation of permission from that institution must be submitted to
the Board before final approval of the project. This document should be emailed or faxed
to . Fax () -. Email
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I have collected a list of 15 individuals from a number of different organizations throughout the
U.S. who have been recommended by personal contacts, but I will not know how many of them
will qualify or be able and willing to participate until I approach them with questionnaire and
study description. I will rely on snowballing to identify additional participants and possibly for
theoretical sampling if there is a need.
12. Describe the proposed procedures, e.g., interviewing survey questionnaires,
experiments, etc. in the project. Any proposed experimental activities that are included in
evaluation, research, development, demonstration, instruction, study, treatments,
debriefing, questionnaires, and similar projects must be described. Continue your
description on following page if necessary. USE SIMPLE LANGUAGE AND AVOID
JARGON. Please do not insert a copy of your methodology section from your proposal.
State briefly and concisely the procedures for the project. (500 words)
Where possible, interviews will be conducted in person. When that is not possible or the
interviewee is more than 50 miles away, interviews will be completed by phone.
Interviews will be unstructured with four initial open end questions (attached).
Because I am using a grounded theory methodology, interviews will be transcribed, coded, and
analyzed as I move through the interviews.
As a result the questions may be adjusted and could ultimately be tailored to meet a need for
theoretical saturation if that is what the data suggests.
13. Project Purpose(s) and Benefits: (400 words)
The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of what actually goes on in the
boardroom in a time of organizational crisis from the perspective of individual directors/trustees.
The study will explore how board members identify and make meaning of difficult situations or
events and how they determine the response or actions that best serve the organization. I want to
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help individual directors/trustees uncover their perception of the board processes that went on as
the crisis became apparent and progressed.
Because the board is the ultimate authority of the organization, it has the last best chance to
minimize harm and prevent failure. By exploring board processes from the perspectives of
board members who experienced an organizational crisis this study has the potential to provide
insights and suggest ways to assist board members in minimizing risks to the organization.
14. If participants in this proposed research may thereby be exposed to an elevated
possibility of harmï¿½physiological, psychological, or socialï¿½please provide the following
information: (UP to 500 words)
N/A
15. Explain how participantsï¿½ privacy is addressed by your proposed research. Specify
any steps taken to guard the anonymity of participants and/or confidentiality of their
responses. Indicate what personal identifying information will be kept, and procedures for
storage and ultimate disposal of personal information. (400 words)
All interview information will be handled confidentially. Participants will not be identified by
name but rather assigned a number for identification on transcripts. Organizations will only be
identified by broad types (i.e., hospital, health care system, other health care organization, higher
education institution, 501 (c)(3) organization, etc.).
Interviewees will be advised in the informed consent form that all of their information will
remain confidential but that I reserve the right to retain all data for potential future scholarly
publications.
All interview tapes and other research materials will be stored in a secure file.
16. Informed consent statements, if one is used, are to be included with this application. If
information other than that provided on the informed consent form is provided (e.g. a
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